they had such a strong impact on the Southern and new member states, which had no chance to influence the process of European decision-making in the first place. Furthermore, this circular perspective also allows taking into account the feed-back effects of these processes on the European level, and the pressure for a strengthening of the normative basis of asylum law in the Charter and Constitution resulting from the “securitization” dynamics of transgovernmental cooperation.

To conclude, it could be argued that we need to look at Europeanization as a problem which we want to understand, rather than a “solution” or an explanation to the phenomenon (Radaelli 2004: 4). In this light, the different approaches addressed in this chapter would not be a sign of scholarly confusion, but rather a series of “new insights, original explanations, and interesting questions”, (ibid.: 2) contributing to our understanding of the changing face of asylum policy under the influence of European integration. Yet, at the end, if Europeanization is not an “explanation” in the sense of a set of independent variables explaining an outcome, then we may well ask whether it deserves to be treated as an analytical approach at all – and how it is related to perhaps more “conventional” notions such as the constructivist and institutionalist approaches addressed in this chapter.

Key readings


24
Foreign Policy
Reuben Wong

24.1 Introduction

The concept of “Europeanization” is of very recent vintage in the study of the domestic impact of European regional integration, in particular the impact of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), on national foreign policies. Other concepts that have been applied to the study of national foreign policies within the context of Europe – such as “Brusselsization” and “Europeification” (Allen 1998; Mueller-Brandeck-Bocquet 2002; Andersen and Elsasen 1995) describe and study the top-down impact of the EU/CFSP as a strictly Pillar II (i.e. intergovernmental) phenomenon in national foreign policy making. They focus on CFSP decisions as compromises between national foreign policies of member states rather than binding decisions from a supranational authority. They are less concerned with the interactive, bottom-up phenomenon of national inputs in CFSP; and the informal socialization of norms – both core research questions in foreign policy Europeanization.

The novelty of “Europeanization” in foreign policy studies is a function of the debate on the existence of a common European foreign policy. Although the international system is populated by important non-state actors, the dominant paradigm in international relations still conceives of foreign policy as essentially the domaine réservé of sovereign governments and therefore exclusive to states. Foreign policy can be defined as “ideas or actions designed by policy makers to solve a problem or promote some change in the policies, attitudes, or actions of another state or states, in non-state actors, in the international economy, or in the physical environment of the world” (Holsti 1992: 82). Or as “an attempt to design, manage and control the external activities of a state so as to protect and advance agreed and reconciled objectives” (Allen 1998: 43–4). The problem with the EU of course, is that it is not a unified state actor, nor does it have clear and consistent external objectives.
Instead of a coherent and authoritative decision-making center, we observe persistent national foreign policies that operate under or alongside—and sometimes at variance with—"EU" foreign policies defined by the Commission, the European Parliament and/or the Council. As the EU is not a single unified actor, "EU foreign policy" (EFP) is usually understood and analyzed as the sum and interaction of the "three strands" of Europe's "external relations system", comprising: (a) the national foreign policies of the member states; (b) EC external trade relations and development policy; and (c) the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU (Hill 1993; Ginsberg 1999; Zielonka 1998b; White 2001; H. Smith 2001; Tonra and Christiansen 2004).

The explicit application of "Europeanization" to foreign policy studies really took off with Ben Tonra's seminal study of the foreign policies of the Netherlands, Denmark and Ireland (Tonra 2000, 2001; Vaquer i Fanés 2001). Other works have looked at Greece, Spain, Germany, Britain, Austria, France, and even new and aspiring member states such as Poland and Turkey (Stravrides et al. 1999; Torreblanca 2001; Miskimmon and Paterson 2003; White 2001; Alecu de Fier 2005; Wong 2006; Terzi 2005). Tonra (2000: 229) defines Europeanization in foreign policy as "a transformation in the way in which national foreign policies are constructed, in the ways in which professional roles are defined and pursued and in the consequent internalisation of norms and expectations arising from a complex system of collective European policy making". Manners and Whitman's (2000: 245) volume on EU member states' foreign policies uses the term "Europeanization" to focus on the limits on member states' pursuit of independent national foreign policies arising from EU/CFSP membership, and concludes that "Member States conduct all but the most limited foreign policy objectives inside an EU context".

Under the CFSP, "Europeanization" can be understood as a process of foreign policy convergence. It is a dependent variable contingent on the ideas and directives emanating from actors (such as EU institutions and statesmen) in Brussels, as well as policy ideas and actions from member state capitals (national statesmen). Europeanization is thus identifiable as a process of change manifested as policy convergence (both top-down and sideways) as well as national policies amplified as EU policy (bottom-up projection).

24.2 Core research questions

Within EFP studies, one school sees member states as the principal actors while another emphasizes the role of supranational institutions (especially the Commission) and the emergence of a pan-European identity and "national interest". Neither school developed good theories of EU foreign policy because they tended to be highly normative and to advocate positions on what the EU should be rather than what the EU is actually doing in world politics.

The Europeanization approach attempts to strike a middle path: it accepts that member states adapt to CFSP decision-making structures and norms, while at the same time recognizing that these same member states are themselves actively involved in creating these structures and norms.

The debates about the Europeanization of foreign policies have focused on the following five questions: how can the process be conceptualized (e.g. is it specific to EU member states?); what is changing and what are the mechanisms and direction of change (top-down from the EU to the member states, bottom-up, or socialization?); what are the scope of its effects?; is it producing convergence or harmonization?; and what is the significance of informal socialization as a vector of change?

First, conceptualizing foreign policy Europeanization. This goes back to the wider debate between the paradigmatic European integration theories - intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism. Is foreign policy immune to Europeanization (if we understand the process as "policy convergence")? Intergovernmentalists privilege the role of national governments in defining their national interests independently of the EU, and then bringing these interests to the table for negotiation. Hoffmann (1966, 2000), observing the reassertion of nationalist sentiment in the EC/EU by France under Presidents Charles de Gaulle (in the 1960s) and Jacques Chirac (from 1995), claimed that states remained the basic units in world politics and that France today remains fiercely jealous and protective of its foreign policy independence. Moravcsik (1991: 75), the chief scholar arguing for liberal intergovernmentalists, argues that the "primary source of (European) integration lies in the interests of the states themselves and the relative power each brings to Brussels". The key actors are governmental elites and the motivation for integration is the preservation of executive capacity at the national level, not its erosion (Moravcsik 1993: 515).

Neofunctional expectations of convergence have been given a new lease of life in the study of European foreign policy by social constructivist accounts of the interaction of foreign policy elites under the regimes of EPC (1970), CFSP (1991) and ESDP in the 2000s. Enmeshed in such a context of policy making where national elites interact with Commission, Council and other EU member states' national diplomacies, a reflexive communautaire becomes the norm rather than the exception (O'Hear 1997; M.E. Smith 2000; Tonra 2001; Carlsnaes and White 2004).

The Europeanization approach attempts to bridge two rival approaches to the study of EU member states' foreign policies. In the traditional approach, the focus is on the foreign policy of individual member states as utility-maximizing, selfish and purposive actors - let us call this the "state-centric" school. The "hard" position in this tradition claims that states are the only essential and salient actors, and that EFP decisions are lowest-common denominator
products of intergovernmental bargaining. Any study of EU foreign policy is thus unproductive as the “real” Europe is the one of state governments. “Europe” is not an actor in international affairs, and does not seem likely to become one” (Bull 1983). Of course, Bull’s assessment was colored by the escalating Cold War tensions of the 1980s between the USSR and Reagan’s USA, but his prognosis for a European military capability independent of the USA/NATO finds renewed favor today in the aftermath of Bosnia, Kosovo and Iraq (Gordon 1997; Howorth 2005).

In the other camp—which I will call “European-idealist”—is the perspective which treats European Foreign Policy as a given, i.e. as a foreign policy that already exists, has a consistent personality that makes an impact on world politics, and is taken seriously by other actors (H. Smith 2002; White 2001; Nuttall 2000; Zielonka 1998b; Carlsnaes and Smith 1994). This approach often presumes that EFP’s scope will expand eventually to subsume national policies in almost all other functional areas (M.E. Smith 2000). The European-idealist perspective privileges the role of supranational European institutions in building a common “European” identity, and a distinctive moral presence in world politics. Duchêne (1973), the first major spokesman in this school, envisaged the EU as a “civilian power”, a kind of “soft power” which wields civilian instruments on behalf of a community which has renounced the use of force among its members and encourages others to do likewise. Taking as their starting point Duchêne’s premise that the EU should and can become a “civilian power” and a model of reconciliation and peace for other regions in the world, European-idealists posit that EU foreign policy should focus on the promotion of democracy, human rights, and security cooperation (K. Smith 1998; Zielonka 1998a).

A second debate revolves around what is changing and in which direction. Questions relating to the domestic impact of the CFSP/ESDP have focused mainly on the “socialization” effect arising from increasingly close links between the foreign ministries of the EU member states (Hocking and Spence 2002). Whilst the CFSP assumes the continued existence of national foreign policies, the fundamental research question revolves around the extent to which the CFSP socialization process has led to change in either the procedures or the actual substance of national foreign policies. The recent enlargement provides an opportunity to examine the Europeanization effect on new members with radically different national foreign policy traditions.

On the mechanisms and scope of foreign policy Europeanization, some scholars have found that foreign policy convergence is to be expected over the long term (Wong 2006, looking at France). Others have argued that only the most superficial convergence—usually in procedure rather than substance—is taking place, and that national foreign policies remain decidedly national (Tsaroulis and Stratoulis 2005, looking at Greece). There is general agreement, however, that three distinct dimensions of the Europeanization process are evident in the relationship between a member state’s foreign policy and the EU (Tsaroulis and Stratoulis 2005; Wong 2005, 2006; Major and Pomorska 2005):

(i) a top-down process of national adaptation and policy convergence (downloading or “EU-ization”);
(ii) a bottom-up and sideways process involving the export of national preferences and models (uploading or “national projection”); and
(iii) the socialization of interests and identities, or “identity reconstruction” (“crossloading”).

The first dimension of Europeanization is used predominantly in the literature to explain the top-down adaptation of national structures and processes in response to the demands of the EU. This concept predicts cross-national policy convergence between EU states after a sustained period of structural and procedural adaptation. The second Europeanization dimension refers to the bottom-up projection of national ideas, preferences and models from the national to the supranational level. Third, Europeanization in its broadest sense means a process of identity and interest convergence so that “European” interests and a European identity begin to take root alongside national identities and interests, indeed to form and shape them. The three aspects of Europeanization and their expected indicators are summarized in Table 24.1.

Fourthly, a key—and probably the most contested—question for research on foreign policy Europeanization, is whether the process would lead to a real convergence of the EU member states’ foreign policy trajectories and an emergence of shared norms and notions of European interests.

Scholars who expect convergence to be the dominant tendency over the long term list geopolitical, institutional and socialization factors. They argue that European states have become relatively less powerful in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries with the rise of competing centers of power such as the United States, Japan and China. Smaller member states such as the Netherlands, Ireland, Portugal and Denmark have been forced to adapt to the changing world environment by aligning themselves with EU positions so as to amplify their voices in international trade and politics. The “post-neutral” member states Austria, Sweden, Denmark and Finland have had to redefine their defense policies in response to the CFSP in 1991 and the CSDP in 1999. This does not mean that the EU always smooths the smaller states’ foreign policies—it sometimes gives small states the necessary institutional resources to profile themselves in “new” regions, or to project their own interests as European interests. Thus Portugal found that the Mediterranean, especially North Africa, became part of its foreign policy agenda, and that it was able to draw effective attention to East Timor through the EU (Tonra 2000, 2001; Phinnemore 2000; Miles 2000; De Vasconcelas 1996).
Table 24.1 Three dimensions of foreign policy Europeanization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aspects of Europeanization</th>
<th>National foreign policy (FP) indicators</th>
</tr>
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</table>
| I  Adaptation and Policy Convergence | a) Increasing salience of European political agenda  
- Harmonization and transformation of a member state to the needs and requirements over of EU membership ("downloading")  
- National Projection | b) Adherence to common objectives  
c) Common Policy outputs taking priority national domaines réservés  
d) Internization of EU membership and its integration process ("EU-ization")  
- National foreign policy of a member state affects and contributes to the development of a common European FP ("uploading")  
- Identity reconstruction | a) State attempts to increase national influence in the world  
b) State attempts to influence foreign policies of other member states  
c) State uses the EU as a cover/umbrella  
d) Externalization of national FP positions onto the EU level  
- Result of above two dimensions. Harmonization process tending towards middle position; common EU interests are promoted ("crossloading") |
| --------------------------|----------------------------------------|


Scholars arguing for foreign policy convergence point out that the EU provides even the larger states (especially those with colonial histories), a means to re-engage in areas of former colonial influence in Africa and Asia. Britain could re-engage with its former Southeast Asian colonies through the ASEAN-EU dialogue in 1980. France was able to re-engage with all the countries in the East Asia region through the vehicle of the Asia-Europe Meeting, launched in 1996 and effectively a summit meeting of EU and East Asian leaders. The EU offers a means or cover in affording a “politics of scale” to support member states’ interests (Ginsberg 1989). By acting as an agent of European foreign policy, Britain, France, Belgium, Portugal and the Netherlands could claim more credit for their dual national/European roles in troubled areas in the African Great Lakes regions, Southeast Asia and even discussions on North Korea. Many large operations in the Balkans, Asia and Africa are not confined to CFSP but require Pillar I resources and member states’ contributions, e.g. peace-keeping forces.

In seeking to Europeanize their national approaches, these key states needed support from allies in the EU, as seen in French and German efforts to upgrade political dialogue with China and to end the arms embargo imposed since 1989, or British efforts to enlist EC help in the Falklands war in 1982. On the side of those who argue for convergence are foreign policy studies in the enlargements of 1986, 1995 and 2004, where new member states “modernized” their foreign policies upon accession by jettisoning outdated national policies to align themselves with established European norms. Thus Spain changed its position on the Western Sahara and recognized Israel, and Austria revisited its neutrality policy (Barbé 1996; Luif 1998; Grabbe 2001).

Of course, such convergence processes are not irreversible or pre-determined. Member states continue to resist being locked into a fixed path of identity and policy convergence. French and British policies are often contrasted to that of Germany, supposedly the model of a “Europeanized” state with a European identity. Yet even Germany showed a clear preference for national interest over agreed EU policy in its recognition of Slovenia and Croatia in December 1991 (Marcussen et al. 1999; Rummel 1996). National interests, as defined by incumbent national elites, still play a decisive role in national foreign policy making. But while national elites may resist the institutionalization of EU practices and a reflex of working for the collective interest, changes in the international context and venues of decision making which are increasingly oriented towards Brussels have incrementally altered even the definition of what constitutes the “European” or the “national” interest.

Commercial policy is a prime example of this shift. The Commission’s 1991 “Car deal” with Japan undertook to dismantle, over a period of ten years, quotas for Japanese car imports in the protected markets of France, Italy and Spain. Member states share the same interests of improving access to world markets and habitually entrust the Commission to take the lead in multilateral negotiations with strong economic powers such as the United States, Japan and China, especially at the WTO (Devayry 1995; M. Smith 1998b). Economic convergence is not limited to top-down processes proceeding from the Commission. The successful national policies of other member states are often copied. British and Dutch successes in attracting Japanese FDI in the 1980s, and Germany’s export success in China in the 1990s, are two examples of policies emulated by other (more protectionist) EU governments (Lehmott 1992; Nuttall 1996).

The Union’s Human Rights policy throws up an even more complex picture of convergence and divergence. The EU has suffered from conflicting interests and coordination problems between the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC), the member states, the Commission and the European Parliament (EP) on dealing with human rights situations from Chad to China. While the formal locus of effective decision making on human rights issues is the Council — empowered by the Maastricht Treaty to ensure the “unity, consistency and effectiveness of action by the Union” — deliberations on human rights action in practice impinge on other policies across the three-Pillar structure (affecting inter alia development assistance, Trade and Cooperation...
Agreements, enlargement, justice and immigration), and thus involve a multiplicity of intra-EU actors, not to mention interactions with the US, UN, Council of Europe, human rights lobbies, etc (Clapham 1999; K. Smith 2001).

A fifth debate has been over the relative importance of formal CFSP institutionalization versus informal socialization. Theories of rational-choice institutionalism admit that "institutions make a significant difference in conjunction with power realities" (Keohane and Martin 1995: 42). States may, however, withdraw from multilateral cooperation if the benefits accruing from cooperation do not compensate the costs incurred. Such a conception will lead us to think that CFSP actions have continually to contend with intergovernmental bargaining, coordination and the constant threat of collapse as the costs to each member state are variable. But the nature of even CFSP, one of the most inter-governmental of EU institutions, has over the last 30 years moved a long way from its original anti-communautaire approach towards a reflexe communautaire. It is not just another rational-choice institution, but has become a critical sociological force and venue that shapes perceptions, structures policy choices, and privileges certain courses of national and collective action while constraining others (Ohrsgaard 1997; Batora 2005).

Many scholars argue that EU foreign policy is not an independent variable, but a variable dependent on the roles played by member states themselves – especially the larger and more powerful ones, in fashioning EU structures and policies. These states, in “projecting” their national policies and policy styles onto the larger European structure, “Europeanize” their previously national priorities and strategies and create a dialectical relationship (cf. Table 24.1). By exporting their preferences and models onto EU Institutions, they in effect generalize previously national policies onto a larger European stage. This has several benefits. First, the state increases its international influence. Second, the state potentially reduces the risks and costs of pursuing a controversial or negative policy (e.g. sanctions) against an extra-European power. At any rate, a strong European presence in the world is potentially beneficial to all in increasing individual member states’ international influence. In the same vein, scholars have argued that the UK Europeanized its sanctions on Argentina during the Falklands conflict in 1982 (Regelsberger et al. 1997; White 2001). However one may conceptualize Europeanization – whether as a cause, effect or process in national foreign policies – I would argue that these examples suggest that foreign policy is not a special case immune to Europeanization pressures on member states.

Elite socialization is a phenomenon frequently associated with national officials attached to the Commission and other EU institutions in Brussels. Research undertaken in recent years by Øhrsgaard, M.E. Smith and Glarbo suggest that officials are increasingly thinking in “European” rather than “national” terms. Anthropological studies of European Commission officials suggests that these officials were exhibiting traits of cultural “hybridization” whereby their “national being” was becoming a “European being” (Harmsen and Wilson 2000: 149–50). Most scholars agree that intense and repeated contacts have socialized not only EU officials, but also national officials working in EU institutions. Even national diplomats are becoming more “European” and displaying a “coordination reflex” in foreign policy making (Ohrsgaard 1997; Glarbo 1999, 2001). Hill and Wallace point out the potential transformational effects of elite socialization within this complex network (Hill and Wallace 1996: 6):

From the perspective of a diplomat in the foreign ministry of a member state, styles of operating and communication have been transformed. The COREU telex network, EPC working groups, joint declarations, joint reporting, even the beginning of staff exchanges among foreign ministries and shared embassies: all these have moved the conduct of foreign policy away from the old nation-state sovereignty model towards a collective endeavour, a form of high-level networking with transformationalist effects and even more potential.

Whether or not national officials have indeed been “localized” or “captured” by EU interests to think “European” rather than “national”, most studies indicate that officials in Brussels work with both the national and the European interest in mind. In their study of the impact of the EU on Irish officials, Laffan and Tannam note that “public officials are no longer just agents of the Irish state; they are participants in an evolving policy which provides opportunities for political action but also imposes constraints on their freedom of action” (Laffan and Tannam 1998: 69; Tonra 2001). Research in this school suggests convergence as “prolonged participation in the CFSP feeds back into EU member states and reorients their foreign policy cultures along similar lines” (M.E. Smith 2000: 164). The main agents for convergence include elite socialization, bureaucratic reorganization, and an institutionalized “imperative of concertation” (Glarbo 1999: 650).

Control by the Council and/or the Commission represent “two cultures” competing in the European foreign policy-making process. The EPC had been devised essentially along the lines of the Gaullist Fouchet Plan, to prevent Brussels from becoming a foreign policy centre and to keep foreign policy as a national competence within the Council. Even so, the “Brusselsization” (steady enhancement of Brussels-based decision-making bodies) of foreign policy shows no sign of abating, and even member states jealous of their foreign policy sovereignty have not been immune to this process (Allen 1998; Peterson and Sjursen 1998; White 2001).
24.3 Key problems

If foreign policy Europeanization is conceptualized as a three-dimensional (top-down, bottom-up, and cross-loading) and mutually constitutive process of change linking the national and European levels (Table 24.1; Major 2005: 177), the key problems in researching this policy area relate to defining exactly what are the causes, effects and results of Europeanization: identifying and measuring the change; the (current) small number of case studies; and isolating the effect of European regional integration from other possible causes of change such as globalization.

As discussed in section 24.1 above, in European foreign policy there exists "no clear, vertical chain of command, in which EU policy descends from Brussels into the member states" (Bulmer and Radaelli 2004: 9). Yet not yet communitarized, CFSP follows an intergovernmental decision-making process. Unlike commercial, competition or monetary policy, there is no supranational entity above the national governments that can authoritatively state what CFSP should be. While the Europeanization approach was originally applied to the domestic impact of the EU on national polities, policies and politics in first pillar issues where the direction of change was primarily top-down, applying the concept to CFSP where decision making is dominated by a bottom-up process, was certain to cause confusion about actors, structures, cause and effect.

Defining Europeanization as multi-dimensional and as "a matter of reciprocity between moving features" is also epistemologically problematic as it blurs the boundaries between cause and effect, dependent and independent variables. Considering Europeanization as a process suggests that the result is a "Europeanized" foreign policy. But how can an EU foreign policy - viewed as being the cause of change at the national level - also be seen as being conceived at the national level (Bulmer and Radaelli 2004)? The notion of Europeanized lacks paradigmatic consistency. Unlike major schools of integration theory such as neo-functionalism or intergovernmentalism, Europeanization does not put forward a series of interrelated premises concerning the dynamic or the end-state of the European integration process. Europeanization is a concept which can be criticized as lacking "core tenets, common to all or most usages of the term, which might serve as the basis for constructing a common paradigmatically defined research agenda" (Harmsen and Wilson 2000; Olsen 2002, 2003).

Identifying and measuring change has proven to be a second major research problem. It is much easier to examine the impact of the CFSP on national foreign policy procedures than substance. Whilst it is possible to record significant changes in foreign policy working practices that directly relate to the CFSP/ESDF, it is much harder to relate substantive policy change to the EU as opposed to a response to globalization and other developments in the wider international system. The process of Brusselsization whereby CFSP activities are increasingly situated in Brussels rather than national capitals confounds some intergovernmental assumptions about the integrative consequences of avoiding the community method. But compared with the level of institutionalized integration in the first pillar, domestic change resulting from foreign policy Europeanization is weaker, less clearly defined and more difficult to detect (Major and Pomorska 2005: 2). Studies on foreign policy Europeanization have also tended to rely heavily on interviews with national officials and Commission in Brussels (Tsardanidis and Stravridis 2005; Tonra 2001) for evidence. But can these officials seriously be expected to tell the researcher that they do not subscribe to the ideals of a coordinated, coherent CFSP?

A related third problem is the paucity of studies applying Europeanization to national foreign policies. Few full-length studies over many years (rather than, for example, over the short duration of a member state's EU presidency) have been conducted to test the longitudinal impact of the EU on national foreign policies (Tonra 2001 and Wong 2006 are exceptions rather than the norm). This problem may, however, be in the process of being resolved as there has in recent years been an explosion of research, with many PhD theses currently being written which examine in detail the interaction between EU and national foreign policies. Research on the foreign policies of new member states offers a potentially promising control factor in measuring the impact of EU foreign policy making on non-Western European foreign policies with very different diplomatic traditions (Alecu de Fler 2005; Pomorska 2005).

Even with a larger "N" of case studies, however, the theoretical and definitional problem of what exactly "Europeanization" is in foreign policy needs to be resolved (Haverland 2005). Is it a movement towards some "ideal" European foreign policy position where member states instinctively coordinate their positions and cooperate on all foreign policy issues? If this is the yardstick, then the intra-EU disagreements over Iraq in 2003 certainly do not bode well. If however, foreign policy Europeanization is taken as a negotiated convergence between "extreme" positions within the EU involving both Community and national actors, then what some call a "pendulum" effect is observable and even measurable (Tsardanidis and Stravridis 2005).

Unlike intergovernmentalism, the Europeanization approach acknowledges the important roles played by non-state actors and Europeanized elites in formulating national foreign policy. But contrary to Haasian integration theory, Europeanization does not foresee a supranational center eclipsing the national capitals. The Europeanization process is just one - albeit a significant one - among many effects in the domestic politics, processes and foreign policies of EU member states.

This leads us to the fourth cluster of research problems - if most of the case studies are on EU member states, how do we control for other causal variables? The methodological problem here is what Peters characterizes as "a collection
of cases without variance in the dependent variable" (Peters 1998: 72). Most studies on foreign policy Europeanization assume a priori that European integration has an important effect on national foreign policies. But variables at the global, European, national and subnational levels interact in intricate ways, so that to claim pressures from European integration as the deterministic or dominant causal variable, would be overstating the case (Wong 2005: 151; see also Haverland, and Vink and Graziano in this volume).

Perhaps that has been why each study which claims that a member state’s foreign policy has been Europeanized is challenged by another which claims that the same has not. Interestingly, a lively debate has focused on a particular member state – Greece – with some studies claiming that a previously obstructionist, uncooperative national foreign policy has come to conform with EU norms (Keridis 2003; Economides 2005; Terzi 2005), and others claiming that this has only been in form but not in substance (Tsardanidis and Stavridis 2005).

There is thus a need to account more systematically for alternative explanations of foreign policy changes, rather than simply ascribing causation to the EU. The use of counterfactual analysis, in other words of consciously posing the hypothetical question “What if the EU did not exist?”, which is almost inherent in any Europeanization study, would thus also be very relevant in this policy field. Few studies in the domain of foreign policy rigorously employ this thought experiment. Counterfactuals are not substitutes for field research, but they are useful to help one arrive at more accurate conclusions after the range of real available cases has been exhausted. When even non-EU member states (notably Norway, Switzerland and Turkey) formulate foreign policies that seem to respond to Europeanization pressures (Major 2005: 178–9; Terzi 2005), researchers should be careful to control for the impact of other variables that might cause the same kinds of effects otherwise ascribed to the impact of the European Union.

24.4 Conclusion

The growing currency of Europeanization in foreign policy studies in recent years could be attributed to the concept’s utility in capturing, more accurately than the paradigmatic European integration or International Relations theories, the significant changes that are taking place at the national level, fostering at the same time convergence and diversification at various levels of European polities (Hill and Smith 2005b: 393–4).

As a top-down process, Europeanization is the process of policy convergence caused by participation over time in foreign policy making at the European level. This produces shared norms and rules that are gradually accumulated (Sjursen 2001: 199–200; Øhrhaugard 1997). As a bottom-up process, it is the projection of national preferences, ideas and policy models into Europe. Europeanization is thus a bi-directional process that leads to a negotiated convergence in terms of policy goals, preferences and even identity between the national and the supranational levels (M. E. Smith 2000; Aggestam 2004). The supranational—intergovernmental divide has narrowed considerably today as member states adjust to the increasing pressures of foreign policy Europeanization. Even Britain and France, the two member states traditionally most opposed to European supranational integration and in favor of intergovernmental decision making in the EU, show evidence of creeping towards foreign policy decision making at the European level (White 2001; Wong 2006).

Studies on foreign policy Europeanization share many overlapping assumptions about causes, effects and processes. For example, proponents of the top-down “national adaptation” dimension would accept the bottom-up claim that member states play critical roles in forging “European” policies in the first place. And the third dimension of Europeanization – that of identity and interest convergence – stops short of the neo-functionalist claim that the European would supplant the national over time. However, these studies share the common expectation that European identity shapes and is increasingly incorporated into national identities and, in turn, national foreign policies.

If Europeanization is a dependent variable or effect, what is/are the independent variable(s) driving the process? I would argue that we would have to cast the net for explanatory variables farther than the current Europeanization literature in Comparative Politics/Public Policy, and deeper into time for an answer. Europeanization is ultimately driven by European integration, which itself can be traced to the underlying political and economic imperatives for highly coordinated cooperation between member states that early integration theorists identified (Haas 1958).

The significance of Europeanization in the foreign policy arena is that foreign and security policy is one of the last remaining bastions of national sovereignty. Treaties, not legislation, govern CEP. Foreign policy Europeanization is much more a process of socialization than forced, formal adaptation. Yet socialization and learning processes have taken place and actually brought integration forward in this policy area originally designed to avoid supranational integration. Perhaps the primary contribution of the Europeanization concept to foreign policy analysis has been its utility in making sense of this unexpected socialization of foreign policy elites (Tonra 2001; Glarbo 2001; Aggestam 2004).

Key readings

Part V

Conclusion
Also by Paolo Graziano
L'EUROPEIZZAZIONE E POLITICHE PUBBLICHE ITALIANNE: Coesione e lavoro a confronto

Also by Maarten P. Vink
LIMITS OF EUROPEAN CITIZENSHIP: European Integration and Domestic Immigration Policies

Europeanization
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Contents

List of Tables and Figures vii
Acknowledgements viii
List of Contributors xi

Part I: Introduction

1 Challenges of a New Research Agenda
Maarten P. Vink and Paolo Graziano 3

Part II: Theory and Methods

2 The Three Worlds of Regional Integration Theory
James Caporaso 23

3 Conceptual Issues
Claudio M. Radicelli and Romain Pasquier 35

4 Theorizing Europeanization
Simon Buinder 46

5 Methodology
Markus Haverland 59

Part III: Politics and Polity

6 Territory
Klaus H. Goetz 73

7 Candidate Countries and Conditionality
Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier 88

8 Regulatory Governance
David Levi-Faur 102

9 State Structures
Peter Bursens 115

10 Core Executives
Brigid Laffan 128

11 Parliamentary Scrutiny
Ronald Holzhauser 141