Claiming the “diaspora”:
发送州策略、精英流动性以及公民身份的地域性

Elaine Lynn-Ee HO

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Abstract: This paper addresses the scholarship on extraterritorial citizenship strategies implemented by sending states in order to mobilize elite emigrants and enhance global competitiveness. It argues that these strategies should be distinguished analytically from claims of ‘diaspora’. The paper further delineates a geographical agenda by reflecting on, first, the contestations, and second, the aspects of negligence articulated in these strategies. Third, it argues that studying the proliferation of emigrant populations with multiple national affiliations helps illuminate the selectiveness of such strategies. Lastly, although geography is central to understanding these strategies, the processes studied also raise questions about the spatialities produced.

Keywords: Citizenship, migration, diaspora, extraterritorial, sending states, emigration

Introduction

‘Diaspora strategies’ aimed at professional and business class emigrants have grown in popularity amongst governments in migrant-sending states that wish to enhance their country’s global competitiveness in the knowledge-based economy. Such countries include but are not limited to Australia, China, India, New Zealand, Singapore and the United Kingdom. The interest in these types of migrants emanates from the belief that their human capital and international business links can help countries develop global economic opportunities. Countries courting these elite subjects, as well as other countries planning to jump onboard the bandwagon, are often urged to learn from one another in their pursuits to attract their best and brightest emigrants (Wescott, 2006; Sriskandarajah and Drew, 2006; Zhu, 2007; Zhang, 2009).

This paper focuses on emerging scholarship, within and beyond geography, about such government strategies in sending states (henceforth sending state strategies). Although
not all migrant-sending countries are explicitly sending migrants elsewhere, the label, ‘sending states strategies’, is used in this paper to refer to countries that are reaching out to elite emigrants who can help stimulate economic development in the knowledge-based economy, and in some cases, for nation-building purposes. These strategies crossing international borders are premised on ideas of membership and citizenship, thus complicating territorial conceptions of the nation-state model and the geographies of citizenship (Desforges et al, 2005).

Given these geographical implications, it is surprising that geographers have taken up the study of sending state strategies only recently compared to other disciplines in the social sciences. This paper argues that problematising the claims to ‘diaspora’ made in sending state strategies can help open up new avenues for exploring the geographical implications of these initiatives that extend citizenship exclusively to elite emigrants in selected parts of the world. Although some anthropologists and sociologists have contributed to spatial debates on processes of re-territorialization amidst de-territorialization, the goal of this paper is to set out new research directions that would prompt more nuanced accounts of the uneven spatialities that come about as a result of elitist sending state strategies. In so doing, this paper brings into view the constituting effects on the politics of citizenship and redistribution, not only within, but also beyond territorial boundaries.

The next section discusses the terminologies and analytical frameworks that scholars have used to discuss these sending state strategies. I argue that while other social scientists anchor their analyses around citizenship, geographers have deployed the concept of diaspora instead. The paper further argues that sending state strategies to maintain relationships with their elite emigrants should be distinguished analytically from the idea of diaspora despite popular policy and scholarly use of labels such as ‘diaspora strategies’ to describe these activities. This paper subsequently contributes four agendas

1 This paper focuses on emigrants whose socio-economic and educational profile makes them an important source of human capital for their countries of origin. It is informed by but differentiated from earlier literature that looked at the initiatives by sending states with significant populations of low-paid labor emigrants engaging in low-skilled work and who mainly contributed remittances.
for future consideration and theorization in the developing geographical scholarship on sending state strategies and elite mobility. The paper urges geographers studying such initiatives to pay attention to: first, contestations by emigrants who resist the diasporic imaginaries propagated by sending state strategies; second, emigrants who are neglected in the national articulations of these sending state strategies; third, the proliferation of emigrant populations claiming belonging to two or more countries; and lastly, the asymmetrical spatialities produced by these sending state strategies. These research directions reveal the uneven spatialities of the transnational spatial projects mooted by sending state strategies.

**Terminologies and analytical beginnings**

Anthropologists, sociologists, political and legal theorists (Escobar, 2003; Guarnizo, 1998; Itzigsohn, 2000; Goldring, 2001; Barry, 2006) have earlier studied the attempts by Latin American and Caribbean sending states to reach out to their labor emigrants, framing their arguments on the complications posed to citizenship by transnationalism. For instance, Michael Peter Smith (2003a) and Robert Smith (2003) characterize the political connections forged by Mexican governments with Mexican emigrants in the United States (US) as a type of transnational citizenship. They use the label, ‘extraterritorial citizen’ (M.P. Smith, 2003b; R. Smith, 2003) to describe emigrants with citizenly rights outside of Mexico or who claim such rights. Fitzgerald (2006), in turn, uses the labels ‘extraterritorial citizenship’ and ‘emigrant citizenship’ interchangeably to describe the way political power is reconfigured territorially as states extend membership and rights to emigrants.

Bauböck (2009) later introduces the term, ‘external citizenship’, to debate the legitimacy and enforceability of status, rights and duties for emigrant populations. Concerns arise over the capacity of sending states to enforce conscription or taxation on emigrants; dual citizenship complications; and a disjuncture favoring emigrant rights over duties (Fitzgerald, 2006 and 2008; Nyers, 2009; Bauböck, 2009). To some extent, the professional and business class emigrants targeted by sending states fit Ong’s (1999) controversial depiction of flexible citizens who accumulate multiple citizenships and
capitalize on ethnic and kinship networks in different countries to advance transnational
capitalism while avoiding their citizenly responsibilities.

On the other hand, geographers analyzing sending state strategies tend to deploy the
concept of diaspora. Geographers have long engaged with the study of diaspora both as a
social condition and as an analytical construct (Mitchell, 1997; Blunt, 2003; Samers,
2003; White, 2003; Jazeel, 2006; King and Christou, 2009). A growing interest amongst
some geographers has focused on sending state efforts to mobilize their elite expatriate
populations, such as by extending recognition, citizenship membership and rights abroad.
Some states even establish government departments to liaise with and organize national
events for citizens abroad. In a report compiled from an international policy workshop,
Ancien et al (2009:3) categorize such initiatives as a ‘diaspora strategy’ and define it as
‘an explicit and systematic policy initiative or series of policy initiatives aimed at
developing and managing relationships with a diaspora’.

This paper focuses on sending states that seek to capitalize on emigrants’ professional
and business networks and competencies to facilitate transnational financial exchanges,
rather than merely relying on remittances, in order to accelerate economic development
in the country of origin. The emerging geographical literature on this topic ranges from
those making a case for targeting the professional and business class through such
strategies (Bedford, 2001; Bedford et al, 2002; Hugo, 2006a and 2006b; Gamlen, 2007),
to those seeking to make sense of the disparate initiatives deployed by sending states
(Gamlen, 2008; Ancien et al, 2009), and others endeavoring to unpack the logics
underpinning these activities (Dickinson and Bailey, 2007; Larner, 2007).

The dissonances and new configurations happening to notions of nation, state and
territory in the context of globalization have been an established subject of discussion in
geography (Allen, 2004; Amin, 2004; Brenner, 2004; Agnew, 2005; Jonas and Ward,
2007). Geographers studying elite emigrant initiatives by sending states agree that the
territoriality of the state should not be taken for granted (Dickinson and Bailey, 2007) and
that territory should not be confused with territorialization (Gamlen, 2008). Sending
states are extending their right to govern beyond territorial confines by stretching membership recognition, conferring citizenly rights and claiming obligations from emigrants. In this way, processes of territorialization reinforcing the state’s right to govern exceed the physical boundaries of the nation-state, thereby enabling the sending state to engage in re-territorialization amidst de-territorialization. However, this paper contends that these discussions on state territoriality in relation to professional and business class emigrant populations should be disentangled analytically from the idea of diaspora.

‘Claiming’ the diaspora
The idea of diaspora, according to Anthias (1998:559), describes ‘a connection between groups across different nation states whose commonality derives from an original but maybe removed homeland; a new identity becomes constructed on a world scale which cross national borders and boundaries’. For others like Gilroy (1993) and Hall (1990), diaspora is characterized by hybridity and heterogeneity, which disrupts the tidy containerization of nation-states and identity categories. A proliferation of writings on diaspora, however, leads Brubaker (2005) to ask ‘are we seeing simply a proliferation of diaspora talk, a change in idiom rather than in the world?’ It is this conceptual stretching in relation to the literature on sending state strategies targeting professional and business class emigrants that I will address in this section.

In the studies on sending state strategies towards elite emigrants there is a troubling analytical slippage that conflates the idea of diaspora (long distance identification with a homeland) with the emigrant populations targeted by such strategies. On the one hand, geographers engaging with the scholarship on elite mobility and sending state strategies recognize that the idea of diaspora is appropriated in strategic ways (Dickinson and Bailey, 2007; Larner, 2007) and that there may in fact be ‘varieties of diasporas’ (Ancien et al, 2009:30). However, it is ironic that the debates are nonetheless anchored on the idea of diaspora and thus the common use of labels like diaspora strategies, diaspora relations, diaspora engagement and diaspora membership (Dickinson and Bailey, 2007;
Larner, 2007; Gamlen, 2008; Ancien et al 2009) both as descriptors and as analytical frameworks.

Deploying the concept of diaspora as a point of reference suggests and reifies, *a priori*, the existence of an identifiable diaspora body that is the subject of courtship by sending state strategies. As Yeoh and Willis (1999:357) argue, ‘diasporic existence and imaginations also give rise to new strategies [which] may be state-designed’. Thus discussions on state strategies targeting professional and business class emigrant populations should examine circumspectly the claims made by sending states about the idea of diaspora. The very act of naming by sending states brings into being an idea of diaspora that is tied to the national imaginary and nationalist ambitions (Werbner, 2002). Such approaches perpetuate the problematic of connoting diaspora as a unitary category and also assumptions of community that reproduce essentialized notions of place and identity, which could stoke ethnonationalism (Anthias, 1993:563; Carter, 2005:54).

Invoking diaspora also risks re-inscribing essentialist identities that serve to further capital accumulation (Mitchell, 1997). Indeed, the elite emigrant initiatives deployed by sending states emphasize national economic development through human capital transfer and entrepreneurialism. The neoliberal business ethos articulating the idea of diaspora in these sending state initiatives can potentially accentuate particularistic and divisive affiliations like hometown belonging, religion and ethnicity (Mohan, 2008). For instance, Cohen (2009) argues that Israeli programs encouraging skilled Israeli Jews abroad to return to Israel are backed by economic rationalism and ethno-nationalism. Such sending state strategies furthermore privilege particular representations such as global professional relationships while heightening socio-economic divisions with those who are not privy to such networks. Bringing into focus and giving serious treatment to the critical literature on diaspora would enable the emerging geographical scholarship on sending state initiatives to interrogate critically the ways in which the idea of diaspora is cultivated by sending states².

² I recognise that there may be different government departments within a single state involved in liaising with emigrants and they may have contradictory agendas, but for the
Notably, both state and non-state agents are implicated in these projects of naming and claiming. The state has been a prime actor in the countries reaching out to elite emigrants. Scholars also highlight the activities of emigrant groups in lobbying and cooperating with sending states to strengthen the state’s capacity abroad (Hugo, 2006a; Larner, 2007; Gamlen, 2008). However, the role of research and policy think tanks, preceding state interest, in promoting these strategies should be brought to the fore in scholarly analyses.

In Canada, for instance, the non-profit Asia-Pacific Foundation (APF) think tank is a key advocate in urging the Canadian state to adopt a consolidated approach towards Canadians abroad (Zhang, 2009; Devoretz, 2009). The APF has been collecting data and disseminating information on research and activities related to the overseas Canadian community. Its activities include setting up a web portal, distributing electronic newsletters and sponsoring events to keep overseas Canadians connected to Canada. In a press letter, the director of the APF even urged the government to establish a ‘Ministry of Canadians Abroad’ as a dedicated outfit looking into the issues faced by overseas Canadians (Devoretz and Parasram, 2010). The British Institute of Public Policy Research (IPPR) has also set up a ‘Brits Abroad’ website to increase public awareness on emigration from the United Kingdom and encourage the government to engage more with its emigrant populations (Sriskandarajah and Drew, 2006; also see Finch et al, 2010).

These parties, state and non-state, actively ‘claim’ the diaspora in two ways: first, by way of laying claim to an identifiable object, and second, ‘claiming’ in terms of imagining and materializing the idea of an object. It is in this sense that Haiti claims its scattered emigrant population as a ‘tenth department’ in addition to the nine geographic departments within Haiti (Fitzgerald 2008:3). Likewise, Canada’s dispersed emigrant populations have been categorized as ‘Canada’s secret province’ (Devoretz, 2009). Such acts of ‘claiming’ the diaspora constitute new spatialities and subjectivities that tend to subsume political and social differences. In the remainder of this paper, I will use the term, new extraterritorial citizenship strategies instead of diaspora strategies, in order to

purpose of this paper I used the phrase ‘state’ to refer to the overall governing apparatus of a country.
first, de-center the imaginary of ‘diaspora’ as well as emphasize the implications of these strategies for citizenship and citizenly subjectivities. Second, new extraterritorial citizenship strategies differentiate the new subjects being ‘claimed’, namely the professional and business class, from the earlier literature on sending states with significant populations of emigrants in low-paid, low-skilled jobs. The targeted professional and business class emigrants are part of sending states’ neoliberal projects to mobilize human capital and international business links, which they believe can help enhance national economic competitiveness in the global knowledge-based economy.

Cultivating the ‘diaspora’

Much has been written about the manner in which immigrant regimes like the United Kingdom, Australia and Singapore are promoting economic development through managed immigration policies (Kofman, 2005; Flynn, 2005; Yeoh, 2006). The ‘race’ for global talent to promote growth in national knowledge-based economies is, however, not limited to immigration contexts, but extends to emigration contexts trying to play catch up as well. The recent initiatives promoting knowledge exchange, investment and development by countries such as New Zealand, Ireland, India and China are not wholly novel. Labor-exporting countries in Latin America and the Caribbean were forerunners in institutionalizing relationships with their labor emigrants. What is distinctive about the former group of countries now implementing the new extraterritorial citizenship strategies are the professional and business class they are targeting and the logics underpinning these initiatives. It is this niche in migration policies that has caught the attention of geographers recently.

The interest that sending states have in professional and business class emigrants is premised on neoliberal capitalist logics and the anticipated benefits of being plugged into global networks, which will bring countries (and individuals) economic opportunities. As cited in the IPPR publication titled ‘Brits Abroad’ (Sriskandarajah and Drew, 2006:74), ‘engaging more actively with its diaspora would benefit the UK economically by providing it with a network of people in senior positions who could create relationships abroad, promote UK industries and give their time and experience to young Britons in the
UK and channel investment to the UK’. These ideas on global exchanges are influenced in part by an economic geography literature on ‘brain circulation’ (Saxenian, 2005), which has not only gained popularity amongst academics as a theoretical tool but also amongst international and national policymakers as a policy approach (Wescott, 2006; Mani and Varadarajan, 2004; Zweig et al, 2008; Ancien et al, 2009). International and national policymakers regard the new extraterritorial citizenship strategies as a means to benefit national development by ‘connecting the dots’ to join up and mobilize geographically dispersed emigrant knowledge and investment.

Amidst the hype over brain circulation, its actual benefits are, however, disputed by some scholars, including Saxenian herself (2005). In a later study of Mainland Chinese policies to attract returnees and overseas Chinese investments for development, she points out that, unlike the prototype Taiwanese Silicon Valley-Hsinchu case study, a number of factors hinder the positive effects of brain circulation in China. These include a bureaucratic, risk-averse and unregulated environment in China coupled with inexperience and the lack of integration between R&D and commercialization. In a separate study, Chen (2008) examines Saxenian’s brain circulation thesis and argues that returnees have made limited contributions in Beijing’s Zhongguancun Science Park. Chen (ibid) suggests this is because vertical guanxi relationships (personal ties) rather than lateral market trust have hindered the efficacy of the enterprises. He adds that the portfolio of the returnees also needs to be differentiated in terms of the transnational and local connections they can capitalize upon to build up the enterprises. In other words, the new extraterritorial citizenship strategies targeting human and international business capital, which are premised on knowledge and capital transfer logics, may not produce the benefits anticipated by policymakers.

The preceding arguments problematizing national articulations of diaspora and questioning the underlying logics of the new extraterritorial citizenship strategies signal a need to interrogate the reasoning, population catchment, effects and politics of such strategies. The remainder of this paper will now signal four additional areas of study to
help advance geographical scholarship on the new extraterritorial citizenship strategies that are growing in popularity amongst sending states seeking to win the race for talent.

**Contesting diaspora cultivation**

As signaled earlier in this paper, much of extant geographical literature on the new extraterritorial citizenship strategies is framed analytically around the idea of diaspora. Indeed, underpinning the new extraterritorial citizenship strategies is the imagination and mobilization of a national community living outside of the national borders. Discourses propagating roots and belonging reconfigure geographic mobility into a spatial arrangement that gives coherence to the nation and the diaspora as a single spatial and temporal unit (Ma Mung, 2004). However, a now well-established literature examining the idea of diaspora (Anthias, 1998; Werbner, 2002; Samers, 2003) as well as that on transnational migration (Yeoh and Willis, 1999; Walsh, 2006) illuminates the fractured nature of national belonging during migrancy. Development geographers have further highlighted ethnic, political and hometown affiliations that divide emigrants from the same country of origin (Mohan, 2008; Lampert, 2009; McGregor, 2009). With these in view, the new extraterritorial citizenship strategies by sending states aimed at professional and business class emigrants should be made subject to analyses considering how these states attempt to coalesce and cement notions of ‘diaspora’ where such a diasporic imagination and identification might have been previously weak or lacking.

The universalizing narratives propagated by sending states may be questioned by the elite subjects targeted under the new extraterritorial citizenship strategies, which brings me to my main point here. The existing geographical literature on initiatives by sending states in relation to elite mobility provides few insights into contestations and re-negotiated scripts. Lessons can be gleaned from the empirically grounded writings of other disciplines like sociology and anthropology instead. For instance, Mani and Varadarajan (2005) provide several insights through their study of celebrations at India’s *Pravasi Bharatiya Divas* (Days of Indians Abroad). They argue that the Indian state’s account of Indians abroad conflates into a singular narrative the different histories of colonial and postcolonial migration, varied regional origins as well as the distinct class positions of
those identified as Persons of Indian Origin or Non-Resident Indians. Several of the Indian delegates at the celebrations, some of whom are prominent persons in their countries of residence, expressed ambivalence towards the universalizing narratives and exhortations for return and patriotic contributions. They were concerned that calls for patriotism towards India might cause friction with their countries of residence. Others from Fiji expressed resentment towards the lack of intervention by the Indian government when ethnic Indian Fijians were attacked in the aftermath of the Fijian coup in 2000. These insights indicate that even as sending states sponsor actively new extraterritorial citizenship strategies, the state may also be held accountable for its version of diasporic belonging and contributions as well as previous inaction. Such alternative perspectives draw attention to the manner in which the outreach efforts of sending states are redefined by emigrants.

The analysis by Mani and Varadarajan (2005) is but one case study of the new extraterritorial citizenship strategies that is growing in popularity amongst sending state interested in recapturing human capital and global investment. It leaves open to question: what other types of contestations are there by elite emigrants? For instance, is it possible that China’s attempts to create links and attract back its scientific and professorial elite abroad could result in high-level demands for greater academic freedom and transparency within the country? The responses of elite emigrants in relation to the state, whether in support or not, helps reframe the struggles over defining membership and citizenly claims-making. Geographers can contribute to this emerging scholarship by conducting comparative research in a variety of national and transnational contexts, examining not only who moots such projects and their motivations and activities, but also emigrant trajectories and the response of elite emigrants to sending state initiatives. Significantly, geographically situated empirical analyses can flesh out and conceptualize the spatial implications of such negotiations; even as sending states attempt to develop a ‘transnational space’ (Margheritis, 2007), contestations by elite emigrants can disrupt such state-sponsored projects and spatial formations. Methodologically speaking, these views are elicited most productively when the researcher ‘gets out’ into the field to observe and allow the subjects under consideration an opportunity to ‘speak back’ to the
broader discourses circulating and shaping human behavior. Focusing the analytical lens on the fractures and fissures of the new extraterritorial citizenship strategies in this way helps flesh out the contested aspects of state-society relations while decentering both national and diasporic spatial imaginaries.

**Neglected emigrants**
Besides the views of the visible subjects targeted by sending state strategies, another productive area of study is to bring into view other subjects that have been, whether intentionally or unintentionally, neglected by the hegemonic discourses in circulation. The new extraterritorial citizenship strategies mainly court emigrants belonging to the professional and business class, especially individuals in the science, engineering, technology and business fields. This has led to criticisms that such sending state initiatives are elitist. As Raghuram (2009:109) argues, ‘mobility is a strategization of power that reinforces certain versions of development’; thus geographical scholarship should pay careful attention to the selective nature of the new extraterritorial citizenship strategies. Sending state initiatives ought to be examined critically for the ostensible spatial absences in state narratives of diaspora, belonging and contribution.

In an analysis of the new extraterritorial citizenship strategies by India and New Zealand, class privileging is flagged up as a distinctive area for contention by Dickinson and Bailey (2007) and Larner (2007) respectively. In the case of India, Dickinson and Bailey (2007) argue that discourses propagated by the Indian state sideline labor migration histories, specifically South African migration, in favor of the new emphasis on human capital and investment. Likewise, Larner (2007:342) highlights that New Zealand’s outreach towards Kiwis abroad has ignored the substantive numbers of working class New Zealanders who had moved to neighboring Australia. This suggests that the visible targets of the new extraterritorial citizenship strategies are those in privileged class positions and more likely to be based in North America and Europe, an issue that will be discussed later in this paper. Yet the category of professional and business migrants is a slippery one as migrants in such occupations in their origin countries may become
deskilled in the receiving context, such as in the case of the Hong Kong ‘millionaire migrants’ (Ley, 2009) and Mainland Chinese skilled immigrants in Canada (Li, 2008).

Other than classed invisibilities, still more can be done to contribute to such analyses on at least two levels. First, what other axes of neglect are there? This brings to mind arguments foregrounding the need to recognize the multiple axes of difference within cultural constructions of identity and essentialising discourses of diaspora (Anthias, 1998; Braziel and Mannur, 2003; Brubaker, 2005). These differences and divisions may arise from historical and local conditions, as well as from the intersections of gender, ethnicity, political affiliation and religion. What are the implications of these axes of neglect for what citizenship represents as a social compact and citizenly equality? In the case of religion, Mani and Varadarajan (2005) argue that there is a geopolitical and religious absence in the definition of diaspora propagated by the Indian state. Those expelled from India when Pakistan and Bangladesh, both predominantly Muslim societies, sought independence are noticeably absent from the Indian state’s selective narrative of diaspora. This in turn intersects with a simmering Hindu nationalism that underpins and is reproduced at the Pravisa Bharatiya Divas when accolades are given to pravisa bharatiya who support Hindu fundamentalist politicians and groups. By inference, this suggests a privileging of the Hindu national identity not only within but also beyond the national territory despite the secular Indian state’s claim to multiculturalism.

The parallel scholarship on transnational social spaces also provides a useful reference point for future studies interrogating the politics of negligence in the emergent spaces of new extraterritorial citizenship strategies. Extant literature on gender, for instance, points to the manner in which women’s identities as carers and nurturers of the home are reinforced through the emphasis on male career mobilities at the expense of relegating care-giving roles to female spouses (Yeoh and Willis, 1999). Apart from gendered symbolisms, women’s actual rights as citizens may also be compromised through their lack of representation in the groups that liaise with sending states and the subsequent secondary priority given to their concerns (Goldring, 2001). Similarly, gendered absences in the new extraterritorial citizenship strategies deserve further study, especially the
manner in which this may re-entrench assumptions about gender roles amongst human capital-bearing subjects.

The above examples illustrate the dimensions of neglect inherent in the new extraterritorial citizenship strategies such as along the lines of sidelined histories, class, gender, religion and geopolitical anxieties. These strategies privilege particular identities (or citizens) and perform a sleight of hand that re-inscribes essentialist national identities while making invisible other overlapping spaces of political and social identities. Future research on the new extraterritorial citizenship strategies should articulate in greater depth the geographical and historical conditions contributing to such spatial absences.

**Proliferating emigrant mobilities**

The literature on transnational migration indicates that with accentuated mobility and especially patterns of transnational sojourning (Ley and Kobayashi, 2005), emigrants may be counted as part of more than one national population while abroad. For example, the Greek returnees in the study by King and Christou (2009), characterized by them as a counter-diaspora, are situated simultaneously as part of another country’s emigrant population (namely the US or Germany in this case study) as well. The *Nikkeijin* with mixed ancestry in White’s (2003) study are regarded as both Japanese and Brazilian, but economic and social marginalization in Japan reinforce their identification with Brazil (Ruiz, 2005). Return migration trends amongst Hong Kong and Mainland Chinese returnees (Ley and Kobayashi, 2005; Zhu, 2007; Kobayashi and Preston, 2007; Salaff et al, 2008) with Canadian citizenship status position them as part of a Canadian population in Greater China even though when in Canada they are considered by China as overseas Chinese (Salaff and Chan, 2006). Although these trends may not be new, as indicated in Blunt’s (2003) study of Anglo-Indians who claim belonging to both imperial India and post-colonial Britain, greater mobility today accentuates the complexity of claims to national affiliation.

The current geographical literature on new extraterritorial citizenship strategies have been, however, limited to studying the emigrant populations of one source country. The
The treatment of emigrant subjects belonging to two (or more) countries is a new area deserving of study for it can help illuminate the attitudes of sending states towards sovereignty and citizenship despite claims to extraterritorial initiatives. For instance, the Singaporean state, claiming that more Singaporeans are remaining overseas for longer periods of time, changed its citizenship regulations so that Singaporeans born abroad and who had obtained their citizenship by descent (rather than birth or naturalization) can continue to pass on their Singaporean citizenship to their children (*Parliamentary Debates Singapore*, 2004). Yet, Singapore does not allow dual citizenship citing concerns over divided loyalties. Canada, on the other hand, recognizes dual citizenship and used to allow citizenship by descent for up to three generations. However, it changed its regulations in the wake of a controversy over the 15,000 Canadian citizens who had to be rescued during the Lebanon war in 2006, many of whom returned eventually to Lebanon (Nyers, 2009). In 2009 Canada tightened citizenship regulations to limit the passing of citizenship by descent for children born overseas to only one generation. In other words, foreign-born Canadians who have their children abroad will not be able to pass on the right of citizenship to their children (*Globe and Mail*, 3 February 2009), unlike in the past when citizenship could be passed on to the second and third generations. Studies into the new extraterritorial citizenship strategies governing subjects belonging to two (or more) countries can help reveal the partial nature of these initiatives and the sustained reservations nation-states have about an extraterritorial model of citizenship.

The new extraterritorial citizenship strategies promoted by most sending states have, moreover, been restricted to conventional views of which mobile populations should be targeted. The transnational migration literature has long signaled the commuting practices of Chinese immigrant families in countries like Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the US (Bedford et al, 2002; Ong, 1999; Waters, 2003). Bryant and Law (2005) argue that efforts focusing on New Zealand’s emigrant populations have overshadowed the economic potential represented by immigrant populations living within New Zealand, which are usually characterized as another country’s emigrants. These immigrants, many of whom have naturalized as citizens, offer New Zealand unprecedented opportunities for creating business links with their countries of origin but their potential has been
overlooked in the new extraterritorial citizenship strategies that prioritize primordial attachments instead. In another case, the aforementioned Asia-Pacific Foundation recognizes that immigrants from Greater China (including Hong Kong) and India who have naturalized in Canada are returning to their country of origin. As such it is pressing Canadian policymakers to take seriously the business potential represented by subsequent immigrants’ emigration from Canada and the need to reach out to these constituencies abroad (Globe and Mail, 2006). These observations suggest that scholars should train their analytical lens not only on the strategies of sending states on one side of the spectrum, but also examine to what extent the ties that immigrants sustain with their sending countries can benefit immigrant-receiving countries as well. Additionally, it is also worth considering whether subsequent emigration by immigrants who have already naturalized in the receiving country results in new types of ‘sending’ state strategies by countries of immigration.

In sum, the proliferating emigrant mobilities sketched out above complicate the universalizing narratives of genealogies and present a multiplicity of origins when compared to what is popularly and unilaterally referred to as ‘diaspora’. Cresswell (2006:21) argues that ideologies of mobility are implicated in the production of mobile practices. Proliferating emigrant mobilities present new questions over whose ‘diaspora’ is being targeted, by which country and the underlying assumptions about belonging, community and loyalty. Future study into the new extraterritorial citizenship strategies could take into consideration the manner in which proliferating elite emigrant mobilities result in partial spaces of citizenship and where struggles for cultural and legal recognition are made over time (Staeheli, 2008).

**Spatial considerations**

As earlier discussed, the brain circulation thesis has been influential in prompting sending states to implement new extraterritorial citizenship strategies connecting their countries with emigrants abroad who can direct knowledge and investments back to the country of origin. Studies of such strategies suggest that such networks challenge territorial sovereignty as sending states extend their outreach to elite emigrants living into other
countries (Margheritis, 2007). These views parallel a broader trend within human geography shifting from scalar to networks analyses (Bunnell and Coe, 2001; Amin, 2002; Brenner, 2004). However, new debates on categories of spatial analysis suggest that there is more to the new extraterritorial citizenship strategies than flows and networks. Moreover, I argue that studying these new extraterritorial citizenship strategies can help further inform socio-spatial debates.

In their consideration of the spatial concepts (namely territory, place, scale, networks) used to understand the spatiality of social relations, Jessop et al (2008) argue that it is important to locate socio-spatial theorizations in the empirical phenomenon being studied and to articulate the different socio-spatial dimensions at work. Apart from the abovementioned spatial concepts, several geographers have advocated alternative ways of conceptualizing spatiality. The most provocative of these has been the call by Marston et al (2007) to abandon scale in favor of a flat ontology of ‘sites’. A number of geographers, however, express reluctance to renounce scale entirely though they recognize and caution against an ontological fetishism of scale (Leitner and Miller, 2007; Moore, 2008 and Legg, 2009). Thus Moore (2008) suggests that the analytical aspects of scale should be distinguished from studying the politics of scale as practice (how people experience and engage with their social worlds). Adding to that, Legg (2009) argues that a view of scalar hierarchies can help illuminate the unequal distribution and contestation of power within network and assemblage-based analyses. He further suggests that apparatuses are suitable as another category of spatial analysis when re-territorializing and re-scaling tendencies are dominant within assemblages.

Studying the new extraterritorial citizenship strategies discussed in this paper presents opportunities to advance a multi-faceted understanding of spatiality in several ways. The new extraterritorial citizenship strategies challenge territorial and place-based definitions of sovereignty and citizenship while invoking a networked imaginary through the strategies targeting scattered emigrant populations (Larner, 2007; Dickinson and Bailey, 2008). Yet one can argue that scalar hierarchies of state power are reproduced in these strategies that enable states to govern beyond their national territories (Gamlen, 2008; Ho,
2008). Significantly, this paper has recommended studying contestations towards such state strategies and to make visible the emigrant populations that are neglected by these strategies. The paper also signals the importance of studying the proliferating mobilities manifested by emigrant populations, which result in the production of new sites of citizenship claims-making. These additional areas for study can contribute to analyses recognizing the manner in which dynamically changing and heterogeneously populated sites interplay with de/re-territorialized, networked and scalar operations.

On one level, empirically grounded studies of the new extraterritorial strategies can help illuminate the variety of spatial processes at work in any given moment and to demonstrate how particular concepts, such as territory, scale and networks come to the fore, and mutually imbricate one another, in specific spatiotemporal contexts (Jessop et al, 2008). However, these studies should not stop at taking the spatial metaphors for explanation, and instead as Moore (2008) suggests, aim to unpack the relationship between sociological processes and spatial conceptualization in order to contribute towards articulating the socio-spatial struggles at work. Consider for example the geographical implications of the new extraterritorial citizenship strategies discussed below.

The emergence of the new extraterritorial citizenship strategies belies the traditional north-south divide in that countries of both economically mature and less mature economies are engaged in this competition for emigrant human capital and investment. In fact in this respect, countries like India and China are regarded as innovators (Zhu, 2007). While ongoing efforts are made to connect with elite emigrant populations in various parts of the world, the networks imagery is capitalized upon simultaneously by sending states to project a globalized image of themselves. It has also been suggested that the “diaspora option” (Zweig et al, 2008) can help narrow the ‘North-South scientific gap’ (ibid, 4). However, shifting the analytical lens to the receiving end reveals that these sending state initiatives tend to be concentrated in the core regions or metropolitan cities of the world.
As Larner (2007) observes in her study of New Zealand, the membership of the government-supported Kiwi Expatriate Association (KEA) is more likely to be in North America, the United Kingdom (UK) or Europe despite three-quarters of the overseas population being based in Australia. This disparity is reflected when compared to the results of a survey distributed amongst KEA networks that indicated only 26.3% of those who responded to the survey were in Australia compared to approximately three-quarters who indicated their locations as the UK, Ireland and USA (Gamlen, 2007:13). The concentration of the government-supported KEA membership in these core regions is not unusual amongst sending states trying to develop initiatives and consolidate membership amongst selective emigrant populations. In the case of India, the emigrants deemed to be of the most strategic resource to India’s national development are the professional class of Indian immigrants based in the United States, United Kingdom and Canada. The Indian immigrants in Europe and North America are depicted as the ones who best represent the political and economic ambitions of India in the twenty-first century according to a 2001 report by the High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora (Mani and Varadarajan, 2005:54). Moreover, the first three ‘Mini Pravati Bharayati Divas’, seeking to bring the festivities to emigrants unable to attend the main celebrations in India, were held in cities representing affluence, namely New York (2007), Singapore (2008) and the Hague (in 2009 to coincide with the World Trade Organization meeting).

I argue that the mobilization of emigration populations in core regions or metropolitan cities as sources of human capital and international business links reinforce these spaces of present or potential knowledge, innovation and wealth. For instance, the pool of overseas Chinese professionals targeted by Mainland China’s initiatives to promote educational, business and technological links are in fact based predominantly in North America, Europe and Japan (see Wescott, 2006; Zweig et al, 2008). The links these overseas Chinese professionals generate with China reverberate back to these heartlands, producing profitable margins, technological spin-offs, research and development opportunities, and personnel exchange for the countries involved. Zweig et al (2008:27) note the case of a Mainland Chinese professor based in Canada who claims that his professional collaborations in China propelled his research and helped him recruit
talented graduate students and research assistants, some of whom he brought back to Canada. This view of networks indicates that the density of exchanges and benefits are limited to key nodes in the network. The selective nature of these networks entrenches asymmetrical global relationships with countries that are not privy to membership in this club of networks.

Just as geography is central to understanding the networked nature of the new extraterritorial citizenship strategies, the processes under study also raise questions about the asymmetrical spatialities produced by these strategies. Certainly, the above observations are not the only spatialities at work; more empirically-led research exploring the networks of other sending states and receiving contexts is called for in order to better understand the geographical implications of these new extraterritorial citizenship strategies.

**Conclusion**

In this paper, I have problematised the categorization known as ‘diaspora strategies’ and set out new directions for geographical inquiry into the elitist extraterritorial citizenship strategies of sending states. These sending state strategies seek to mobilize elite emigrants’ human capital and international business links. I note that extant geographical scholarship on sending state strategies helps challenge the methodological nationalism that takes the territorially bounded nation-state as its unit of analysis. However, I also argue that these studies re-centre articulations of the nation-state by suggesting the existence of a diaspora that is the subject of courtship by sending states. I argue that geographers should be attentive to the cultivation of such diasporic imaginations by sending state strategies that seek to instill notions of membership, rights and duties in dispersed and variegated emigrant populations.

The paper then outlines several areas in which geographers can contribute to delineating the uneven terrain of the spatial formations that come about as a result of these new extraterritorial citizenship strategies. Unpacking these uneven spatialities is important because they shape new citizenship formations within and beyond the nation-state. First, I
urge geographers to carry out empirically grounded analyses that can reveal contestations within universalizing narratives put forward by sending states. In so doing, geographers can contribute by disrupting national and diasporic spatial imaginations that reinforce the ideological power of the nation-state, Second, I foreground the importance of paying attention to emigrant populations neglected by the new extraterritorial citizenship strategies in order to consider the absent spaces of citizenship. Third, I draw attention to proliferating emigrant mobilities as a new area for investigating underlying assumptions about belonging, community and loyalty. This research angle reveals the partial spaces of the new extraterritorial citizenship strategies. Lastly, I argue that studies of these new extraterritorial citizenship strategies can inform geographical debates on spatiality and I also suggest the implications of such asymmetrical geographies for political and social outcomes. My goal in outlining these four agendas for further study is to signal, not the foreclosing of questions, but their opening up through geographically informed analyses.

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