LIMITS OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY UNDER THE REINVENTED STATE IN DEVELOPING NATIONS

M. SHAMSUL HAQUE
National University of Singapore, Singapore

ABSTRACT

In recent decades, there has emerged a worldwide movement for reinventing the state and government in favor of market forces, promarket policies and roles, and businesslike structures and standards. Under such a reinvented state, there are corresponding changes in terms of how, for what, and to whom public officials are held accountable. These new trends have some major critical implications for the realizations of public accountability. This article explores these concerns with special reference to developing nations.

INTRODUCTION

In the past, concern for public accountability received special attention from scholars and policy makers in various postcolonial developing nations pursuing a nascent mode of democratic governance. Beyond the common obstacles to the realization of public accountability--such as the expanding scope and complexity of government functions, increasing difficulty in gathering reliable information, and growing power of permanent bureaucratic experts--these newly emerging nation-states allegedly faced other unique challenges such as weak political institutions, military intervention, vulnerable civil society, gap between borrowed bureaucratic norms and indigenous social values, absence of strong political opposition, and so on (Haque, 1994; Smith, 1991). Other barriers to accountability included
various forms of bureau pathologies like centralization, lack of capacity, corruption, and rent seeking behaviour (Therkildsen, 2001). Paradoxically, in order to overcome such external and internal factors constraining public accountability, there is even more necessity to pursue all major means to reinforce accountability, especially because it is likely to promote organizational responsiveness, individual performance, and overall standards (Rosenbloom, 1989; Hayllar, 2000).

However, central to the problems of public accountability in developing nations is the nature of their state formation, indicating the composition of state power structure (comprising major branches of government), extent of bureaucratic power, pattern of state-society relations, citizens’ rights or entitlements to public sector services, and so on. It has been observed that although postcolonial societies adopted the common measures of accountability (e.g. legislative committees, ministerial supervision, administrative tribunals, judicial control, media scrutiny), due to the overdeveloped status and expansive interventionist role of bureaucracy, these mechanisms became relatively ineffective in many instances (Haque, 1998). For example, in various Asian and African countries, the overdeveloped state apparatus came to play a dominant role, exercise extensive autonomy from society, and mould major social classes and groups (Alavi, 1972; Westergaard, 1985). This trend of overwhelming state power and intervention became more systemic in some of the socialist states. Even the so-called developmental state articulated by scholars in the context of some Asian countries, was found to be based on considerable government intervention and expansive role of technocratic bureaucracy (Therkildsen, 2001). In Latin America, the bureaucratic-authoritarian state introduced various forms of repression and excluded the popular sector from state power (Haque, 1998). Under all these state
formations observed in the developing world, it was hardly possible to discern the effective realization of government’s accountability to various sections of the public.

More recently, in line with the worldwide trend to restructure or reinvent the state, many developing countries have pursued significant state reforms based on greater emphasis on market competition, non-intervention, debureaucratization, and corporatization, which has critical impacts on public accountability (Romzek, 2000). Under such a newly emerging promarket state, the nature of accountability has changed, in general, from inputs and processes to outputs and results, from vertical (superior-subordinate) to horizontal (shared or joint) structures, from citizens’ rights to customers’ demands, and so on (Haque, 2000). This article explores the basic tenets of this recently reinvented state and its critical implications for public accountability in the developing world.

TENETS OF THE “REINVENTED STATE” IN DEVELOPING NATIONS

The current worldwide initiative to reinvent the state and redesign its public sector is largely based on certain promarket theoretical underpinnings, including the so-called institutional economics that prescribes a limited role of the state and an expansive role of market forces; public choice theory that highlight government failure and the rent-seeking behavior and self-serving interests of public officials; and principal-agent theory that stresses the problems of multiple hierarchies and principals in the public sector (Therkildsen, 2001). In both developed and developing countries, the practical hallmarks of this new model of “reinvented state”—which is often interpreted as the neoliberal state, the promarket state, and the hollow state (Clarke and Newman, 1997; Haque, 1998)—can be
found in recent changes in the state’s ideology and mission, policy orientation and institution, role definition, internal management, service recipient, and so on.

It is recognized that the ideological inclinations of the reinvented state have globally shifted towards neoliberal beliefs such as individualistic rational choice and self-interest, open market competition, free trade and investment, anti-welfarism and non-intervention, and market-led service delivery (Haque, 1999). The primary mission of the state has also moved towards economic growth, competition, efficiency, and economy. In various degrees, these tendencies of the state in favor of promarket assumptions and objectives can be observed in various Asian, African, and Latin American countries (Asmerom, 1994; Haque, 2002). With regard to the policy orientation of the reinvented state, there has been a significant transition from nationalization, regulation, and protectionism to privatization, deregulation, and liberalization in most countries in the developing world, especially under the so-called stabilization and structural adjustment programs (Hildyard, 1997). These policy changes have been adopted by many Asian, African, and Latin American countries often under pressure of international agencies that imposed such market-led policies as loan conditionalities for these countries (Haque, 1996). During the 1980s and 1990s, these countries privatized a huge number of state enterprises, withdrew many regulations and structural constraints, and expanded free trade, foreign investment, and foreign ownership (World Bank, 1995; Haque, 2002).

In line with the above ideological and policy shifts, the role of the state and its public sector has changed from direct to indirect activities and from the leading to facilitating tasks related to the delivery of services. The main purpose of this role change is to “enable the private sector, local governments and communities to provide such
services . . .” (Therkildsen, 2001:11). In Asia, Africa, and Latin America, the examples of such a new market-friendly role of the state include Argentina, Chile, India, Mexico, Malaysia, Pakistan, Singapore, Thailand, Uganda, and Zimbabwe (Haque, 2002). This trend of gradually shifting the role from government to private sector is evident not only in measures like privatization and outsourcing, it can also be found in the increasing emphasis on downsizing the public sector. In one form or another, the downsizing initiatives have been introduced in countries like Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Ghana, Guatemala, India, Kenya, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, the Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Uganda (Haque, 2002). According to one study, as a percentage of total population, the number of public employees decreased between the early 1980s and 1990s from 1.8 to 1.1 percent in Africa, 2.6 to 1.1 percent in Asia, and 2.4 to 1.5 percent in Latin America (Schiavo-Campo, 1998). In order to downsize the public sector, some drastic retrenchment measures were adopted even in poor African countries suffering from unemployment, including Kenya, Malawi, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. In these countries retrenchment often met with strong union protests (Therkildsen, 2001).

In terms of internal management and organizational structure, some major principles and techniques of business management (e.g. managerial autonomy, market testing, partnership, performance targets) have been incorporated into the public sector in the process of its market-driven reforms. In advanced capitalist nations, the recent public sector reforms have witnessed the increasing separation between policy function and service delivery, adoption of autonomous agencies, use of performance-based management and budget, and practice of public-private partnership (OECD, 2005; Glynn and Murphy, 1996). Among developing countries, the use of autonomous agencies, performance-based criteria, and managerial
flexibility has emerged in various degrees in such cases as Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippine, Thailand, Nepal, Pakistan, Botswana, Ghana, South Africa, and Uganda (Haque, 2002; Therkildsen, 2001). There has also been a growing trend towards public-private partnership in countries like Argentina, Mexico, Ghana, South Africa, Uganda, Zimbabwe, India, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand (Haque, 2002).

In addition, in line with the global trend to consider citizens (based on certain rights or entitlements) as customers or clients (based on exchange relations) in delivering services, many developing countries have embraced this idea and are often using the term “customer” in their public services. Examples of such countries include cases like Ghana, Jamaica, Kenya, South Africa, Bangladesh, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico (Kaboolian, 1998; Haque, 2002). During the 1980s and 1990s, this new structure of government-people relationship based on exchange rather than entitlement, became quite evident in the declining public spending on various welfare services (especially education and health) in many Asian, African, and Latin American countries (World Bank, 2000).

The above contemporary reforms in major domains of the reinvented state are relevant to the understanding of public accountability, because such reforms have often been carried out in the name of ensuring greater accountability and transparency as a part of an overall “good governance”. As some scholars suggest, some of the main themes and objectives of recent reforms or reinventions have been performance, efficiency, quality, and accountability (Martin, 1997:1; Hayllar, 2000:60). It is, therefore, necessary to examine whether these reform initiatives have enhanced or constrained the realization of accountability, which is pursued in the next section with special reference to developing countries.
LIMITS OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY UNDER REINVENTED STATES

In general, accountability means someone’s answerability to someone else for carrying out assigned tasks or activities, and public accountability implies the answerability of public officials (both elected and appointed) to the public for accomplishing their assigned tasks or duties and for their behavior and action (Gregory, 2003; Koen, Bram, Falke, Peters, and Bouckaert, 2005). There are various types of accountability classified as binary categories, including political versus administrative accountability, hierarchical versus shared accountability, procedural versus result-based accountability, internal versus external accountability, centralized versus decentralized accountability, and so on (Thomas, 2003:552).

However, under the current reinvented state discussed above, these concepts, types, and means of public accountability have come under challenge for various reasons (Haque, 2000:600). According to Ryan and Walsh, there have emerged a new mode of accountability characterized by conceptual ambiguities, internal rather than external means, customer rather than public concern, emphasis on output and performance, multiple agencies, and so on (Ryan and Walsh, 2004:622). In this regard, the article explores the impacts of major dimensions of the reinvented state on public accountability in terms of its three major concerns: (a) accountable for what, (b) accountable but how, and (c) accountable to whom.

Accountability for “What”

Although there are differences among scholars and policy leaders with regard to the content of accountability or the criteria for which public officials are held accountable, traditionally there emerged certain
convergence in this regard. After the Second World War, the forces and processes of democratization in different parts of the world, led to the institutionalization of democratic norms, especially citizens’ rights and public interest, as the guiding principles of public accountability (Zarei, 2000; Haque, 1994). Beyond the legal concern for the rule of law and economic questions of efficiency and effectiveness, there emerged various democratic and people-centered criteria of accountability, including integrity, fairness, justice, participation, representation, equality, and welfare (Zarei, 2000:43-44). There also emerged public accountability for neutrality, responsiveness, sense of duty, loyalty, neutrality, and impartiality (Zarei, 2000:44; Haque, 2000:601). In addition to these established criteria found in advanced democracies, many newly independent postcolonial countries also introduced public officials’ accountability for nation-building, economic progress, racial harmony, and so on (Haque, 2000:601).

However, since the early 1980s, the criteria of accountability have considerably changed under the reinvented state. Although the above democratic criteria have not been totally replaced, there is now greater emphasis on performance, efficiency, value-for-money, and customer satisfaction. Performance, measured in terms of outputs or results, has become one of the central benchmarks for public accountability (Moe, 2001:293). The realization of performance targets, which indicates the extent of efficiency and effectiveness, is used for assessing individual and organizational accountability (Therkildsen, 2001:1). In most Western democracies, there has been an increasing focus on efficiency and economy rather than equity and fairness as the primary criteria of public accountability. Similarly, greater emphasis is being placed upon the principle of the so-called value-for-money and customer satisfaction rather than citizen’s entitlement and
public opinion as determining factors for accountability (Jos and Tompkins, 2004:259). In line with this overall trend, many developing countries have shifted the priority of public accountability in favor of performance, efficiency, value-for-money, and customer choice, and adopted related instruments like performance indicators and targets, performance contracts, output-based budgets, quality controls, and so on (Therkildsen, 2001:28).

There are some serious consequences of these new trends in the content or criteria of public accountability under the reinvented state. First, it is pointed out that accountability based on the criteria of performance and efficiency may marginalize government’s accountability for ensuring citizens’ rights, representation, and welfare, and thus, weaken the democratic principles of accountability (Haque, 2000:602). In fact, it is suggested that the record of measuring performance has been quite disappointing in many countries, including Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the UK (Aucoin and Jarvis, 2005:66-67). The use of such performance measures is likely to encounter much greater problems in developing countries where measurable performance criteria have hardly been a part of organizational culture in public governance.

Second, in relation to performance measurement, there is also a concern regarding the difficulty in measuring each year the government’s outcomes or results and relating them to outputs (Cameron, 2004:62). Many of the government’s final outcomes, e.g. law and order, environmental protection, and national security, are intangible and difficult to define and translate into instrumental output measures. In addition, according to Aucoin and Jarvis (2005: 66-67), there is a concern regarding the blurring boundary between outcomes (domain of ministers) and outputs (domain of public servants) as ministers tend to overlook their own
responsibilities and tell public servants to be accountable for achieving outputs. Although some developing countries are now following this framework of outcome-output relations, there are similar “uncertainties about causal links between means and ends” (Therkildsen, 2001:31).

Third, under this scheme of accountability for results or outcomes, there has emerged the tradition of self-reporting by ministries and departments regarding their achievements, which are unlikely to be considered objective and reliable by opposition leaders and interest groups (Aucoin and Jarvis, 2005:68-69). There is likely to be a tendency among government organizations to exaggerate achievements and cover up failures. In the developing world, where there is a relative lack of transparency and proper monitoring, an emphasis on result-based rather than process-based accountability may encourage public agencies to manipulate their results or outcomes (Lodhia and Burritt, 2004).

Accountability Ensured “How”

With the rise of democratic governance in different parts of the world, especially in Western countries, there emerged a serious concern for how to make government accountable, which led to the introduction of various means or mechanisms of public accountability. Some of the well established and widely known external means of accountability in democratic societies include legislative committees, parliamentary questions, financial audits, ministerial controls, judicial reviews, advisory committees, ombudsmen, anti-corruption agencies, public hearings, opinion polls, and media scrutiny (Kearns, 2003; Haque, 1994; Aucoin and Jarvis, 2005). There are also internal organizational means of accountability such as official rules, codes of conducts, administrative hierarchy, performance evaluation, organizational culture, and professional ethics. Some of these means of public
accountability are prescribed in the constitutions of various nations. Following the experiences of Western democracies, most of these means of accountability were adopted, at least officially, in developing countries.

However, under the current reinvented state, although these traditional means of public accountability have not been replaced, there has emerged a new structural pattern of how such accountability is being realized. It is observed that while the earlier means of accountability were based on a top-down hierarchical model of authority structure and tight budget control, recently there has been a shift towards a more flexible horizontal model that emphasizes shared or collaborative structure and budgetary autonomy (Ryan and Walsh, 2004:621-622). There is a growing trend towards the so-called joined-up government based on public-private partnership that requires its accountability to multiple stakeholders, including private enterprises, local government authorities, and non-profit or third-sector organizations. Such collaborative or partnership-based structure of accountability have emerged in many developing countries like Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Thailand, Philippines, South Korea, Vietnam, Ghana, Malawi, Mozambique, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (World Bank, 1996; Haque, 2000).

In addition, the means of accountability has shifted from ex ante procedural control to ex post result-based control (OECD, 2005:11). For instance, in most Western countries, with much greater autonomy given to the executive agencies or autonomous agencies in financial and managerial matters, the long-established procedural mechanisms of accountability and control (both external and internal means mentioned above) are being deemphasized, and more priority is being given to result-based means of accountability such as the monitoring and evaluation of performance targets, outputs, and outcomes (Aucoin and Jarvis, 2005: 66). In some cases like New
Zealand and the UK, in fact, there has emerged a distinction between the accountability of public servants for the provision of outputs and the accountability of ministers for the expected outcomes (Aucoin and Jarvis, 2005; Lodhia and Burritt, 2004). In the developing world, such a trend toward public accountability based on horizontal structures and result-based controls has gradually emerged in various Asian, African, and Latin American countries (see Haque, 2000).

These contemporary changes in the means of accountability have certain critical implications that need to be seriously taken into consideration. First, under the horizontal structure of governance based on collaboration and partnership, many government activities and services have been outsourced or contracted out to private firms and non-profit institutions, which may pose a serious challenge to certain traditional means of accountability. As Cameron mentions, “The involvement of private providers in service provision raises the question of to whom are outsourced contractors and their staff accountable. In practice, outsourcing tends to reduce the range of accountability mechanisms through which providers must answer” (Cameron, 2004:64). For example, the contracted service providers do not often disclose adequate information and are not directly accountable to the legislature and ministers (Martin, 1997; Cameron, 2004). In addition, in the process of maintaining dual accountability to both state agencies and business companies, private sector partners are obliged more to their respective company owners or bosses who are not subject to strict government rules, ombudsman offices, and audit procedures (Bovens, 2003; Aucoin and Jarvis, 2005; Cameron, 2004). It is stressed that “it is not always possible to monitor the mode of interaction and negotiation between government executives and business managers, and to decipher whether the joint ventures or business deals
are made in favor of private firms at the expense of public interest” (Haque, 2000:609).

In the process of partnership, there is also a potential danger of public employees compromising their accountability by disclosing and transmitting confidential government information to non-government partners or stakeholders (Cameron, 2004:66). Although there have always been allegations against such officially recognized alliance between government and business firms in Western capitalist nations, in most Asian, African, and Latin American countries, the legalized alliance between top public officials and big business is relatively new (Haque, 1998). In these developing societies, it is more likely to pose a greater challenge to various means of accountability that are already weak or ineffective.

Second, under the result-based system of accountability, the extensive financial and managerial autonomy given to public managers (who are in charge of structurally disaggregated executive agencies or autonomous agencies) is likely to pose a challenge to the effectiveness of existing means of accountability. In this regard, it is mentioned that due to greater emphasis on outcome rather than process, there could be the problem of “diminishing relevance of such means of public accountability as internal control and supervision over various inputs and processes in the public sector” (Haque, 2000:609). In addition, under new managerial autonomy for disaggregated public agencies, it is more likely that ministerial control over these agencies would diminish and the hierarchical chain of command would be broken (Mulgan, 2002; Martin, 1997). In this context of devolving authority to the managers of autonomous agencies, the political representatives, especially ministers, may find it convenient to avoid their own responsibility and accountability by blaming the public managers for any kind of wrong-doing or underperformance (Glynn and Murphy,
1996: 134). In developing countries, where there already exists the problem of bureaucratic corruption that requires greater control and monitoring, further managerial and financial autonomy may worsen the problem and make the job of anti-corruption agencies more difficult (Haque, 2000; Therkildsen, 2001).

Accountability to “Whom”

Prior to the recent shift towards the reinvented state, the traditional practice of public accountability in most democracies always emphasized the citizens or the public as the final agent to whom all public servants (both elected and appointed) were to be held accountable. As Boven mentions, at the end of the “accountability line”, it is citizens who judge government’s performance and hold it accountable (Bovens, 2003). In parliamentary democracies, while anonymous and impartial civil servants are accountable to ministers, these ministers are answerable to parliament and eventually to the public (Zarei, 2000:48). In most cases, citizens have entitlements to public sector services (e.g. health care, education, and security), and have rights to make state agencies accountable for delivering such services. In the developing world, despite various constraints to accountability, at least officially, most governments adopted various constitutional and legal measures to make public agencies accountable to citizens for delivering basic services (Haque, 2000; 603).

However, under the emerging reinvented state, the result-based accountability of public officials is more towards customers or clients, including private entrepreneurs, non-profit organizations, and ordinary customers or users of services, which some scholars call “multicentric accountability” (Barberis, 1998; Zarei, 2000). The idea of accountability to individual customers rather than collective citizens is advocated by some authors who are in favor of reinvention is governance (Osborne and
One major practical indicator of customer-oriented accountability is the adoption of user charges for various services, which has become a common practice in developed nations, and more recently in many developing countries (Therkildsen, 2001:30). In order to ensure such accountability to customers, many countries in both the developed and developing worlds have introduced the so-called clients’ charter in order to meet the demands and grievances of service users (Haque, 2000:613).

There are serious potential implications of these new trends of accountability in terms of to whom public officials are accountable. First, due to structural devolution, commercialization, autonomization, and joined-up government, there seems to be growing confusion among politicians, civil servants, non-government organizations, private entrepreneurs, and citizens regarding who is accountable to whom (Kernaghan, 2000:16). Such confusion is accentuated by “fragmented distribution networks, multiple overlapping services, political pressures, and conflicting community values” and diverse “relationships with various types of citizens (i.e. clients, customers, taxpayers, recipients, voters, or users)” (Milakovich, 2003:63). According to Koen et al., there is apparently “the perceived tension between traditional upward accountability to ministers and ministries and downward accountability to users, customers and interest groups” (Koen et al., 2005:5).

Second, with the rising frequency of less permanent, contract-based appointments of public servants, they have increasingly become responsive and answerable to ministers who determine their job contracts rather than to citizens whose opinions may not much direct impact on their careers. This trend of replacing permanent careers by fixed-term contracts can be found in most Western nations as well as many developing countries, and this erosion of tenure has led to job insecurity, politicization of public
service, and weakening of accountability (OECD, 1997; Kimber and Maddox, 2003). The situation could be more critical in developing nations where the politicization of public bureaucracy has always been a major problem of accountability.

Third, under the reinvented state, the extensive involvement of local and foreign private enterprises in service delivery also poses a challenge to government’s public accountability. It is observed, for instance, that outsourcing or contracting-out “can generate governance concerns in terms of the accountability for the services being provided by a private contractor. This is especially relevant when that service is being provided directly to citizens on behalf of the government” (OECD, 2005:136). The reason is that when services are delivered by private entrepreneurs, most citizens cannot exercise their rights to participate in decisions, raise questions, and get access to information. It becomes even more difficult to ensure accountability in poor developing countries due to the involvement of foreign investors and international agencies over which citizens in these countries have hardly any control and influence. In addition, due to the recent increase in foreign ownership of public assets in developing countries, the scope of people’s control and access has diminished (Haque, 2002). In these aid-dependent countries, there has emerged a tendency to demonstrate government’s greater accountability to external actors like the World Bank, the World Trade Organization, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in terms of complying with the pro-market reform initiatives prescribed by these organizations, although such reforms might have worked against the public interest (Haque, 1998). As observed by Therkildsen in this regard, “donors require that recipient governments are accountable to them for the use of aid funds. This further weakens already fragile institutional accountability mechanisms” (Therkildsen, 2001:8).
Fourth, as discussed earlier, there has emerged a global trend in line with the reinvented state to redefine citizens as customers, which implies that now only the users or clients have access to public services and influence over public officials. This certainly has implication for the narrowing scope of the public to whom public agencies are accountable. It is pointed out that the managerialist view on accountability presents a narrow market-led concept of the public, confuses customer satisfaction with public accountability, and fragments the united public into powerless individualistic consumers (McGarvey, 2001; Kaboolian, 1998). In practical policy terms, treating citizens as customers is reflected in the withdrawal of subsidized services and adoption of user charges, which has adversely affected low-income citizens who are being gradually excluded from public sector access and influence. The situation is much worse in poorer countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America where subsidy cuts and user fees have led to much broader exclusion of underprivileged citizens from basic health care and education (Haque, 2002). Thus, under the reinvented state, “although public governance may be readily accountable to affluent customers, it is not obliged to show accountability to underprivileged citizens who cannot afford user charges and do not qualify as customers” (Haque, 2000:604).

CONCLUSION

In this article, it has been explained that recently there has been a global movement for reinventing government in favor of competitive market forces, market-driven policies, promarket roles, and marketlike structures and standards. Under this reinvented state, there have emerged some major shifts in public accountability in terms of its criteria, means, and agents, which have critical implications for such accountability in most countries, including those in
the developing world. It implies that although there were serious obstacles to public accountability in developing nations in the past, the new frameworks and directions of accountability have not only failed to resolve existing problems in any substantive manner, they seem to have created a new set of constraints to accountability (Therkildsen, 2001:8). Like other claims made regarding the benefits of reinvention or reform, the claim of greater accountability remains quite controversial at best, which raises question as to why such reinvention was introduced.

Many critics argue that for most countries in the developing world, the recent reinvention initiatives originated from external sources, especially international agencies that imposed market-driven structural reforms as loan conditionalities on highly indebted developing countries. In this regard, the World Bank and the IMF played significant roles in prescribing such reforms and influencing various governments in Asia, Africa, and Latin America (Haque, 1999). As Therkildsen mentions, in aid-dependent countries, “multilateral and bilateral donors typically are major stakeholders in the reforms” (Therkildsen, 2001:37). Beyond such external pressure and influence, however, there are internal vested interests behind the current reinventions in government. In the developing world, these internal forces or interests include, in particular, the local business elites who made significant gains from buying privatized state assets, partnering with top government officials, and obtaining contracts for outsourced services (Haque, 1998). In most instances, there was hardly any concern or opinion poll regarding people’s attitudes and reactions to these reforms. Thus, beyond the adverse implications of government reinventions for public accountability discussed above, the very processes of initiating and adopting such reinventions have not often been based on the principles of public accountability in the developing world.
Despite these challenges to accountability posed by the processes and outcomes of reforms under the reinvented state, the fact remains that without accountability, the level of public confidence in government as an indicator of its legitimacy is going to worsen in developing countries. Thus, there is a need for serious rethinking about recent changes in the modes of accountability and their critical impacts; for adopting appropriate measures to remedy these unfavorable outcomes; and for reconsidering (if necessary, reversing) some of the reinvention initiatives (Haque, 2000:610). As Kernaghan suggests, “If citizens are to have confidence in their public service, they must be assured that democratic accountability is not being sacrificed on the altar of public-service reform” (Kernaghan, 2000:16). It should be always understood that public accountability must go beyond the criteria of efficiency and value-for-money; that the democratic means of accountability must not be sacrificed just for managerial autonomy or flexibility; and that the final judgment of public accountability should belong to the public.

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