State carnivals and the subvention of multiculturalism in Singapore

Daniel P.S. Goh

Abstract

Increasing attention is being paid to the specificities of Asian multiculturalism in relation to ethnic pluralism, citizenship and developmental state formation. This article examines these relationships by analysing three carnival events in colonial and postcolonial Singapore that were organized by the state to promote its official multiculturalism. Through its cultural logics of horizontal racial segmentation, cascading symbolic authority from the state to co-opted communal representatives and multi-modal ritual iteration, the 1937 King George VI coronation celebrations proffered an imperial multiculturalism based on mediating plural groups and procedural norms. Adopting the same cultural logics in the 1970s, the newly-independent nation-state revived and transformed Chingay, a creole Chinese religious procession, into an annual parade celebrating the nation as comprising racially plural groups bound together by the modern ethos of progress the developmental state exemplified. In the 2000s, Chingay has been turned into an international spectacle celebrating Singapore as a cosmopolitan global city of hybridizing multiculturalism. But indicative of new racial-class segmentation, the old nation-building pluralism is promoted by Racial Harmony Day carnivals held in suburban public housing neighborhoods. This bifurcated multiculturalism reflects the developmental state’s attempts to deal with new citizenship trends as they grind against the old ethnic pluralism. While faced with the same issues globalization brings, this postcolonial multiculturalism is distinctively different from liberal multiculturalism, not least because the subvention of multiculturalism is achieved through the state appropriation of vernacular cultural practices through its carnivals.

Keywords: Carnival; multiculturalism; nation-building; state; Singapore; postcolonialism; globalization; pluralism

Introduction

A major question that is emerging from the scholarship on multiculturalism is its character in countries that were former Western colonies, affected as they...
are by colonial racial legacies and globalizing migratory and cultural flows. Distinctions have rightly been made between the politics of multiculturalism in European states and settler states such as the USA, Canada and Australia, where the politics of whiteness matter more than assimilation into national cultures (Gunew 2004; Moran 2005). Critical work has also begun on the specificities of Asian multiculturalism in relation to ethnic pluralism, citizenship and developmental state formation (Hefner 2001; Kymlicka and He 2005; Goh et al. 2009).

In this article, I examine these relationships by analysing carnival events in Singapore that were organized by the state to promote its official multiculturalism. I analyse carnival events in three time periods: celebrations of King George VI’s coronation in 1937, the revival of the creole Chingay Parade in the 1970s, and the simultaneous globalization of Chingay as ‘Asia’s Mardi Gras’ and invention of Racial Harmony Day carnivals in the 2000s, which I studied ethnographically in 2007, 2008 and 2009. They place Singapore in the eras of colonial state formation, nation-state building, and globalization respectively. My aim is to work out the relationship between the carnival form and the state in constituting specific forms of social solidarity recognizable as ‘multiculturalism’.

The subject of carnivals is important in its own right since Mikhail Bakhtin’s (1968) seminal work on Renaissance carnivals demonstrated their subversive potential. Scholars have treated contemporary carnivals as an emergent critical practice that transgresses and challenges capitalism and its statist order (LaCapra 1983: 291–324; Stallybrass and White 1986: 4–26; Gardiner 1992; Hardt and Negri 2004). Chesters and Welsh (2006: 34) describe the carnival as a potent set of ‘repertoires of action’ used by anti-globalization groups to target the ‘soft symbolic underbelly’ of neoliberalism (also St John 2008). Others have been more ambivalent, pointing out that the history of carnivals licensed or utilized by ruling powers does not match Bakhtin’s idealization (Eagleton 1981: 148; Dentith 1995: 70–9; Humphrey 2000). Rather than revolutionary forms, carnivals are the terrain on which politics is fought and their grotesque bodies and carnivalesque transgressions are sites on which power is wrought and resisted.

My study here is aligned with the latter view. The colonial and postcolonial state in Singapore organized street carnivals to materialize and legitimize official versions of multiculturalism. The continuity is not incidental, but is founded upon what Apter (1999) calls the ‘subvention of tradition’, which is a theoretical expansion of the influential scholarship led by Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983) on the appropriation of traditional rituals to invent national cultures in Britain and the Empire. In Apter’s case, the Nigerian Durbar, a colonial invention to legitimize imperial rule, was adapted by the postcolonial state for its ideological work to imagine the Nigerian nation at different stages of its own state-building trajectory. In British Malaya, the durbar form was
used in the 1890s to bring Malay sultans together to legitimate British ‘protection’. But it became disused because the colonial government found it too expensive and meaninglessly ornamental. It was briefly revived in the early 1930s to serve political reforms that eventually crumbled along with the durbars. Instead, exuberant street carnivals drawing on the folkloric symbolisms of local culture emerged as the popular form of choice. Following Apter, I employ the term ‘subvention’ here not in the limited sense of governmental financial support, but to refer to the state’s investment of its resources to support particular types of multiculturalism, in my case, through the carnival form.

The sociology of multiculturalism has largely focused on the analysis of policies and public sphere politics, as the liberal state reinvents itself to deal with increasing societal diversity. As Hartmann and Gerteis (2005) argue in their reworking of the Durkheimian theory of social solidarity, multiculturalism refers to ‘visions of difference’ that seek different associational and normative bases for social cohesion ‘in the context of diversity’. However, this sociology has largely neglected practices of multiculturalism (Kymlicka and Norman 2000: 10). On the other hand, cultural practices that express societal diversity, have often been studied in cultural sociology as acts of popular resistance, subaltern subversion and heterogeneous identity formation in socially significant spaces, in which the performativity of the body looms large in producing group identities of belonging and difference (Gilroy 1993; Bell 1999). This division can be seen in the sociology of Singapore’s multiculturalism, where the postcolonial reinvention of the colonial state to deal with ethnic pluralism has been analysed separately (Brown 1994: 66–111; Lily Zubaidah 1998; Chua 2003, 2005) from the study of ethnicity and everyday cultural practices (Li 1989; Lai 1995). If Turner and Rojek (2001) are correct in maintaining that sociology is the study of solidarity and the body its methodological focus, then a Durkheimian sociology of multiculturalism should be combined with a cultural sociology of the performativity of the body. I see the carnival form as a decisive instrument that the state uses to connect to vernacular cultural practices, and this therefore allows us to bridge the division of labour in the sociology of multiculturalism.

There would be an important shift however, away from early Durkheimian theory towards the conceptual terms of The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (Durkheim 1995). In the hands of the state, the carnival form is an instrument of collective ritual for cultivating its vision of multicultural solidarity in the citizenry through totemic representation – organized symbolic markings on objects and bodies in sacralized space – and effervescent emotional inducements. The cultural logics guiding the carnivals, I will show, consist of horizontal racial segmentation, cascading symbolic authority and multi-modal ritual iteration. By tweaking these logics, the state promoted different visions of multicultural solidarity through the three eras. Whereas the colonial state
promoted what Hartmann and Gerteis (2005: 224) call ‘fragmented pluralism’, in which mediating groups form the associational basis of cohesion and procedural norms the normative basis, the postcolonial state promoted an ‘interactive pluralism’ involving mediating groups and substantive moral bonds that were national in character. As I will show, in its embrace of globalization, the state’s multiculturalism has today bifurcated into a tense coexistence of diametrically opposing interactive pluralism and ‘cosmopolitanism’, which involves procedural norms and the individual as associational basis.

Mad about George VI and empire, 1937

Established in 1819, Singapore formed the Straits Settlements with Penang and Malacca. After the Settlements became a Crown Colony in 1867, British colonialism expanded into the peninsular Malay sultanates, ostensibly through indirect rule by advice, but in actual fact the states became increasingly centralized colonial administrations. Over the century, migrants from China, India, the Malay Archipelago and Europe of heterogeneous caste, clan and regional groups opened up the country and settled down. The native groups were not left to their own devices. Much ideological work, through the census, ethnographic writings and urban planning, went into defining diverse ethnicities into racial categories of ‘Chinese’, ‘Malay’, ‘Indian’ and ‘European’, which provided the framework for government (Hirschman 1986; Milner 1998; Goh 2008; Pieris 2009). In the Malay states, Malays were constructed as the indigenous majority and accorded political primacy, though British bureaucrats ruled in their name. The Chinese, seen as apolitical economic animals, were confined to social and economic activities, while the Indians were seen as docile, simple folk best deployed as plantation and municipal labourers under European management.

However, the hegemony of the colonial state was not total and it did not have the coherent unity that it portrayed to the native masses. By the 1930s, British Malaya had matured, and its decline was now palpable. The colonial state was wrecked by internal conflicts between conservatives who favoured the revival of Malay customary authority and technocrats who sought further bureaucratic rationalization to unify the patchwork of separate Straits and Malay state governments. The colonial state came under intense pressure from Chinese nationalists and anti-imperialists of all political stripes. Malay modernists began to articulate nationalist sentiments. Indian nationalists also succeeded in organizing labourers into unions. It was in this heady political context that the first state carnival was held in Malaya in May 1937. The occasion was provided by the coronation of King George VI. Previous coronations and crown jubilees were quiet and solemn affairs limited to official circles. In the advent of modern wire communications, coronation celebrations
were coordinated across the time zones of Empire and exchanges of tribute and news became instantaneous, providing a simultaneity that made an imagined imperial community real and immanent. Imperial *multi-racialism*, the form that multiculturalism took in this era, was central to this emergent identity. The *British Malaya Peoples’ Coronation Celebrations Memento*, a bilingual record and souvenir published by and for the Chinese, introduced the event with an imagination of races coming together under empire:

Amid the thousands of personages of rank and distinction who thronged Westminster Abbey stood Sultans from Malaya, Rulers of Arab States, and Chiefs from Africa, every single Colony being represented also by one or more of its leading officials or prominent citizens. . . . Malayans and Chinese, as might be expected, excelled themselves in staging the processions and spectacles at which they are such adepts, and while the European element of Singapore expressed its sentiments by means of bunting and brilliant illumination, naval and military occasions and social functions, the islanders of Penang, for example, enjoyed borea performances and processions, the Chinese of Ipoh witnessed the traditional lion and dragon displays, Indians and Ceylonese gave Teluk Anson a magnificent fireworks spectacle and a procession of boats. Lantern processions, sports and entertainments for children were other typical forms of rejoicing in Malaya. (*British Malaya* 1937: 4–5)

In Singapore, the celebrations consisted of a series of horizontally segmented carnivals organized around discrete racial categories corresponding to official classifications. This horizontal segmentation was one of three features that were carried forward into the postcolonial carnivals. The Chinese and Malays were represented by their eponymous street processions. A pseudo-religious Hindu procession represented the Indians, while the Europeans had their solemn prayer service balanced by dancing a night away at the Coronation Ball. While the audience was always, in different proportions, multicultural, the exhibited cultural object was constructed in the register of ethnic authenticity. The visual focus was therefore singular, forcing the audience to consume the heterogeneous and often hybridized content as specifically belonging, naturally, to a particular racial group.

For example, the Malay procession was a hodgepodge rich in symbolism. The procession began with ‘Britannia surrounded by typically nationally dressed Malay, Arab and Indian’ (*British Malaya* 1937: 16), but a cacophony of representations followed. These included religious representations such as a holy man offering a Muslim prayer, historical elements such as soldiers of the old Hindu-Buddhist Majapahit Empire dressed in Pathan dress, local legends such as Bukit Merah (Red Hill) being stained red by an attack of swordfishes, realistic portrayals of Malay agricultural and maritime practices, live exhibitions of Balinese, Dayak and Peranakan (descendants of Chinese-Malay
intermarriage) cultures, and even a hula-hula dance item that reflected Polynesian connections (British Malaya 1937: 16-7, Souvenir Programme 1937). Nevertheless, these were grouped under ‘Malay’. Ethnic diversity was seen as cultural permutations of an underlying racial essence.

Interlaced with horizontal segmentation were vertical hierarchies of cascading symbolic authority, the second feature of the celebrations. The lowest level was the audience who lined the streets in expectation of a spectacle and unconsciously participating as contributors to the carnival atmosphere. At the second lowest level were floats, each owned by an officially recognized local unit: civic association, residential entity, school group, or religious organization. These involved grassroots participation headed by local leaders, who answered to communally constituted committees corresponding to the racially segmented过程ions. These committees were, in turn, headed by officially recognized representatives of the respective communities, who were variously legislative councillors, justices of peace and middling bureaucrats. Through the latter individuals, the colonial government coordinated the entire coronation celebrations as an official event. The symbolic authority cascaded down from the determination of which exclusive racial category each unit would come under at the national level, to the assignment and coordination of theme for each unit at the event committee level, to the enactment of concrete cultural content by each unit, and to the consumption of the content by the audience.

Importantly, intercultural interaction happened only at the lowest and uppermost level of the hierarchy, while the local units experienced minimal interaction within a racial segment and none at all across. At the top, the native representatives negotiated the limits of their racial boundaries in the sanctioning ambit of the state. At the bottom, the crowd’s behaviour was unscripted and involved some degree of intercultural and interethnic interaction. Indeed, a fair bit of hybridization seemed to have happened among the non-White population, for example, between Chinese and Indian groups during the trance and body-piecing Silver Chariot procession that usually took place during the Hindu festival of Taipusam starting from a prominent temple in town. During the Coronation celebrations, the Silver Chariot procession carrying the sacred image of Sri Thandayuthapani was performed and a grand fireworks finale was sponsored by Indian moneylenders and leading Chinese companies. Indeed, the Memento, which was published by the Chinese community, emphasized the Silver Chariot procession as a highlight of the Singapore celebrations with unprecedented ‘vast crowds’ of an estimated 100,000 people that made the procession ‘slow and difficult’ (British Malaya 1937: 11).

This grassroots hybridity was, however, overtaken by imperial multi-racialism. Hybridity was neither discouraged nor suppressed. As a necessary and basic feature of the carnivalesque, it could not be, and was thus put to work and controlled by the cultural logics discussed above. Significantly, the Silver
Chariot procession and fireworks display were capped with a radio relay of the Empire Coronation Broadcast that carried a commentary on the return procession to Buckingham Palace in London (Public Celebrations 1937: 11). Local carnivalesque hybridity was concluded with a sobering turn of the gaze to the imperial centre.

The third feature of the coronation celebrations was the multi-modal ritual iteration of imperial multi-racialism. Pluralist racial representations were ritualistically repeated throughout the events of the celebrations and the repetitions took on different modes of ritual celebration. One interesting adjunct event was the Coronation Youth Rally, a pseudo-political rally of some 1,800 native students of English schools expressing loyalty to the Empire. It involved speakers, organizers and performers of a multi-racial cast deliberately chosen to emphasize racial pluralism, though the students were mostly scions of Straits Chinese elites (Coronation Rally of Youth 1937). Queen’s Scholar Lim Hong Bee, chair of the organizing committee, described the Rally in the opening address, ‘Small though our Rally may be in comparison with other rallies it is unique in including representations of various races; its distinctive value is to serve as a reminder that the brotherhood of nations is already in existence under the British flag’ (British Malaya 1937: 13).

Ideologically, the segmented form of segregated racialized bodies expressed the pluralist premise that justified imperial multi-racialism, simultaneously as the cascading authority projected a state-centered multiculturalism that is anchored in vernacularism. J. S. Furnivall (1948: 304), in his study of British Burma and the Dutch East Indies, influentially defined pluralism in the colonies as a ‘medley of peoples’ that ‘mix but do not combine’, meeting ‘only in the market-place’ and ‘living side by side, but separately, within the same political unit’. For Furnivall, what made society possible in this situation of ethnic anarchy was a coercive, interventionist colonial state. What Furnivall failed to see was that fragmented pluralism was primarily an outcome of colonial institutionalization borne out of a political economy of racialized exploitation rather than a natural consequence stemming from the interaction between race and market forces. The colonial state had a vested interest in culturally representing pluralism as a natural condition in the colonies.

In turn, the represented pluralism of the coronation celebrations gave the colonial state concrete political legitimacy inscribed on the racialized bodies of the natives. The cascading symbolic authority of the celebration carnivals expressed a multiculturalism of racially fragmented pluralism unified by and in the colonial state, which alone, it is believed, could be the guarantor of multi-racial harmony through the procedural norms of governmental arbitration involving communal leaders recognized and co-opted by the state. The Chinese, large numbers of whom were involved in anti-imperialist activities, could therefore be represented as loyal subjects when brought under the aegis of state control, rather than the dangerous political subversives they were...
otherwise. The traditional Chinese New Year Lantern Procession performed for the celebrations was said to be ‘[b]rilliantly artistic and picturesque’, a ‘magnificent spectacle . . . eloquent of sincerity behind the expressions of loyalty by a united community ranging from ricksha owners, labourers, and traders, to students, merchants, and men of all professions’ (British Malaya 1937: 12, Programme 1937) – the immanent class struggle elided by a display of unity under the authoritative umbrella of the colonial state.

Complementing the constructed pluralist grounds of legitimacy was the anchoring of state rational authority in the sentimental soil of local, communal symbolisms, practices and identities. The form of street carnival allows the scripted performance of multi-racialism to be masked with a veneer of spontaneity, evoking emotions for both participants and viewers alike. It taps into the universal property of emotional effervescence produced when an individual meets and experiences a crowd, which is then symbolically ordered by rituals to give sense to the rising sensibilities. Importantly, Durkheim (1995: 217–25) raises this experience of collective effervescence as the origins of sociality, in which the material and the symbolic are synthesized through emotional investment to produce society. In particular, the coronation celebrations’ processional form copied the vernacular practices of settled migrant Chinese, Malay and Indian communities of celebrating ethnic and religious festivals by way of processions that expressed journeys of diasporic belonging and becoming. The Silver Chariot and Chinese Lantern processions clearly tap into existing processions performed during ethnic festivals, while the Malay procession has an Islamic character that suggests links to processions performed during the Prophet Muhammad’s Birthday.

In this sense, Bakhtin’s (1968: 10) oft-quoted point, that carnivals combine ‘the awareness of the people’s immortality’ with ‘the realization that established authority and truth are relative’, cuts both ways. State carnivals tap into the sense and sensibilities of the immortality of the people, just as vernacular carnivals do, but while vernacular carnivals relativize state authority, state carnivals relativize ethnic and religious authority. The state’s legitimacy, wholly inorganic because of its colonial constitution, thus becomes materially and symbolically rooted in the organic substrate of vernacular life, where the abstract space and time of the governmentality of state rule become embedded in the deeply meaningful places and memories of communities. This embedding then allows the state to manipulate the culture, space and time of community life for its own purposes – it is this aspect that becomes clearer and more intense in the national era.

**Purifying the creole for nation-work, 1970s**

After the Second World War, decolonization opened up the political field for nationalist quarrels. Racial politics came to the fore and became intertwined
with leftist anti-colonial opposition to the anti-communist compact between
the British and conservative nationalists. Two major racial riots rocked Sin-
gadope in this period: the 1950 anti-European riots over the custody of a Dutch
girl raised in a Muslim family during the War, and the deadly Chinese-Malay
riots on 21 July 1964, sparked by brawls during the Prophet Muhammad’s
Birthday procession. The 1964 riots were caused by the quarrel between the
United Malays National Organization (UMNO) and the People’s Action Party
(PAP), the respective ruling parties of federal Malaysia and Singapore. Sin-
gapore joined the federation in 1963, after the PAP’s Anglophone leaders, with
the help of the British and UMNO nationalists, outmaneuvered and sup-
pressed the Chinese-speaking socialists, who co-founded the party and helped
the Anglophone elites to gain power through their popular appeal to the
majority Chinese population. The UMNO-PAP compact fell apart when the
PAP challenged UMNO, characterizing itself as representing multi-racial
equality against Malay hegemony. The quarrel and riots led to the separation
of Singapore from the federation in 1965.

Once Singapore was independent, economic developmentalism and survival
became the overriding national ideology. The PAP elites embarked on rapid
export-oriented industrialization in alliance with Western multinationals. By
1973, when the economy was clearly taking off, the elites turned their attention
to social and cultural policy (Mauzy and Milne 2002: 4). Nation-building was
burdened with the tensions of openness to modernization and the preservation
of cultural heritage, which were intertwined with the tensions contained in the
colonial legacy of racial imaginations. The elites began to construct a new
multiculturalism protecting the cultural rights of diverse groups and preserv-
ing their cultures for nation-work, but they had to do this within the racial
framework already institutionalized by the state, while making sure all these
did not impede modernization.

David Brown (1994: 46–76) has characterized the PAP elites’ national multi-
racialism as corporatist, involving the construction of state-sponsored institu-
tional channels through which group interests could be expressed and
managed and the forging of a national cultural identity that is layered and
segmented but united under the national values and ideology promoted by
the state. The model was an organic national community of discrete racial
groups – organized along the old colonial categories of ‘Chinese’, ‘Malay’ and
‘Indian’, with the remaining minorities under ‘Others’ – whose harmonious
interaction and consensus on political matters were achieved and guaranteed
by the autonomous state that looked after the universal interests of society.
This was applied to educational and language policy, family planning policy
and public housing, all of which made Singapore society in the PAP’s multi-
racial image (Chua 1995: 101–46; Trocki 2006: 137–59). But while these trans-
formed everyday life, there was still a need to connect the model ‘organically’
to the vernacular cultural life of the citizenry, so that the corporatist model

State carnivals and the subvention of multiculturalism in Singapore 119

© London School of Economics and Political Science 2011
would become a natural facet of everyday life, common-sense understanding and ethnic affection. In 1973, the elites turned to the cultural production of the carnivalesque for this purpose when they revived the Chingay parade to commemorate the Chinese New Year.

Chingay was a creolized version of street processions that the Hokkien Chinese from Fujian enacted during religious festivals and special events. The parade was closely associated with spiritualist folk religion, and in Singapore, was preformed once every three years, involving the procession of a statue of a deity from the cemetery temple near the harbour to the main Hokkien temple in Chinatown. East India Company officer J.D. Vaughan (1971[1879]: 49) described in his 1879 ethnography that it was ‘accompanied by coolies bearing flags, umbrellas, symbols, sedan chairs, and bands of music making the most horrible din’. According to a Confucianist reformer in 1906, it had become ‘vulgar’ in Singapore, with hired women ‘dressed up in gorgeous style and paraded through the streets to be seen by all nations’ (Chen 1967: 133). Along with another creolized practice, the Hungry Ghost Festival, the reformers managed to abolish Chingay in Singapore (Song 1948: 125). In Penang, the Chingay parade was closely related to Chinese secret societies and involved many of their ritual symbolisms and martial arts. Despite Confucianist reforms, the parade continued to be a major expression of Penang Chinese identity against the colonial government’s banning of secret societies and, in contemporary times, Malay nationalism.

Crucially, the revived Chingay parade was cleansed of its creole religious character to express a secular Chinese identity marking a new year of an ethnic calendar. The erasure of creole spiritualism was evident in the removal of the spiritualist heading of Chingay procession, whether of a wooden boat, religious artifact or spirit-medium in trance leading the floats. The Chinese Lion Dance, deemed as purely traditional and symbolically ethnic without religious significance, became the usual lead. The translation of Chingay, a creolized transliteration, was also changed from qian (祈安; Chen 1967: 133) to zhuangyi (妆亿; People’s Association 2007: 22), the former meaning ‘praying for peace’ and the latter ‘dressed up for a masquerade’. A columnist of the main English daily, Straits Times, recalled the creole history of Chingay and remarked that the new organizers had made ‘artful use’ of zhuangyi, which could not be found in any Chinese lexicon, to approximate the phonetic effect of ‘Chingay’ when pronounced in Hokkien (Straits Times 1975).

Despite the creole-religious precedents, then Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew has been credited with founding the ‘first’ Chingay, ‘with all its noise and gaiety’, to compensate for the ban on firecrackers, ‘a customary New Year practice to drive away evil spirits’, as there was ‘good reason’ for the ban because firecrackers ‘had caused damage to property and injury’ (People’s Association 2007: 22). Significantly, while firecrackers were banned elsewhere, they were set off during the parade. The benevolence of the paternal PAP
regime was therefore coded in the parade itself. Protecting the people from the real danger of the very instruments they believed would protect them from evil spirits, the regime drew its legitimacy from the people’s vernacular beliefs. Lee, who would later become a self-styled Confucianist, also believed that Chingay would modernize Chinese New Year celebrations. In the new state-sponsored Chingay, Lee believed that the ‘spirit and festive joy of the season, with the richness of its traditional ways and customs, can be brought alive in a modern Singapore society’ (Straits Times 1973a). The Director of the People’s Association explained, ‘Singapore is changing with the times, but we must not let the young forget the traditions of the olden times’ (Straits Times 1973b). By reviving Chingay in secular form, the state therefore also staked its claim as the patron and preserver of ‘authentic’ Chinese traditions.

The inaugural 1973 Chingay involved more than a score of floats sponsored by business associations and government agencies in a two-mile procession moving across the downtown Chinese districts. They exuded a mix of traditionalism and didacticism. The Chinese Chamber of Commerce’s dragon float followed the Tourist Promotion Board’s float promoting the new merlion national icon and the Family Planning Board’s family planning float. Two thousand participants entertained the public with stilt walking, dragon dance, big-head doll clowning, cycling juggling acts, mini dramas and big-flag balancing performances. The parade proved to be popular, but to be sure the government solicited public feedback and endorsement as part of its corporatist approach. The main English daily, The Straits Times, invited readers to send in their views, which raised an ‘unusually heavy’ level of response that indicated Chingay had struck a chord with the population. Nine letters were published. One reader remarked that the dances ‘show the rhythmic and fast pace our society is moving, the merriment we are enjoying and the unity with which we are advancing in prosperity’ (Straits Times 1973c). Readers called for Chingay to be made into an annual event and two letters written by Malay and Chinese readers suggested making Chingay a multi-racial parade. Another reader advocated moving the parade into the newly minted public housing estates, while an expatriate resident thought it worthy of a tourist attraction on par with Mardi Gras. Soon after, Minister of Culture Jek Yeun Thong announced that the Chingay would be repeated the following year, because such activities were ‘a good means of helping Singapore to preserve the best in the traditions of the East’ (Straits Times 1973d).

As a secularized, state-sponsored event, the transgression aspect of vernacular Chingay was excised along with its creole spiritualism. However, this did not mean the depoliticization of Chingay. Rather, Chingay was transformed from expressing a creole Chinese resistance identity to expressing national multi-racialism, the cultural logics of which closely followed imperial multi-racialism. Reflecting the state’s nation-building and community development focus at this historical juncture, Chingay was moved from the downtown area
to the public housing estates, making it less accessible to tourists. In its second year, the parade, led by a 30-foot long *papier mache* tiger, was held in Toa Payoh, a suburban new town resettling villages of different ethnic groups in public housing estates. Then, non-Chinese floats made its first appearance in 1976 and thus Chingay became a multi-racial parade. Significantly, the 1976 parade was held in the Geylang area where the 1964 riots broke out. Four stilt walkers symbolizing the four races ‘walked confidently hand in hand abreast’, representing ‘Singapore walking tall into the new year’ and new national era (*Straits Times* 1976). In 1979, non-Chinese floats included the Central Council of Malay Cultural Organizations’ portrayal of the legend of Sang Nila Utama founding pre-modern Singapore, ‘Indian maidens’ from the Singapore Indian Fine Arts Society expressing ‘their joy at the end of the harvest season’, the Malay theatre troupe Sriwana performing a Malay opera, and the Punjabi group Dharamveers performing Bhangara folk dance (People’s Association 1979).

Like imperial multi-racialism, the national version did not emphasize a unifying hybridity but horizontal segmentation along the same colonial racial lines, except that segmentation took place within the parade. Instead of ad hoc carnival committees comprising co-opted communal leaders, the cascading symbolic authority was bureaucratized, flowing from Prime Minister Lee and the Minister of Culture through the People’s Association bureaucrats down to the leaders of government-sponsored community organizations and government-sanctioned cultural groups. Multi-modal iterations took the form of a national liturgical calendar. Reinforced by other smaller events throughout the year, for example May Day rallies, the annual enactment of Chingay in January or February complemented the National Day parade in August, approximately six months apart from each other. The two government-organized civic parades were very different in character – the National Day parade being a solemn ceremony with military march-pasts and flyovers followed by civic contingents – and presented a multi-modal reinforcement of official multiculturalism.

The differences befitted the national imaginary. The horizontal segmentation within a parade rather than across parades expressed a pluralistic but singular imagined community instead of divided communities united under empire. Intercultural interaction was no longer limited to the top and bottom of the carnival hierarchy. The bureaucratized symbolic authority proffered the progress of national development and the values of multi-racial equality and national unity as substantive moral norms. It also lent legitimacy to the state as an ethnically neutral authority and thus allowed it to use the national multi-racialism as ideological rationalization of wide-ranging policies to discipline the population (Puru Shotam 2000; Chua 2003). Together with the National Day parades, annual iterations of Chingay parades signified the perennial nation, if not existing in the imagination from time immemorial, then
extending into the immortal future as the transcendental community. Thus, the carnivalesque constructed the pluralist grounds of legitimacy for state multi-racialism in both colonial and postcolonial periods, except that it was a fragmented pluralism in the former and an interactive pluralism in the latter. Likewise, state legitimacy was rooted through carnival in vernacular practices, but this time in a politically potent creole vernacularism with strong symbolic and affective resonances subvented as a state-sponsored national cultural festival. The enactment of the parade in the new towns not only reached four-fifths of the population, but also linked state multi-racialism to lived meanings of ethnicity associated with kinship (Li 1989) and infused everyday ethnic economic competition in the public housing estates (Lai 1995) with affections and beliefs in multi-racial unity.

**Selling hybridity and the bifurcation of multiculturalism, 2000s**

‘Since 1987 and more intensely from 2001’ (People’s Association 2007: 7), Chingay was transformed into a global event staged along the downtown shopping thoroughfare and civic district of conserved colonial buildings. Foreign participation increased, and heavy tourist promotion and commercialization became apparent. The 2007 parade saw 18 of the 26 floats involving foreign performing troupes and associations from as far flung as Ireland, Belarus and Angola. Performed over two days, the 3,800-strong parade spewed firecracker wrappers over tens-of-thousands of Singaporeans, expatriates and tourists lining the streets and united by their camera flashes. A disco street party capped the night. The pluralist authenticity of the component races of official multiculturalism shifted toward the cosmopolitanism of infinite hybridities. The manager of costumes explained, ‘Previously, we used Chinese fabrics for Chinese costumes, Malay fabrics for Malay costumes and so on. Now, there are no such rules. With Chingay taking on a cosmopolitan flavour, there’s no limit to what the imagination can come up with when creating a costume for Asia’s grandest street and floats parade’ (People’s Association 2007: 71). If Chingay was so valuable for nation-work, then why did the state dilute its nationalist aspects by globalizing it?

Incidentally, the reported milestones of change in 1987 and 2001 were precisely the two periods when the economy was in recession, when reforms were enacted or intensified to move the economy into post-industrial mode to engage globalization. Chingay became intimately tied to the state’s policy to transform the city centre into a global city of commerce, finance, the arts and fine living. Since the 1990s, migrant skilled workers and expatriate professionals from Asia and the West began to make Singapore their home, as transnational corporations made Singapore their base in Southeast Asia, within easy reach of China and India. Manual and domestic guest workers, cheaply
sourced from neighbouring and South Asian countries and not coincidentally of darker skin hues, fuel the boom. Together, the new migrants make up around a quarter of the population residing in Singapore today.

The presence of these non-citizens from diverse cultural backgrounds and extant global media flows facilitated by an open capitalist economy have led to the partial breakdown of national multi-racialism, the clear Chinese-Malay-Indian lines of which have blurred with the intensification of cross-cultural exchanges and marriages, particularly among the middle classes. As an indication of the change, the percentage of inter-racial marriages among non-Muslims increased from 8.9 per cent in 1997 to 16.4 per cent in 2007 and from about one-fifth to one-third for Muslim marriages in the same years (Straits Times 2008). In 2003, the Minister of Community Development announced a shift in multicultural policy. Cultural hybridity and openness is to be encouraged for Singaporeans who are socially mobile while a sentimental link to ‘the Singapore heartbeat’ maintained. The last phrase is one of the five principles making up the government’s Singapore 21 campaign in the closing years of the twentieth century to promote citizenship in the new globalizing era. The Singapore 21 report idealized,

The Singaporean of the 21st century is a cosmopolitan Singaporean, one who is familiar with global trends and lifestyles and feels comfortable working and living in Singapore as well as overseas. At the same time, he retains strong ties with Singapore and . . . a love for Singapore in their hearts. (Singapore 21 Secretariat 1999: 45)

This sentimental component is a reflection of the tension between globalization and nationalism in Asian developmental states. But for Singapore, there is the added postcolonial dimension in the inherited racial pluralism. As Wee (2007: 101–19) points out, the PAP ruling elites have to balance the cultivation of bounded Chinese-Malay-Indian-Others national identity with keeping national culture open to the vicissitudes of economic globalization.

In contemporary Singapore, the overlapping developmental state tensions and postcolonial complex have led to the bifurcation of multiculturalism along class lines, which can be mapped spatially. Young Singaporeans from the upwardly mobile professional and executive classes, the twenty-first century ‘cosmopolitans’ idealized by the state, find themselves rubbing shoulders with expatriates in the workplace and residential estates. Through the 1990s, many upwardly mobile Singaporeans moved from public housing residences to private condominiums and landed residential enclaves ringing the downtown centre. The percentage of Singaporean households living in public housing declined from 88.8 per cent in 1995 to 82.7 per cent in 2008, while those living in private condominiums and landed houses increased from 10.2 per cent to 16.5 per cent in the same years (Singapore Department of Statistics 2010; figures include permanent residents). Many middle-class Singaporeans
who still live in the public housing estates aspire to ‘upgrade’ to private condominiums. Chingay has been transformed into a parade aimed at these ‘cosmopolitans’. As early as 1993, the elites saw Chingay as an instrument to cultivate cosmopolitanism. Wong Kan Seng, a key member of the second-generation PAP leadership, observed that the ‘success of Chingay in attracting participation from East and West’ offered an important lesson. Encouraging Singaporean cultural groups and individuals to ‘venture overseas’, Wong remarked that ‘Singaporeans must not become soft and insular’ and the experience of participating in overseas festivals would make Singaporeans ‘more hardy and adventurous’ and give them ‘an international perspective to build an external economy to stay ahead’ (Wong 1993).

On the other hand, the large majority of Singaporeans live in the public housing satellite towns of the island. The interactive pluralism of national multi-racialism continues to be advocated by the PAP’s elected representatives and their grassroots organizations in the towns. Since the mid-2000s, government-led grassroots organizations have organized Racial Harmony Day carnivals in public housing districts in July, a few weeks leading up to the National Day parade. These replicate the pre-globalization Chingay parade on a smaller, local scale. The 2007–2009 Racial Harmony Day carnivals in Punggol, a new model satellite town in the north-eastern edge of the island, involved a multicultural parade down a closed motorway and carnival game and food stalls set up along the road. Children from local schools dressed in Chinese, Malay and Indian costumes danced their respective ethnic dances to a medley of tunes, and Chinese temples, a mosque, an Indian temple and a couple of churches sold, aside each other, food associated with the respective ethnic groups along with free informational materials.

Racial Harmony Day carnivals, by being completely new inventions without vernacular roots, are shorn of ethnic and historical sediments, though they are modeled after Chingay and therefore try to tap into popular sentiment. Though the day commemorates the 1964 riots, the state has stayed away from referring to the riots in historical depth, wary of putting the minority Malay-Muslims on the spot. Instead, the government has turned to the easy and self-serving fiction that racial difference is an indelible, primordial fact, which if not managed closely by the state, would lead to chaos. The Racial Harmony Day’s poverty of vernacular history and origins makes the artificiality of the ‘heartland’ carnival palpable. Thus, instead of dolls parodying Chinese children foolishly leading a Lion Dance (Figure I), lending a symbolic playfulness to Chingay and perhaps mocking the paternal autocrats who run Singapore, which means Lion City in Sanskrit, foolish dolls wearing stereotypical Chinese, Malay and Indian ethnic dress and racial skin-tones pranced by themselves and attracted playful ridicule and blows from children (Figure II).

In the end, the carnivalesque conjured in such a fashion does little to change the racial pluralism that state-sponsored carnivals perpetuate in representation.
This is made worse by the carnival’s emphasis, for the lack of vernacular practices, on skin-deep cultural consumption. Among the ethnic foods given free or sold cheaply at the Punggol carnival, McDonald’s hamburgers were the most popular in 2007 and Middle-Eastern kebab wraps in 2008, and in the queue for these foods, Chinese, Malay and Indian families waited, without interacting, for their turn in the marketplace. In this new mode of consumptive capitalism in the ‘heartland’, the interactive pluralism of Chingay’s nation-work teeters and threatens to become the old fragmented pluralism of the colonial era.
The division of labour between Chingay in the downtown ‘global city’ and the Racial Harmony Day carnivals in the ‘heartland’ townships express the new horizontal segmentation that now runs along racial-class lines. Local ‘cosmopolitans’, comprising upwardly-mobile, middle-class Anglophone Chinese living in private housing, take to Chingay with their foreign compatriots as audience. In the ‘heartlands’, the vernacular-speaking and working-class locals of all races participate in racially segmented Racial Harmony Day carnivals. The state recognizes the racial-class tensions inherent in the new bifurcated multiculturalism and seeks to elide the divisions between ‘cosmopolitans’ and ‘heartlanders’. Despite criticisms of them as prejudicial stereotypes, these are categories that PAP leaders have used publicly and in conceptualizing social policies. Like the Chinese/Malay/Indian/Others racial categories that they deploy for state multi-racialism, the leaders treat ‘cosmopolitan’ and ‘heartlander’ as representing real cultural differences to be managed and deployed to cultivate the citizenry, thus rendering the categories real in effect.

Crucially, the other two cultural logics of state carnivalesque are recalibrated to serve the elision of the divisions. To reduce the geographical segregation apparent in the division of labour between downtown Chingay parades and ‘heartland’ Racial Harmony Day carnivals, it has become a practice for the People’s Association to extend Chingay for another fortnight and bring the floats to tour public housing districts. The districts take turns to host the parades each year. Local authorities would mobilize governmental grassroots groups to organize sidewalk activities to accompany the parade. Street activities at the 2008 ‘Chingay in the Heartlands’ in the northern districts of Sembawang and Nee Soon included flea markets and popular getai (歌台; concert stage) variety shows that are usually held during the religious Hungry Ghost Festival. Movement in the other direction, from the public housing estates to the downtown centre, is accomplished through participation of ‘heartland’ grassroots volunteers in the main parade as ushers and performers. One participant in the 2009 parade, Gary, was appointed a ‘Chingay blogger’ and his story published in *The Straits Times* online youth newspaper. Ecstatic, anxious and proud, Gary told of his experience performing as an ant in the People’s Association Youth Movement’s 300-strong ‘Garden of Youth’ item, dancing on a caterpillar float. The float, he explained, was a ‘vibrant mass display of the garden community and its residents busy at work’ that celebrates ‘the metamorphosis of the young caterpillar into a graceful butterfly that stands ready to contribute to the community’ (Gary 2009). The float mimes the transformation of Singapore from a ‘garden city’, its old branding as a clean and green industrial city, into the ‘global city’ of ‘cosmopolitan’ citizens able to fly about the world and yet always returning home to contribute to the nation.

On the other hand, Racial Harmony Day is transposed to the downtown ‘global city’ as HeritageFest. Organized by the National Heritage Board every
July, the annual HeritageFest comprises exhibitions, performances and activities held in shopping centres, museums and libraries, and targeted at educating young Anglophone Singaporeans and their expatriate counterparts about Singapore’s multicultural heritage. One of its most popular activities is the Fun on Foot treasure hunt, which involves groups competing to finish downtown heritage trails, for example in Little India in 2004, by answering riddles concerning cultural sites and practices. In this transposition of Racial Harmony Day, heritage is no longer merely functional for cultivating interracial moral bonds underpinning a cohesive multi-racial nation, but its consumption and appreciation becomes the basis for producing the new ‘cosmopolitan’ Singaporean who is able to seize the opportunities of globalizing Asia, yet remaining existentially grounded in the nation. Thus, in the same breath, Wong said in his speech at the launch of the 2004 HeritageFest,

At the individual level, there are considerable benefits to be reaped if we have a good and deep understanding of our own and other’s cultures. Much has been said about the immense potential of China and India. . . . At the personal level, heritage enriches our lives and makes us whole, beyond just digits in the economic framework . . . These anchor us in times of stress and uncertainty. (Wong 2004)

Chingay in the Heartlands and HeritageFest represent new multi-modal iterations connecting ‘cosmopolitans’ and ‘heartlanders’, eliding the division between them and, at the same time, the anxieties of globalization. In the sidewalk carnivals organized by local grassroots organizations, Chingay in the Heartlands takes on a strong vernacular feel and promotes the old interactive pluralism, while the parade floats displaying global hybridities winds its way through the streets as ‘cosmopolitan’ penetration into the ‘heartland’. The direction is reversed in HeritageFest, which brings the vernacular cultural resources of the ‘heartlands’ into the ‘global city’ to fill in hollow conserved colonial buildings now serving as museums and shopping centres, and in grassroots ‘heartland’ participation in the main Chingay parade, such as Gary playing the ant working to transform Singapore into the ‘global city’. The racial-class segmentation remains unequal, with the ‘heartlands’ functioning as the cultural soil for the ‘cosmopolitan’ green-shoots the state is cultivating to take on the new world order.

Symbolic authority has moved away from cascading down the bureaucratic hierarchy to a network model, where the People’s Association sees itself as a coordinating node connecting autonomous organizations to each other to achieve the carnival effect. Chingay floats are no longer assigned to government-linked grassroots organizations but are selected from proposals by non-governmental religious, civic, educational and commercial institutions. Scores of civic organizations seek the honour to collaborate with the Association in organizing Chingay, such as supplying volunteer officials and providing
dancers. Because of international publicity and governmental recognition, participation in Chingay is considered a high-profile status achievement. Moving away from organizing the parade in a top-down planning manner then, the Association has adopted a ‘flexible production’ model of priming the symbolic currency of Chingay participation, maintaining the social field for civic groups to compete with their cultural capital and coordinating the production of the parade with the selected cultural capital, with communication rather than command as the *modus operandi*. As the People’s Association (2009) states on its official Chingay website,

Chingay will also evolve from a showpiece, contingent style parade to a parade of spontaneous celebration. People from all walks of life will want to be part of the Chingay Parade, to be watched and celebrated as one of the Parade’s colours or gems, or as a spectator, mesmerised and clapping and grooving along.

This partly reflects the once-paternal state’s attempt to remodel itself as fraternal host to foreign and local ‘cosmopolitans’, appropriating cultural capital from vernacular cultures to fete internationally mobile elites with multicultural shows, to make Singapore attractive to them as a global city. But it also makes for a schizophrenic multiculturalism. In the 2007 Chingay and Chingay in the Heartlands, a float had young PAP Members of Parliament donning street wear and dancing to sanitized hip hop, surrounded by 300 youths chosen from a nationwide hip hop competition leading up to Chingay. At the end of their number, the cast of politicians – cobbled together in the logic of the old racial pluralism: six Chinese, three Malays, two Eurasians and an Indian – threw sweets at the bemused crowds. The interactive pluralism and paternal authority of the state towards the ‘heartland’ population have not changed, but they are now dressed up by the masquerade in the global marketplace, to pretend for an instance that the world is really flat.

**Conclusion**

Singapore represents a modern, diverse and postcolonial Asian society and, perhaps, exemplifies it because it appropriates and deploys vernacular cultural practices to shape the multicultural values and identities of its citizens; this subvention of multiculturalism is something that no liberal state would do. This, as I have shown, is inherited and learnt from the colonial state, which tapped into the vernacular, creolized practices of its Asian subjects to construct an imperial multi-racialism of plural groups fragmented along racial lines, whose peaceful coexistence was secured by the state. Rather than inventing new national traditions, the nation-state has employed the same cultural logics as imperial carnivals – horizontal racial segmentation, cascading symbolic...
authority, multi-modal iteration – for its cultural nation-work to build the substantive moral norms that bound plural groups together and integrated the races. The same logics were used again to transform Chingay into a ‘cosmopolitan’ carnival to resolve the anxieties of globalization, in a suspension of time, space and bodies mixing and flowing in downtown ‘global city’ Singapore. It expresses a bifurcated multiculturalism of individual citizen-consumers hybridizing cultures through the facilitation of state institutions, while nothing changes in the ‘heartland’ and its interactive pluralism except that the racialized body has become comically grotesque, as we find in Racial Harmony Day carnivals.

A key conclusion of my study is that carnivals are, as Shohat and Stam (1994: 304) put it, ‘politically ambiguous affairs’; it can serve hegemonic state power and often does, precisely because the carnival form allows for symbolic mobilization of the body and the effervescent energies of bodies brought together in ritual. There are two possible ways in which the carnival can serve state power. Negatively, as pressure valves for the release of repressed energies and contained outlets for deviant practices, carnivals complement the disciplinary regimes of the state (Langman 2008; Ravenscroft and Gilchrist 2009). In this sense, carnivals preserve but do not produce state power. Carnivals can also be productive for state power, as the Singapore case shows, with the postcolonial state performing its magic on the bodies gathered in the Chingay parades to transform imperial multi-racialism into national multi-racialism and global multiculturalism.

However, carnivals remain politically ambiguous affairs in which resistance and state hegemony face off loaded with symbolic weapons. Though I have looked at the implication of the carnivalesque in state hegemony here, it would be important to look at subversion at the edges of the teeming carnivals, from little acts of resistance that add up to the mountain of thrash in otherwise litter-free Singapore to the proliferation of informal economies of illegal hawking and frowned-upon youth subcultures reclaiming the streets in their own terms. This is why the carnivals are heavily policed affairs, despite the façade of spontaneity. Furthermore, the spaces of disjuncture opened by iterations of bifurcated multiculturalism between Chingay and Chingay in the Heartlands, Racial Harmony carnivals and HeritageFest, highlight the emergent racial-class inequalities of globalization barely glossed over by the carnivalesque. Vide Kymlicka (2007), multiculturalism is not necessarily liberal in its globalization. History retains its influence in postcolonial states and state carnivals inscribe this history and its discontents unto its citizens. Between the hybridizing fantasies of Chingay and neo-liberal capitalism and the ossified racial pluralism of ‘heartland’ carnivals and the postcolonial nation, the relevance of liberal multiculturalism is lost on the Asian citizen-subject seeking transgression.

(Date accepted: November 2010)
Note

1. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the American Sociological Association Annual Meeting, Boston, 11–14 August 2008. I am grateful to my fellow roundtable participants at the Meeting and the three anonymous reviewers of this journal for their critical comments.

Bibliography


British Malaya Peoples’ Coronation Celebrations Memento 1937, copy in the National Library of Singapore.


Coronation Rally of Youth 14 May 1937, National Archives of Singapore (NAS) item no. 324.


Kymlicka, W. and He, B. (eds) 2005 Multiculturalism in Asia, Oxford University Press.


People’s Association 1979 Chingay ‘79, Singapore.

People’s Association 2007 Chingay: Singapore on Parade, Singapore.


Programme, Chinese Lantern Procession in Honour of the Coronation of Their Majesties King George VI and Queen Elizabeth 13 May 1937, NAS 323.

Public Celebrations in Honour of the Coronation of Their Majesties King George VI and Queen Elizabeth May 1937, NAS 321.


Souvenir Programme of the Malay Community of Singapore in Honour of the Coronation of Their Majesties King George VI and Queen Elizabeth 12 May 1937, NAS 322.
State carnivals and the subvention of multiculturalism in Singapore  133


Staits Times 1973d ‘Chingay Parade a Success, So an Encore is Planned Next Chinese New Year’, 5 April, p. 13.


