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International Review of Administrative Sciences 1996; 62; 315
DOI: 10.1177/002085239606200303

The online version of this article can be found at:
http://ras.sagepub.com
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Introduction

In general, the nature, scope, structure and functions of public administration in a country are largely shaped by various dimensions of its sociohistorical context. However, while the evolution of the administrative system in advanced capitalist nations has been consistent with their historical changes in societal realms such as the mode of production, class relations, political structure, cultural beliefs and behavioural patterns, the formation of an administrative superstructure in Third World countries took place in isolation from their indigenous contextual realities. The origin of this relatively contextless foundation of public administration in these countries can be traced back to their colonial experiences. Despite the end of direct colonial rule in Asia, Africa and Latin America, the colonial bureaucratic legacy continued not only in terms of administrative structure, function, classification, recruitment, socialization, norms and attitudes, but also in terms of adverse administrative features such as elitism, paternalism, despotism, centralization, secrecy, formalism, aloofness and rigidity (Ankomah, 1983; Harris, 1990; Hopkins, 1991; Oyugi, 1989).

The formation of this colonial administrative legacy that began with the pre-independence preparation for self-government based on colonial education and administration was perpetuated further during the post-independence period through various means, including technical assistance, higher education, foreign training, international experts and administrative reforms (Ekeke, 1977; Schaffer, 1978). In this regard, Jreisat (1991: 665) mentions that in most Arab countries, the colonial legacy in bureaucratic structures is still visible in administrative institutes, academic programmes, foreign consultants, and so on. Most Third World regimes introduced administrative changes based on western knowledge and experience rather than the indigenous contexts, and thus, such changes reinforced rather than supplanted the colonial legacy (Subramaniam, 1990). These colonially inherited administrative traditions and externally induced administrative changes were packaged into a new field known as ‘development administration’, which allegedly remained imitative of the western bureaucratic model and served to maintain western ideological dominance over Third World countries (Dwivedi and Nef, 1982; Ekeke, 1977).

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As a result of such colonial origins, exogenous post-colonial reforms, and imitative structural and attitudinal changes, the administrative systems in Third World countries are relatively incompatible with their indigenous societal contexts. This contextless nature of public administration is evident, more specifically, in the inconsistency of the administrative apparatus with its environment, in particular political institutions, economic relationships and cultural norms in these countries. Although this inconsistency has been studied by some scholars, especially those who emphasize an ‘ecological’ approach to public administration, they have limitations in terms of the piecemeal, fragmented and oversimplified nature of their explanations. In this regard, this article attempts to examine the contextless nature of public administration in terms of its incompatible relationship with the political, economic and cultural contexts of Third World societies. It also briefly explains the impact of this contextlessness of state bureaucracy, and offers some recommendations with a view to rectify the situation.

**Third World context and public administration: the major dimensions**

There are significant differences between Third World countries and western nations in terms of the nature of the relationship between their overall administrative systems on the one hand and their economic, political and cultural contexts on the other. Such differences are largely due to the aforementioned fact that while the administrative apparatuses in Third World countries reflect their exogenous (both colonial and post-colonial) origins, the administrative systems in western capitalist nations represent their indigenous societal contexts. For instance, in terms of the economic context, public bureaucracy in advanced capitalist nations is quite compatible with their traditions of limited state intervention, institutions of competitive market forces and a complementary relationship between the state and private capital. But in most Third World countries, the inherited or borrowed western model of bureaucracy is often incompatible with their economic contexts characterized by limited market competition, expansive state intervention and conflicting state–capital relationships.

With regard to the political context, state bureaucracy in western nations is compatible with advanced and stable political institutions, division between politics and administration, bureaucratic neutrality and accountability, and a liberal democratic atmosphere, whereas such bureaucracy in Third World societies is often incongruent with their weak and unstable political systems, politicized administrative apparatus and relatively undemocratic ideological orientation. Similarly, in terms of the cultural context, the normative features of modern bureaucracy (such as merit, competition, specialization and impersonality) have been compatible with western cultural values, including secularism, individualism, rationality, competition, profit motive and achievement orientation (Baker, 1991; McClelland, 1961; Weber, 1958). But these bureaucratic norms are often contradictory with Third World cultures representing values such as ritualism, ascriptive norms, caste structure, informality,
extended family, seniority-based authority, collective responsibility, and so on (Dwivedi and Nef, 1982; Haragopal and Prasad, 1990). In this section of the essay, various forms of incompatibility of the externally acquired administrative systems with the indigenous economic, political, and cultural contexts in Third World countries are examined in further detail.

The economic context

While the rational model of bureaucracy emerged within the western economic context of advanced industrial capitalism characterized by a limited role of the state and an expansive role of private capital and market forces (Garcia-Zamor, 1991: 440), Third World countries adopted this bureaucratic model without similar capitalist development. Within the context of weak private capital, Third World states assumed major economic roles and intervened in almost all sectors in the name of economic progress, poverty eradication, income redistribution, self-reliance, employment generation, and so on. This economic intervention is reflected in the expansive scope of the state sector and the amount of government expenditures. However, this interventionist role of the state bureaucracy has been quite incompatible with various economic needs that emerged in Third World contexts.

First, the weak formation of private capital and entrepreneurship in Third World societies required a complementary role of the state to facilitate the development of such capital and entrepreneurship. But in most cases, an extensive degree of bureaucratic intervention in the economy replaced or subordinated private capital, stifled entrepreneurship and hindered the overall process of capitalist development, with the exception of few newly industrialized countries (NICs) where the state played a relatively positive role to enhance capital accumulation (Luke, 1986: 77). It has been found that in most Latin American countries, the private capital and market forces have been dependent on and constrained by the interventionist state bureaucracy (Fuhr, 1994). In the case of Indonesia, ‘bureaucratic power has replaced money capital as the means of production in that country’ (Carino, 1991: 738). Such interventionist administrative apparatus is hardly conducive to the Third World’s economic need to develop private capital and entrepreneurship.

In addition to this need to create indigenous capital and entrepreneurship, it is also imperative to reduce the external dependence of Third World economies. However, both of these essential components, i.e. the formation of indigenous capital and the realization of economic self-reliance, have been constrained due to the collaboration of Third World bureaucracies with foreign capital (see Gana, 1989; Jain, 1989). This role of the bureaucracy in serving external economic interests began under colonial rule and continued during the post-colonial period in many Third World nations. In the case of Africa, it has been observed by Ouyugi (1989: 109, 119) that the bureaucrats provide regulatory advantages, profit protection and financial advantages to the subsidiaries of transnational corporations in exchange for business partnership, board membership and illicit payments.
offered by these subsidiaries. In Nigeria, for example, the bureaucracy has played a crucial role in the process of ‘the transnationalization of production with its attendant subjugation of the nation to the profit impulse of multinational capital’ (Gana, 1989: 146). According to Ekekwe (1977: 55), even the so-called ‘development administration’ has served ‘to preserve and enhance the interest of international capital’. Thus, the role of Third World bureaucracies has not always been complementary to the economic context in Third World societies that require capital formation and economic self-reliance.

The Third World economic context is also characterized by poverty and inequality that needs to be resolved by adopting appropriate policy measures. But in many cases, the situation of poverty and inequality has worsened due to the direct or indirect role of state bureaucracy in the transfer of wealth and income from the common masses to the ruling élites through its control over major economic assets and activities (see Briones, 1985). The goods and services provided by bureaucratic agencies are often unequally distributed. It has been observed that affluent social élites often manipulate and form an alliance with the bureaucracy in order to divert government programmes in their favour, whereas the common masses (including the urban underclass and rural peasants) are not in a position to do so due to their limited access to the bureaucracy and inadequate knowledge about the bureaucratic welfare system (Martin, 1991; Schaffer, 1978; Smith, 1986). In addition, bureaucratic dominance over economic policies and programmes, often financed by foreign assistance, has expanded the dependence of the poorer classes on the bureaucratic apparatus for employment, health care, education, agricultural inputs and other goods and services (see Smith, 1986). In other words, the role of the state bureaucracy in Third World countries has often been less conducive to their economic contexts in which the mitigation of poverty and inequality is a prime concern.

Finally, although in western nations the role of the state is to serve the interests of the dominant capitalist class, the state bureaucracy in Third World countries often comes in conflict with the interests of various classes that are politically weak. In many Asian and African countries, the bureaucracy is said to constitute the dominant power: such power is not based on its ownership of the means of production but on its control over the state apparatus and agencies that regulate and control scarce resources (Dwivedi and Nef, 1982; Luke, 1986). By appropriating any economic surplus, the bureaucracy itself tends to emerge as a ruling class, which has been variously described as the ‘bureaucratic bourgeoisie’, ‘administrative bourgeoisie’, ‘state bourgeoisie’ and ‘organizational bourgeoisie’ (Sklar, 1991: 215–7). It has also been argued that due to the dependent, fragmented and unstable class structures in post-colonial societies, the state apparatus dominated by the bureaucratic–military oligarchy holds overwhelming power by mediating the interests of various classes and groups (see Alavi, 1972; Westergaard, 1985). In the case of Latin America, it is observed that this bureaucratic oligarchy performs mediatory and regulatory functions with respect to various classes and groups, establishes power relationships with them, and makes
them dependent upon the bureaucracy itself (Kaplan, 1985: 92). However, since it is not always possible to satisfy the interests of all classes and groups, especially when the nature of class formation itself is in flux, the mediating role of the state bureaucracy often comes in conflict with the relatively underprivileged sections of society. More importantly, within Third World contexts, although it is necessary to allow spontaneous transition from a weak to an advanced socio-economic formation, such a transition is often blocked or held back by the state bureaucracy.

The political context
The modern administrative framework adopted by Third World nations is hardly compatible with various dimensions of their political context. Foremost, the politico-ideological tradition of western liberal democracy, within which modern bureaucracy has evolved, hardly exists in Third World nations (Carino, 1991). Such a liberal democratic context, which assumes the neutrality, anonymity and impartiality of the administrative apparatus and its accountability to elected politicians, is either absent or fragile in most Asian, African and Latin American countries. Thus, for Ridley (1995), although colonial rule successfully exported the administrative system, it failed to export democratic political institutions to Third World countries. It has been observed that the liberal framework of a politically neutral civil service is relatively absent in Africa and the political atmosphere in Latin America is often characterized by patron-client relationships or personalismo (Haque, 1994; Medhurst and Pearce, 1984; Oyugi, 1989). Despite the adoption of the British, American or French models of democracy in Third World nations, many of these new democracies suffer from political instability, rigged elections, one-party dominance and unrepresentative legislatures (Vivekananda and James, 1990). The more extreme cases are Arab countries where the monarchical regimes have created a political context that has no resemblance to liberal democracy. In short, the politico-ideological context in most Third World countries is not always compatible with the western model of bureaucracy that presupposes a liberal democratic atmosphere.

This weak formation or fragile ideological context of liberal democracy is related to the absence of political neutrality or anonymity of public bureaucracy as found in western democracies. Although most Third World countries have adopted a modern administrative framework assuming its political neutrality, in reality the line between politics and administration in these countries is ‘inherently blurred’ (Ryan, 1987: 78). For instance, irrespective of whether a government is parliamentary, presidential or dictatorial, it tends to deviate from the bureaucratic principle of neutrality, impartiality and anonymity in most African and Middle Eastern countries (Adamolekun, 1986; Anderson, 1987). In fact, according to Ankomah (1983: 291), this principle of neutrality was introduced in Africa to conceal the reality of a politicized bureaucracy that existed throughout African history. The root of this politicized nature of bureaucracy in Third World countries can be found in their relatively underdeveloped social
formation where the lack of social division of labour in general, is reflected in the absence of a distinction between the political realm and the administrative realm. Such a politico-administrative context is often not conducive to the maintenance of bureaucratic neutrality.

The politicized nature of bureaucracy is also reflected in the extensive power of bureaucracy in Third World countries. Such bureaucratic power is reinforced by the political context characterized by weak and fragmented political institutions such as parliament, political parties, and interest groups (see Crouch, 1985; Riggs, 1971). In a more extreme form, the overwhelming power of bureaucracy and the relative powerlessness of political institutions became evident, especially, in various forms of military intervention in politics and the establishment of dictatorial regimes by a military bureaucracy. It was found from various studies that by the 1970s, about one-third of Third World nations that were members of the United Nations, were military-ruled (Heady, 1984: 263). By the end of 1984, ‘no less than half of the 50 states in Africa were under military rule’ (Hutchful, 1985: 61). According to 1985 figures presented by Riggs, out of 109 new states, 48 (44 percent) ‘had succumbed at least once to a coup d’etat — many had succumbed more often’ (Riggs, 1991: 503). Although many of these countries have recently acquired civilian governments, they still serve the interests of the military establishments. In short, unlike western nations where the power of modern bureaucracy is counterbalanced by advanced political institutions, in most Third World countries the expansive power of the civilian and military bureaucracies is often unbalanced in relation to their weak political institutions.

In addition to this existing imbalance between the power of bureaucracy and that of political institutions, the recent modernization of bureaucracy and expansion of its power (Haque, 1994; Peters, 1984) have often been pursued in many Third World countries at the expense of further underdevelopment or degeneration of their political institutions. Some scholars argue that state bureaucracy in post-colonial societies is already ‘overdeveloped’ and has enormous power in relation to the political realm (see Alavi, 1972; Moore, 1980). The process of such an overdeveloped bureaucracy vis-à-vis an underdeveloped political system that began during the colonial period, continued in a different form during the post-colonial decades. On the one hand, the colonially inherited political vacuum, characterized by disarticulated political institutions, was immediately filled in by an expansive and powerful bureaucracy reinforcing the condition of political underdevelopment (see Peters, 1984). On the other, most post-colonial states introduced the modernization of bureaucratic organizations (i.e. public service, military, police) that led to the further weakening of outside institutions and structures, including political structures such as constitutions and legislatures (Gyimah-Boadi and Rothchild, 1990). Even the so-called ‘development administration’, as Carino (1991: 733) suggests, ‘developed the bureaucracy at the expense of representative institutions’.

According to Dwivedi and Nef (1982: 65), in West Africa, most of Latin America, the Middle East and various regions of Asia, ‘bureaucratic authori-
tarianism has substituted for popular mobilization and mass politics’. In many instances, the authoritarian Third World regimes formed by the bureaucratic–military oligarchy have accentuated the condition of political underdevelopment by suspending elections, disbanding political parties, suppressing mass associations, discouraging free press, silencing popular voice and dismantling various political institutions (see Adamolekun, 1986; Asmerom, 1989; Nef, 1990). In the case of Africa, such bureaucratic dominance has given rise to political systems that are weak, fragmented, disorganized and thus incapable of controlling the administrative apparatus (Asmerom, 1989; Oyugi, 1989). A similar scenario can be observed in Asian countries that have experienced military rule. The point here is that an advanced administrative apparatus requires an advanced political system to ensure the neutrality, accountability and responsiveness of such apparatus. But in most Third World countries, the relatively overdeveloped and powerful bureaucratic system has not been matched with the similar development of extra-bureaucratic political institutions.

The cultural context

Although most Third World countries have inherited or borrowed a western administrative framework that emerged in a western cultural context, the patterns of their own local cultures remain significantly different. As De Guzman et al. (1991: 5) suggest, western administrative techniques and procedures have been ‘introduced in the Third World without regard to their acceptability and consistency with prevailing mores, customs, values and norms in the target community’. This section of the article, attempts to explain how the borrowed, imitative administrative norms and values have been incompatible with the indigenous norms and values representing Third World cultures.

First, the top civilian and military bureaucrats in Third World countries are usually educated and trained in western knowledge, skills and language; they are accustomed to western lifestyles; and they seem to be out of touch with the common masses whom they want to ‘modernize’ (see Heady, 1984). Based on such foreign education and training, most of these bureaucratic élites endorse administrative norms that are often incompatible with the indigenous norms shared by the common masses. Such a normative gap between the bureaucracy and the average citizen, which emerged during colonial rule (Baker, 1991; Schaffer, 1978), still continues in decolonized Third World societies. In the case of India, the incapacity of bureaucrats to understand indigenous norms has been considered as one of the main causes of their failures (Jain and Dwivedi, 1989).

However, Third World bureaucrats are not totally free from the influence of local contexts, and thus, they themselves often encounter conflict between the formal or expected administrative behaviour based on western bureaucratic norms and the actual administrative conduct guided by local norms and expectations. This tension between formal official rules and actual activities and conduct often leads to ritualism or formalism in different aspects of the administrative system (Riggs, 1964). According to Dwivedi and Henderson (1990: 14), this
tendency toward ritualistic behaviour is evident in the fact that the imitative administrative structures unrelated to local traditions have produced the symbolism rather than substance of the American, British or French bureaucratic systems. A considerable degree of this formalism or ritualism can be observed in the major bureaucratic activities and attitudes in Third World countries.

For instance, it is often the traditional ascriptive criteria of race, caste, family, language and status rather than the officially announced standards of merit, ability and achievement that play a significant role in recruitment and promotion decisions in these countries (Peters, 1984; Jain, 1989). For example, in Asian countries such as India and Malaysia, the influence of caste and ethnic identity on the public service is quite significant. In Latin America, although most countries introduced merit-oriented administrative reforms, only a few of them have adopted a preliminary form of merit-based recruitment and selection, and these decisions are often based on nepotism and friendship (Hopkins, 1991; Ruffing-Hilliard, 1991). Similarly, in many Third World countries, although there are sufficient numbers of training institutions and programmes, the contents of training are often imitative rather than need-based. In fact, according to Riggs (1964), the tendency towards formalism encompasses almost every dimension of public administration in these countries.

This incompatibility between the administrative élite and the common masses, and between the formally expected behaviour and actual administrative actions, is the reflection of a more macro-level mismatch between the exogenous cultural values inherent in the administrative realm and the indigenous cultural values found in Third World societies. Thus, with regard to Arab countries, Freisat (1991: 672) suggests that ‘the cultural values of Arab society are frequently incompatible with critical elements of the purely rational and impersonal characteristics of bureaucratic management’. Since the underlying values of Third World bureaucracies mostly represent various foreign sources — including the colonial administrative heritage, post-independence administrative reforms based on western models, and knowledge of Third World experts trained in western institutions — such values are inconsistent with the Third World’s indigenous values. In other words, due to these exogenous origins, the administrative values are different from, and often in discord with, the deep-rooted traditional values found in Third World societies.

This cultural disharmony is quite evident, for example, in the inconsistency between the predominantly ascriptive criteria of traditional authority and the merit principle of bureaucratic authority. In fact, kinship, geographic affinities, ethnic identity and caste system have a considerable influence on the merit principle practised in many Third World countries (CPA Research Team, 1984; Haragopal and Prasad, 1990). Such an administrative situation, however, is not unusual in these countries where the activities of everyday life are largely shaped by their deep-rooted values based on family, kinship, caste, religion, ethnicity, tribal affiliation and patron-client relationships. There are scholars who suggest that the racial, ethnic and religious heterogeneity in the composition of many
Third World states (designed by the imperial powers) has important implications for public policies and administration (Heady, 1984; Hutchful, 1985). For instance, in multi-ethnic countries like Malaysia and Sri Lanka, affirmative action programmes are not only based on secular needs to redress socioeconomic inequalities, but also to promote the ethnically biased preferences of the so-called indigenous population (Mah, 1985). In short, administrative policies in Third World countries go beyond the rational bureaucratic values, and are often influenced by cultural assumptions based on race and ethnicity. The point here is that the indigenous cultural values have an impact on the administrative systems, that the idea of value-free public administration is a myth rather than a reality, and that the borrowed western administrative models have been incompatible with and ineffective in non-western societies holding different sets of values (Dwivedi and Henderson, 1990; Martin, 1991).

Summary and recommendations

In summary, the modern administrative systems in Third World countries are relatively incompatible with their economic, political, and cultural contexts. In terms of economic context, the expansive, interventionist and élitist bureaucracies have been inconsistent with the Third World’s economic needs to develop private capital and entrepreneurship, achieve economic self-reliance, and resolve poverty and inequality. With regard to the political context in these countries, there has been inconsistency between the existence of a western bureaucratic model and the absence of its politico-ideological context, between bureaucratic power and the power of political institutions, between the rhetoric of political neutrality and the reality of politicization, and between bureaucratic overdevelopment and political underdevelopment. Similarly, in terms of the cultural context, in most Third World countries, due to the exogenous origins of administrative systems, there is disharmony between the interpretations of top bureaucrats and the understanding of the common masses, between the formal official norms and the actual administrative actions, and between administrative values and indigenous cultural values.

This contextless nature of public administration has a serious impact on various dimensions of Third World societies. For instance, the contextual incompatibility of the interventionist bureaucracy with the backward economic formation in many of these societies has often created obstacles to private capital and entrepreneurship, worsened the condition of poverty, exacerbated external dependence on foreign capital and undermined the overall socioeconomic development (Dwivedi and Nef, 1982; Gana, 1989; Jain, 1989). On the other hand, the incongruence of an overdeveloped administrative system with the context of underdeveloped political institutions led to the expansion of administrative power, intensification of bureaucratic élitism, violation of public accountability, erosion of civil society and de-institutionalization of the overall political process (Crouch, 1985; Haque, 1994; Heady, 1984; Islam, 1990; Riggs, 1971). Finally, the mismatch of imitative administrative norms with the indigenous cultural
context has created a communication gap between the élitist bureaucrats and the common people, weakened the capacity of these bureaucrats to understand local problems and led to the formulation and implementation of unrealistic state policies.

In order to resolve these adverse conditions emanating from the contextless nature of public administration, different administrative experts and institutions have prescribed various administrative reforms, which themselves suffer from the problem of contextlessness. This is because administrative reforms recommended to Third World countries were mostly based on the experiences of administrative changes in advanced capitalist nations themselves. In other words, the administrative reforms undertaken in most Asian, African and Latin American countries have been detached from their own social realities, including the economic forces, political power structures and cultural patterns (Martin, 1991; Oyugi, 1989). In this regard, it is essential to take into account the various contextual factors of Third World societies in suggesting policy alternatives to overcome problems resulting from contextless administrative systems.

First, in order to mitigate the economic problems arising from administrative incompatibility with the indigenous economic context, it is necessary to reduce the scope and power of the expansive and interventionist bureaucratic apparatus. Such a reduction in economic power, however, does not imply the current policies of deregulation and privatization. Rather it requires the devolution of the state’s economic activities (except for economic functions that cannot be performed effectively without state intervention) to the community level through the creation of economically viable and self-reliant grassroot organizations composed from various sections of the local population. If provided with sufficient autonomy from the economic dominance and control of the state, these organizations may diminish bureaucratic power, develop local entrepreneurship and ensure economic self-reliance.

To resolve problems resulting from the incompatibility of the administrative system with the political context, it is essential to ensure a balance between the power of an advanced bureaucracy and that of weak political institutions. It requires not only a reduction in bureaucratic power by restructuring its centralized structure into an open, accessible and participatory administrative system, but also the empowerment of representative political institutions to exercise control over this administrative apparatus (Umapathy, 1982). With regard to political control over bureaucracy, there are African countries, such as Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia and Ghana, where state bureaucracies were brought under the control of ruling political parties, although they were not equally effective. This strategy may deviate from the bureaucratic principle of political neutrality, which has been a façade to camouflage bureaucratic politics and power in many countries (Ankomah, 1983), but it is likely to diminish bureaucratic power in relation to representative political institutions, reduce bureaucratic élitism and rigidity, and ensure bureaucratic accountability to political representatives.
Finally, with regard to problems arising from the inconsistency of borrowed administrative culture with the context of an indigenous culture, there is a need for administrative indigenization, especially in terms of shaping bureaucratic values, norms and attitudes based on the understanding and analysis of indigenous values and norms. There are very few Third World countries that have established such normative and attitudinal standards in line with the indigenous cultural context. It is essential for the administrative élites to undergo fundamental normative and attitudinal changes: it requires appropriate training and incentives, reduction in foreign studies, and intensive re-education programmes in order to transform the imitative and élitist normative standards into more indigenous and people-oriented norms and attitudes (see Haque, 1994; Umapathy, 1982). Such measures are more imperative today when the values, attitudes and lifestyles of bureaucratic élites in Third World societies are increasingly being shaped externally by the global media and culture industry, alienating them even more from the indigenous cultural context.

Notes
1. The administrative systems in many Third World countries still reflect the heritage of their respective colonial rules, including the British, French, Dutch, Spanish, Portuguese and American (Harris, 1990; Islam, 1990). For instance, the British administrative legacy is dominant in Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Botswana, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia; the Spanish and American systems are prominent in the Philippines and Latin American countries (American influence in Latin America is a recent phenomenon); and the French tradition remains influential in the former French colonies (Jain, 1989; Subramaniam, 1990).

2. For example, despite the recent initiative of privatization, central government expenditure in 1992 was 21.7 percent of the GNP (gross national product) in Pakistan, 28.2 percent in Sri Lanka, 29.4 percent in Malaysia, 25.6 percent in Brazil, 22.1 percent in Chile, 22.4 percent in Venezuela, 30.7 percent in Kenya, 34.8 percent in Zimbabwe, 40.4 percent in Botswana, and so on (World Bank, 1994: 180–1).

3. Although the expansive economic role of the state bureaucracy has been rationalized on various grounds, such as to reduce foreign domination over the economy, substitute a weak private sector, induce entrepreneurship and regulate natural monopolies (Briones, 1985), such intervention has often reduced the opportunity for private investment and constrained the formation of indigenous capital.

4. It is mainly because the very process of colonialism required an advanced bureaucratic apparatus to facilitate access to raw materials and cheap labour, maintain law and order and ensure tax collection (Ekekeke, 1977: 53).

5. Liberal democracy is characterized by provisions such as regular elections, freedom to vote and choose representatives, government by an elected body, public accountability, and so on (Johnston, 1986: 176).

6. Military rule took various forms, including indirect limited intervention (to secure certain objectives), indirect complete intervention (with puppet civilian regimes), civil–military alliance (between civil and military bureaucracies), open direct military rule (military rule without much legitimacy), quasi-civilianized direct military rule (military rule with a tendency to legitimize it); and so on (see Heady, 1984: 265–6).

7. This observation has been made by Andranovich and Riposa (1991: 693) in the case of Guatemala.
8. Political underdevelopment or decay, caused by bureaucratic modernization and expansion, has been explained in terms of the absence of competitive political parties, limited political participation, lack of interest articulation, existence of military rule, and so on (Heady, 1984).

9. It has been argued that colonial rule downgraded politics, discouraged political control over the bureaucracy, fused politics with bureaucracy, expanded bureaucratic power based on ethnicity and communalism, and thus, established an ideological basis for a centralized and elitist bureaucratic state (Mutahaba, 1989; Schaffer, 1978).

10. For instance, after independence, Pakistan was transformed into ‘an administrative state or a bureaucratic polity’ in which the political institutions remained weak, while the civilian and military bureaucracies acquired overwhelming power (Islam, 1990: 72).

11. Richter (1989: 224) mentions that ‘Most of the bureaucracies in developing nations represent the continuity of roles and attitudes drawn from a previous colonial heritage’.

12. As Smith (1986: 21) suggests, ‘In the third world the rationality of bureaucracy may clash with the rationality of the poor peasant, though not with that of the modern, capitalist farmer.’

13. Bryant (1978: 208) observes that most training programmes in Third World countries have been ‘formalistic and narrowly focused upon the techniques used within structured “first world” situations’.


15. For instance, administrative reforms towards a greater extent of bureaucratic accountability and a higher degree of decentralization have been ineffective, because these reform measures largely discounted the influence of various contextual factors such as interclass and intergroup conflicts, expansive bureaucratic power and unequal access to bureaucratic decisions (Haque, 1994; Luke, 1986).

16. For many Third World countries, privatization has worsened poverty and inequality due to the withdrawal of subsidies and concentration of wealth, shifted economic power from small producers to big industries attached to the current pro-market regimes, and subordinated the national economy further to foreign capital through the international sale of public assets (Baker, 1991; Haque, 1996).

17. Tanzania and Zambia were more effective in exercising political control over their bureaucracy due to the existence of an organized single dominant party, whereas Kenya was less effective because of its weak political party and localized politics (Asmerom, 1989; Gyimah-Boadi and Rothschild, 1990; Mutahaba, 1989).

18. However, indigenization does not mean a total rejection of anything that has exogenous origin or an absolute endorsement of all local cultural norms, because many such local norms (e.g. the caste system in India) might have adverse implications for certain groups and classes in Third World countries.

19. For instance, Iran’s administrative system is based on its early tradition of the Sassanian administration (Farazmand, 1990); China’s administrative system is indigenous to the extent that it emphasizes people-oriented administrative values and ethics (Chow, 1991); and Nicaragua’s post-revolution structure of administration was based on indigenous needs, public expectations, and local participation (Andranovich and Riposa, 1991; Hopkins, 1991).

References


