Subsidies in an R&D growth model with elastic labor

Jinli Zeng\textsuperscript{a,*}, Jie Zhang\textsuperscript{b,c}

\textsuperscript{a}Department of Economics, National University of Singapore, 1 Arts Link, Block AS2, Singapore 117570, Singapore
\textsuperscript{b}National University of Singapore, 1 Arts Link, Block AS2, Singapore 117570, Singapore
\textsuperscript{c}University of Queensland, Qld., Australia

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Abstract

This paper compares different subsidies in an R&D growth model with competitive suppliers of a final good and monopolistic suppliers of intermediate goods. Unlike existing studies with lump-sum taxes and fixed labor, we assume distortionary taxes and elastic labor, finding some new insights. First, subsidizing R&D investment is more effective than subsidizing final output or subsidizing the purchase of intermediate goods in terms of promoting growth. Second, in terms of raising welfare, the R&D subsidy may also be more effective than the other subsidies and all of them are dominated by their mix, but none can achieve the social optimum.

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1. Introduction

R&D activities for innovations, a major driving force for growth, are subsidized in many industrial countries and receive increasing attention in economic studies. The
rationale for government intervention involving R&D activities originates from the fact that innovators of new goods face knowledge spillovers and difficulties in appropriating the benefits of innovations (e.g., Romer, 1990; Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Jones and Williams, 2000). Due to this externality, there would be too little incentive to engage costly innovations without government intervention, as innovators do not internalize the gains from their innovations. A typical form of government intervention dealing with this R&D externality is to grant monopoly rights to innovators in such forms as patents and trademarks. However, even if monopoly protection is granted permanently to successful innovators selling their goods in the model of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) with expanding varieties of intermediate goods via R&D, the decentralized equilibrium always suffers too little R&D investment and thus too slow growth.1 In such a model, pricing above marginal costs is necessary for R&D to break even on the one hand, but reduces the demand for intermediate goods below the first-best level on the other hand. That is, granting monopoly rights alone does not eliminate under-investment in R&D in the presence of the R&D externality.

In order to internalize the R&D externality and correct the distortion of the monopoly pricing, various types of subsidies have been examined in the literature with lump-sum taxes and fixed labor supply. As expected, the R&D subsidy can indeed promote R&D investment and growth (e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995; Davidson and Segerstrom, 1998). Much less obvious is that the R&D subsidy is dominated by other types of subsidies in terms of social welfare (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995): Subsidizing either final output produced by competitive firms or the purchase of intermediate goods produced by monopolistic firms can achieve the social optimum, but subsidizing R&D, though also welfare improving, cannot. This is somewhat surprising as the actual government policy has tended to rely on R&D subsidies, e.g., the United States has long had an R&D subsidy in place. One reason seems to be that the R&D subsidy is an ‘inexpensive’ tool in terms of lost revenue, which can only be made up with distortionary taxes, since lump-sum taxes assumed in the related studies mentioned above are hard to implement.

Once limiting our funding options to distortionary taxes and allowing for elastic labor supply, several interesting questions arise: first, do these subsidies still stimulate growth and improve welfare? Second, are the subsidies to final or intermediate products still better than the R&D subsidy? Third, can these subsidies completely eliminate the distortion of the monopoly pricing and internalize the R&D externality to achieve the social optimum in a decentralized setting? Finally, if the social optimum cannot be achieved, can different subsidies be combined to generate a better outcome than using a single subsidy?2

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1Over-investment in R&D may also occur in models with different settings but much empirical evidence supports under-investment in R&D (e.g., Cohen and Levin, 1991; Griliches, 1992; Nadiri, 1993; Jones and Williams, 1998).

2This is not an issue in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) because a single subsidy, either to final output or to the purchase of intermediate goods, can achieve the social optimum with the aid of lump-sum taxes.
The objective of this paper is to answer these questions. Specifically, using distortionary taxes we examine the different types of subsidies and their combinations in terms of their effects on growth and welfare. In order to do so, we extend the R&D growth model of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) with variety expansion by incorporating elastic labor supply.

Our different approach brings to light several new insights. First, subsidizing R&D investment is more effective than subsidizing final output or subsidizing the purchase of intermediate goods in terms of promoting growth. This is because the former directly reduces the cost of R&D investment at a lower tax cost compared to the latter forms of subsidies. The lower tax revenue for the R&D subsidy to achieve any given growth target than other subsidies does give the R&D subsidy an advantage when the tax has to be distortionary. Second, in terms of raising welfare, the R&D subsidy may also be more effective than the other subsidies and all of them are dominated by their mix, but none can achieve the social optimum, because of the relative strength and weakness associated with the different types of subsidies. As mentioned above, the R&D subsidy tends to be more effective in engendering dynamic gains at a lower tax cost than the other types of subsidies, in a direction of mitigating the under-investment caused by the R&D externality. As in the literature, however, the R&D subsidy is less effective than the other subsidies in reducing the efficiency loss associated with monopoly pricing.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section sets up the model and solves firms and households’ optimization problems. Section 3 describes the social planner’s problem, which is to be compared with decentralized solutions. Section 4 derives the results. The last section concludes.

2. The model

The model is an extension of the endogenous growth model with variety expansion in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, Chapter 6) by considering a labor–leisure choice and distortionary taxes. In this model, R&D investment creates new types of intermediate goods for final production.

2.1. Households

The economy is populated with a continuum of identical infinitely lived households with a (constant) mass \( L \). Each household has one unit of time which is allocated between leisure \( l \) and production \((1 - l)\). The representative household’s preferences are defined over an infinite horizon

\[
U_0 = \int_0^\infty \left[ \frac{(c^\theta)'^{1-\theta} - 1}{1 - \theta} \right] e^{-\rho t} \, dt, \quad \theta > 0, \quad \rho > 0, \quad \varepsilon > 0, \tag{1}
\]
where \(c\) is consumption, \(\rho\) the rate of time preference, \(\varepsilon\) the taste for leisure, and \(\theta\) the inverse of the constant elasticity of intertemporal substitution. To economize notations, we omit time subscript \(t\) whenever no confusion may arise.

Household income, from assets and work, is allocated between consumption and saving

\[
\dot{a} = ar + (1 - \tau)w(1 - l) - c, \tag{2}
\]

where \(\tau\) is the tax rate on labor income, \(a\) the amount of assets, \(\dot{a}\) the time derivative of \(a\) (or investment), \(r\) the real interest rate, and \(w\) the wage rate. Here, we abstract from taxing interest income because it would further complicate the difficult welfare analysis. If interest income were taxed at the same rate as wages are taxed, the tax base would be broadened, but the after-tax rate of return on investment in R&D would fall. To generate the same level of tax revenue for subsidies, the broadened tax base reduces the tax rate on wage income and thus may lead to higher labor supply (hence higher demand for the intermediate goods), while the reduced rate of return on R&D investment reduces R&D investment. The net gains in growth and welfare of the uniform income tax over the wage income tax are therefore unclear. However, with this uniform income tax, all the subsidies would still stimulate R&D activities and growth, in a direction to mitigate the efficiency loss originating from the R&D externality. Thus, the results with the uniform income tax would be essentially similar to those with the wage income tax, though quantitatively different.

The household chooses consumption \(c\) and leisure \(l\) to maximize its utility in (1) subject to the budget constraint (2), taking the interest and wage rates as given. Solving this problem yields:

\[
\gamma \equiv \dot{c}/c = (r - \rho)/\theta, \tag{3}
\]

\[
c = (1 - \tau)wl/\varepsilon. \tag{4}
\]

Eq. (3) is standard in the literature, linking consumption growth positively to the rate of return on assets \((r)\) and the willingness of intertemporal substitution \((1/\theta)\) but negatively to the rate of time preference \((\rho)\). Eq. (4) captures the relationship between consumption and leisure. Finally, the transversality condition is \(\lim_{t \to \infty} \{a \cdot \exp[-\int_0^t r_e \, dt]\} = 0\), i.e., neither debt nor asset will be left at the end of the planning horizon.

2.2. Final production

A final good is produced by a large number of identical competitive firms. A firm \(i\) uses \(X_{ij}\) units of intermediate good \(j\) and \(L_i\) units of labor to produce \(Y_i\) units of the final good according to

\[
Y_i = F(X_{ij}, L_i) = AL_i^{1-\alpha} \int_0^N X_{ij}^\alpha \, dj, \quad A > 0, \quad 0 < \alpha < 1, \tag{5}
\]

where \(A\) is a productivity parameter, \(N\) is the number of available intermediate goods, and \(\alpha\) measures the importance of intermediate good \(j\) relative to labor in final
production. Since $X_{ij} = X_i$, $\forall j$, in equilibrium by symmetry, the production function in (5) becomes

$$Y_i = ANL_{i}^{1-\alpha}X_{i}^{\alpha},$$

(6)

where output growth is driven by expanding the variety of intermediate goods $N$. The profit function of firm $i$ in the final sector is defined as

$$\Pi_i = (1 + s_y)AL_{i}^{1-\alpha} \int_{0}^{N} X_{ij}^\alpha dj - wL_i - (1 - s_x) \int_{0}^{N} p_j X_{ij} dj, \quad 0 \leq s_x < 1, \quad s_y \geq 0,$$

(7)

where the price of the final good is normalized to unity, $p_j$ is the price of intermediate good $j$ measured in units of the final good, and $s_y$ and $s_x$ are respectively subsidies to final output and to the purchase of intermediate goods. In the final sector, factors are paid by their marginal products:

$$F_{X_{ij}} = (1 + s_y)X_{ij}^\alpha X_{ij}^\alpha, \quad F_{L_i} = w.$$

The optimal condition $(1 + s_y)F_{X_{ij}} = (1 - s_x)p_j$ gives firm $i$’s demand for an intermediate good, $X_{ij}$, leading to the aggregate demand $X_j$ as

$$X_j = \Gamma \sum_{i} L_i (zp_j)^{1/(\alpha - 1)}, \quad \Gamma = \left[\frac{x^2 A (1 + s_y)}{1 - s_x}\right]^{1/(1-\alpha)},$$

(8)

where $\Gamma$ is a function of the subsidy rates $s_x$ and $s_y$. The optimal condition $(1 + s_y)F_{L_i} = w$ gives firm $i$’s demand for labor, $L_i = (1 - \alpha)(1 + s_y)Y_i/w$. Equating aggregate labor demand and supply, i.e., $\sum_i L_i = L(1 - l)$, the equilibrium quantity of labor is equal to

$$L(1 - l) = (1 - \alpha)(1 + s_y)Y/w.$$

(9)

2.3. Expansions of the variety of intermediate goods

We adopt several assumptions in the literature to simplify the analysis. First, the R&D process is deterministic, i.e., investing $Z$ fixed units of the final good in R&D creates a new type of intermediate good. Also, innovators are given permanent monopoly rights over the production and sale of their invented intermediate goods, and one unit of any intermediate good can be produced using one unit of the final good (i.e., a unit marginal cost). Finally, there is free entry in the R&D sector.

With the permanent monopoly right, the value of a new technology (the discounted present value of the gross profit from producing a new intermediate good) is

$$V_i(p_j) = \int_{t}^{\infty} (p_j - 1)X_j e^{-r(s) ds} dv,$$

(10)

where $r$ is the interest rate. Without any state variable in (10), the problem $\max_{p_j} V_i$ is equivalent to

$$\max_{p_j} [(p_j - 1)X_j] = \max_{p_j} \{(p_j - 1)\Gamma L(1 - l)(zp_j)^{1/(\alpha - 1)}\}.$$
Since an individual supplier of intermediate good $j$ is negligible compared to a continuum of intermediate goods with a mass $N$, we assume that it takes the quantity of aggregate labor $L(1-l)$, the wage, and the prices of other intermediate goods and the final good as given when making its own price decision. The problem in (11) gives the same monopoly pricing rule for all $X_j$:

$$p_j = p = 1/x > 1.$$ (12)

That is, the monopoly sets a constant markup on the unit marginal cost.

Combining (8) and (12) yields the equilibrium quantity of an intermediate good

$$X_j = X = \Gamma L(1-l),$$ (13)

which is also constant over time and the same for all intermediate goods. With free entry into the R&D sector, the profit from R&D must be zero: $\eta(1-s_n) = V_t = (1-x)X/(x\eta)$. Rewrite it as

$$r = \frac{(1 - x)X}{(1 - s_n)\eta x} = \frac{(1 - x)\Gamma L(1-l)}{(1 - s_n)\eta x}.$$ (14)

By (14) and the definition of $\Gamma$, the rate of return on R&D investment $r$ depends on the subsidies ($s_y, s_x, s_n$) and leisure $l$. Also, this rate of return is increasing with the size of the labor force $L$. In other words the model suffers from a ‘level effect’ as discussed in Jones (1995).4

2.4. Government

The government taxes labor income at a flat rate $\tau$ to finance the subsidies

$$\tau w(1-l)L = s_y Y + s_x N X / x + s_n \eta \gamma_N N,$$ (15)

where $\gamma_N \equiv \dot{N}/N$ is the growth rate of the variety of intermediate goods. In (15), the left-hand side is the total revenue from labor income taxes and the right-hand side is the total expenditure on subsidizing final output ($s_y Y$), the purchase of intermediate goods ($s_x N X / x$) and investment in R&D ($s_n \eta \gamma_N N$). As other types of taxes only lead to quantitative rather than qualitative alterations, we ignore them for simplicity. However, we will explicitly have a consumption tax later when focusing on whether subsidies funded by distortionary taxes can achieve the social optimum.

3. The social planner’s problem

For comparisons with a decentralized setting, we first solve the social planner’s problem

$$\max_{c,l} \int_0^\infty \left[ \frac{(c t^\theta)^{1-\theta} - 1}{1 - \theta} \right] e^{-\rho t} dt,$$ (16)

4When the ‘level effect’ is removed, the welfare differences for different policies may be smaller in the light of Jones (1995). In our simulation later, we will remove the level effect by normalizing $L$ to unity in the benchmark parameterization, and explore the remaining welfare differences across different policies.
subject to the resource constraint: \( Y = A[L(1-l)]^{1-\gamma}NX^g = Lc + \eta N + NX \). The solution is given by

\[
I_{sp} = \frac{\varepsilon \eta \rho (Az)^{-\gamma/(1-\gamma)} - \varepsilon AL(1-\gamma)(1-\theta)}{AL(1-\gamma) - \varepsilon AL(1-\gamma)(1-\theta)},
\]

(17)

\[
X_{sp} = (Az)^{1/(1-\gamma)}L(1-l_{sp}),
\]

(18)

\[
\gamma_{sp} = (1-\gamma)X_{sp}/(\varepsilon \rho \theta) - \rho/\theta,
\]

(19)

\[
c_{sp} = c_0e^{\varepsilon \rho \theta} \quad \text{with} \quad c_0 = A[L(1-l_{sp})]^{1-\gamma}N_0[(1-\gamma)(\theta-1) + \varepsilon \rho / X_{sp}].
\]

(20)

The welfare function is

\[
U_0 = \max_{[c,l]} \int_0^{\infty} \left( \frac{c_0 l_{sp}^{1-\gamma}}{1-\theta} \right) e^{-\rho t} dt = \frac{(c_0 l_{sp}^{1-\gamma})}{(1-\theta)[\rho - (1-\theta)\gamma_{sp}]} - \frac{1}{\rho(1-\theta)}.
\]

(21)

The transversality condition means \( \rho - (1-\theta)\gamma_{sp} > 0 \). Numerically, Table 1 shows the ratio of R&D investment to output, the growth rate, and welfare for various parameterizations in the social planner’s solution. The benchmark parameterization, briefly noted in Table 1, will be discussed with more details later.

4. The decentralized equilibrium with subsidies

The decentralized economy in this type of model is known to be always in a balanced equilibrium for any constant subsidy rates set by the government, whereby the proportional allocations of output and time and the growth rate are all constant over time, and the growth rate is the same for final output, consumption, and the rate of innovation. Because of the labor – leisure choice, the derivation of the growth rate is much more involved than in a standard R&D model with fixed labor supply.

We first rewrite (3) as: \( r = \gamma_{sp} + \rho \). Substituting it into (14) provides \( X = \gamma_{sp}(1-s_n)(\theta\gamma + \rho)/(1-\gamma) \), which, together with (13), gives \( l = 1 - \gamma_{sp}(1-s_n)(\theta\gamma + \rho)/[(1-\gamma)\Gamma L] \). Also, combining (9), (13) and the final-output function \( Y = A[L(1-l)]^{1-\gamma}NX^g \) yields \( w = (1-\gamma)(1+s_s)A\Gamma^{g}\gamma^{-1} \). Finally, substituting (4) and the above expressions of \( (X,l,w,Y) \) into the resource constraint for the economy, \( C = Lc = Y - \eta_{g}N - NX \), leads to the solution for the growth rate

\[
\gamma = \frac{[(1-\gamma)\Gamma L - (1-s_n)\gamma_{sp}][1-\gamma(1-\tau)(1+s_s)\Gamma^{g-1} - \varepsilon \gamma_{sp}(1-s_n)(\Gamma^{g-1} - 1) - \varepsilon \gamma_{sp}(1-s_n)(\Gamma^{g-1} - 1)}{(1-\gamma)(1-s_n)(1-\gamma)[1-\gamma(1+s_s)\Gamma^{g-1} + \varepsilon \gamma_{sp}(1-s_n)(\Gamma^{g-1} - 1) - \varepsilon \gamma_{sp}(1-s_n)]}.
\]

(22)

where the rates of the tax and subsidies must satisfy the following transformed version of the government budget constraint

\[
\tau = \frac{s_y}{(1-\gamma)(1+s_s)} + \frac{\varepsilon s_y}{(1-\gamma)(1-s_s)} + \frac{\varepsilon \gamma s_y}{(1-s_n)(1-s_s)(\theta\gamma + \rho)}
\]

(23)
which arises from dividing both sides of the government budget constraint (15) by final output $Y$ and arranging terms. Therefore, (22) and (23) jointly determine the equilibrium solution for the growth rate. Now we can see that the subsidies ($s_x, s_y, s_n$) affect the growth rate $g$. The effects of subsidies ($s_x, s_y$) on growth also go through the factor $G$ defined in (8).

To facilitate the welfare analysis, we also derive the solution for the equilibrium welfare level as a function of the tax and subsidies. Given the initial number of intermediate goods $N_0$, the subsequent number is determined by the exponential expansion $N = N_0 e^{g t}$. Also, given the solution for $g$, we can obtain the solution for consumption and leisure:

$$c = c_0 e^{w}, \quad c_0 = \frac{\eta N_0}{L} \left\{ \frac{[1 - s_x - x^2(1 + s_y)](1 - s_n)(\theta y + \rho)}{x(1 - x)(1 + s_y)} - y \right\},$$

$$l = 1 - \frac{\alpha x(1 - x)(1 + s_y)}{(1 - \alpha) g L}.$$

### Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameters</th>
<th>R&amp;D rate (%)</th>
<th>Growth rate (%)</th>
<th>Welfare</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Benchmark parameterization</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha = 0.3$, $\theta = 1.5$, $\sigma = 0.5$, $\eta = 2.02$, $\rho = 0.05$, $A = L = N_0 = 1$</td>
<td>32.35</td>
<td>7.53</td>
<td>-39.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Alternative parameterizations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>$\alpha = 0.2$</td>
<td>40.80</td>
<td>10.85</td>
<td>-22.77</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\alpha = 0.4$</td>
<td>23.86</td>
<td>4.93</td>
<td>-59.48</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\alpha = 0.6$</td>
<td>33.63</td>
<td>8.60</td>
<td>-27.03</td>
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<td>$\alpha = 0.7$</td>
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<td>6.59</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\rho = 0.02$</td>
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<td>10.11</td>
<td>-16.92</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\rho = 0.08$</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\eta = 1.0$</td>
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<td>$A = 0.5$</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>$L = 0.5$</td>
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<td>-57.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$L = 2.0$</td>
<td>39.81</td>
<td>19.35</td>
<td>-14.53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** (1) The benchmark parameters are chosen to be consistent with those used in the literature and generate a growth rate of 3.0% in a competitive equilibrium with R&D subsidies (the average growth rate for the past 30 years in the United States). (2) The optimal R&D rate refers to the ratio of R&D investment to output.
As in the social planner’s problem, the welfare function is of the form

\[ U_0 = \max_{\{c,l\}} \int_0^\infty \left( \frac{c^s}{1 - \theta} - 1 \right) e^{-\rho t} \, dt = \frac{(c_0^s)^{1-\theta}}{(1-\theta)(\rho - (1-\theta)\gamma)} - \frac{1}{\rho(1-\theta)}, \tag{26} \]

where \( \gamma \), \( c_0 \) and \( l \) are given by (22), (24) and (25), respectively. Moreover, the transversality condition implies \( \rho - (1-\theta)\gamma > 0 \). We can now compare different types of subsidies.

We begin with the equivalence between subsidies provided to final output \( s_f \) and to the purchase of intermediate goods \( s_x \) and any combination of them. Define \( s_f \equiv (s_x + s_y)/(1 - s_x) \) as the effective subsidy rate to final output (hereafter, the production subsidy), then \( (1 + s_f)/(1 - s_x) = 1 + s_f \) and \( \Gamma = [x^2A(1 + s_f)]^{1/(1-\delta)} \). It suffices to show that it is the effective subsidy rate \( s_f \), not the decomposition between \( s_x \) and \( s_y \), that matters for both the growth rate \( \gamma \) and welfare \( U \). Using the definition of \( s_f \), we substitute (23) into (22) and solve it to obtain

\[ \gamma = -\Psi_2 + \left( \Psi_2^2 - 4\Psi_1 \Psi_3 \right)^{1/2} / 2\Psi_1, \tag{27} \]

where

\[ \Psi_1 \equiv \theta \left\{ \theta \varepsilon(1 - s_n)[1 - x^2(1 + s_f)] - (\varepsilon + s_n)(1 - \alpha)\varepsilon(1 + s_f) \right\} + \alpha(1 - s_n)[1 - \alpha(1 + s_f)], \]

\[ \Psi_2 \equiv - \left[ \frac{1}{\alpha(1 - s_n)} - \frac{\rho}{\alpha} \right] \left\{ \theta(1 - s_n)[1 - \alpha(1 + s_f)] - (1 - \alpha)s_n\varepsilon(1 + s_f) \right\} + 2\alpha \theta\rho(1 - s_n)[1 - x(1 + s_f)] - \varepsilon \rho(1 - \alpha)\varepsilon(1 + s_f) \]

\[ + \theta(1 - s_n)[1 - \alpha(1 + s_f)], \]

\[ \Psi_3 \equiv - \left[ \frac{1}{\alpha(1 - s_n)} - \frac{\rho}{\alpha} \right] \rho(1 - s_n)[1 - \alpha(1 + s_f)] + \varepsilon \rho^2(1 - s_n)[1 - x^2(1 + s_f)]. \]

To guarantee that the growth rate \( \gamma \) given by (27) is nonnegative, we assume that \( \Psi_1 > 0, \Psi_2 < 0 \) and \( \Psi_3 < 0 \). From (27), we can see that the growth rate depends on the combined effective subsidy rate \( s_f \) rather than individual subsidy rates \( s_x \) and \( s_y \). Also, leisure \( l \) is a function of the effective subsidy rate \( s_f \) in (25), and so is consumption \( c_0 \) when writing (24) as

\[ c_0 = \eta N_0 / L \left\{ \frac{[1 - x^2(1 + s_f)](1 - s_n)(\theta\gamma + \rho)}{\alpha(1 - \alpha)(1 + s_f)} - \gamma \right\}. \tag{28} \]

---

\(^5\)This assumption holds true if \( \theta > \alpha \) and if \( \rho \) is sufficiently small in the absence of any subsidy. The need of a small enough \( \rho \) is standard for \( \gamma > 0 \) by (3). Also, the restriction \( \theta \geq \alpha \) is not binding in the real world since most related empirical evidence suggested \( \theta > 1 \). With these assumptions, we ignore the negative root \( \gamma = -\Psi_2 - (\Psi_2^2 - 4\Psi_1 \Psi_3)^{1/2} / 2\Psi_1 \).
Thus, the welfare function given by (26) depends on the effective subsidy rate $s_f$ as does the growth rate. Summarizing our discussion, we have

**Proposition 1.** With elastic labor supply and distortionary taxes, the subsidies to final output or to the purchase of intermediate goods are equivalent concerning their effects on growth and welfare.

The equivalence between these two types of subsidies was seen in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) with lump-sum taxes and fixed labor supply. Here, we extend it to the case with a labor – leisure choice and distortionary taxes. With Proposition 1, we can now focus on the production subsidy $s_f$ and the R&D subsidy $s_n$ in the rest of the paper.

Setting $s_x = 0$ and $s_f = s_y$, the government budget constraint (23) becomes

$$\tau(1 - z)(1 + s_f) = \frac{sn\eta z^2(1 + s_f)}{X} + s_f.$$  \hspace{1cm} (29)

Using (22) and (25), we have the solution for leisure:

$$l = \frac{Y_1}{Y_2},$$  \hspace{1cm} (30)

where

\begin{align*}
Y_1 & \equiv \varepsilon \eta \rho (1 - s_n) \Gamma^{-z}/z + \varepsilon AL \{\theta (1 - s_n) (1 + s_f) / \zeta - (1 - z)(1 + s_f)\}, \\
Y_2 & \equiv \varepsilon AL \{\theta (1 - s_n) [1 - \zeta (1 + s_f)] / \zeta - (1 - z)(1 + s_f)\} \\
& + AL \theta (1 - s_n)(1 - \zeta)(1 + s_f)(1 - \tau) / \zeta.
\end{align*}

We can then express $c_0$, $X$ and $\gamma$ as

\begin{align*}
 c_0 & = \frac{\Gamma N_0 \theta (1 - \tau)(1 - \zeta)}{\zeta^2 \varepsilon}, \hspace{1cm} (31) \\
 X & = \Gamma L (1 - l), \hspace{1cm} (32) \\
 \gamma & = \left( \frac{1 - \zeta}{1 - s_n} \right) \frac{X}{\varepsilon \eta \theta} - \frac{\rho}{\theta}. \hspace{1cm} (33)
 \end{align*}

Before comparing the subsidies, it is interesting to compare the decentralized solution without any subsidies and taxes with the social planner’s. From (30) and (17), leisure is higher in the former than in the latter. Conversely, from (32) and (18), the equilibrium quantity of intermediate goods is lower in the former than in the latter, partly also because at $s_f = s_n = 0$, $\Gamma = [\zeta^2 A]^{1/(1 - \zeta)} \leq (\zeta A)^{1/(1 - \zeta)}$ due to the monopoly pricing $p = 1/\zeta$ in the former. As a result, the growth rate is lower in the former than in the latter, according to (33) and (19). The intuition is that in the presence of the externality of the variety expansion, the perceived rates of return to working and innovation in this decentralized economy without subsidies are lower than the social rates. Granting monopoly rights to innovators alone does not close the gap in the rates of return as pricing intermediate goods above their marginal costs reduces the demand for intermediate goods.
It may appear that financing subsidies through a lump-sum tax can achieve the socially optimal solution. This was indeed the case in Barro and Sala-i-Martin: with inelastic labor supply in their model, setting the production subsidy rate as $1 + s_f = 1/\alpha$ (i.e., equalizing the user cost and the marginal cost of intermediate goods) would imply $F = [\alpha^2 A(1 + s_f)]^{1/(1-\alpha)} = (\alpha A)^{1/(1-\alpha)}$ and hence would achieve the socially optimal quantity of intermediate goods $X$. But in our model, this is insufficient to obtain the socially optimal quantity of $X = \Gamma L(1 - l)$ since the level of labor per worker $1 - l$ at this particular subsidy rate remains below its socially optimal level. That is, lowering the user cost of intermediate goods to their marginal cost by the production subsidy to correct the efficiency loss of monopoly pricing is not enough to achieve the social optimum with elastic labor. Subsidizing R&D investment by a lump-sum tax cannot achieve the socially optimal solution either, since when $X$ becomes the same as in the social planner’s solution, a positive $s_n$ in (33) will lead to excessive growth compared to that in the social planner’s solution in (19).

4.1. Growth-maximizing subsidies

We now compare the two subsidies in terms of their effectiveness in promoting growth for two reasons. First, growth is important in its own right, both in theory and in practice. Second, the type of subsidy that is more conducive to growth can gain more dynamic efficiency in dealing with the R&D externality and monopoly pricing, and thus is a possible candidate to improve welfare.

The growth rate under the production subsidy can be obtained from (27) by setting $s_n = 0$:

$$\gamma(s_f) = \frac{[(1 - \alpha)\Gamma L/\alpha - \rho][1 - \alpha(1 + s_f)] - \varepsilon \rho[1 - \alpha^2(1 + s_f)]}{\theta[1 - \alpha(1 + s_f)] + \varepsilon \theta[1 - \alpha^2(1 + s_f)] - \varepsilon(1 - \alpha)\alpha(1 + s_f)}. \quad (34)$$

We then observe the following (see Appendix A for the proof):

**Proposition 2.** For $\theta \geq \alpha$ and a small enough $\rho$, the growth rate is globally concave with respect to the production subsidy, and reaches its global maximum at a finite positive value of the subsidy.

Intuitively, the production subsidy exerts opposing forces on growth. The positive force is standard and obvious. Missing in models with lump-sum taxes is the negative force from the tax distortion that reduces labor supply and in turn lowers the demand for intermediate goods by (13). Further, the positive effect falls with the subsidy rate due to diminishing marginal product of intermediate goods in final production. Thus, when the subsidy rate is low (high), the positive (negative) effect dominates. When the opposing effects exactly cancel out, the growth rate peaks.

Under the R&D subsidy $s_n$, the growth rate is determined by (27) with $s_f = 0$, i.e.,

$$\gamma(s_n) = \frac{-\Psi_2(s_n) + [\Psi_2(s_n) - 4 \Psi_1(s_n) \Psi_3(s_n)]^{1/2}}{2 \Psi_1(s_n)}. \quad (35)$$
The growth effects of the R&D subsidy are summarized below (see Appendix A for the proof).

**Proposition 3.** For $\theta \geq \alpha$ and a small enough $\rho$, the growth rate is globally concave with respect to the R&D subsidy, and reaches its global maximum at a finite positive value of the subsidy.

Unlike the production subsidy, the R&D subsidy stimulates growth by directly reducing the cost of R&D investment (a fraction of final output as in Table 1). It is thus most likely that the R&D subsidy reaches any growth target at a lower tax rate than does the production subsidy.

An important question can then be posed: which of these subsidies can lead to a higher growth rate? An analytical investigation into this question is complicated, because of the complex expressions of the growth rate in (34) and (35). We thus appeal to numerical simulations with various parameterizations. A benchmark parameterization is set as: $\alpha = 0.3$, $\theta = 1.5$, $\varepsilon = 0.5$, $\eta = 2.02$, $\rho = 0.05$ and $A = L = N_0 = 1$. Here, the values of $(\alpha, \varepsilon, \theta, \rho)$ are within the standard ranges used in the literature, while those of $(A, L, \eta)$ are chosen such that the (welfare-maximizing) growth rate would equal 3.0% in the decentralized equilibrium with the R&D subsidy. This scenario is calibrated to the United States which has an average growth rate around 3.0% for the last 30 years and has used an R&D subsidy, not the production subsidy. In other parameterizations, we allow the values of the parameters to vary around their benchmark levels, and see whether the results are sensitive to the variations in parameterization. We report the results in Table 2 which also gives the numerical solution for the social planner’s problem for comparisons.

For all the parameterizations with which we have experimented, the R&D subsidy always leads to a higher growth rate than does the production subsidy. And the tax rate (for growth-maximizing) is lower under the R&D subsidy than under the production subsidy unless the latter cannot achieve positive growth. With the benchmark parameterization, for example, the growth rate is only 0.35% (with a tax rate of 90%) under the production subsidy, but is 5.94% (with a tax rate of

---

6The value of the key parameter $\varepsilon = 0.5$ is taken directly from Lucas (1990), while the values $\theta = 1.5$, $\rho = 0.05$ and $\alpha = 0.3$ (implying a labor’s share of 0.7) are based on the growth calibration exercises in Lucas (1990), King and Rebelo (1990), and Stokey and Rebelo (1995).
84\% under the R&D subsidy. Further, the growth-maximizing combinations of subsidies are the same as the growth-maximizing R&D subsidies for all the parameterizations. To provide a global view, Figs. 1(a) and (b) depict the relationship between the combinations of the two types of subsidies and the resulting growth rates under the same benchmark parameterization (viewed from different angles).

From these figures, it is clear that only the R&D subsidy should be used to maximize the growth rate, corresponding to the mix of subsidies \( (s_f, s_n) = (0, 86.15\%) \) in Table 2. In fact, as shown in Table 2, the R&D subsidy may generates excess growth compared to the growth rate in the social planner’s solution (derived in Section 3), while the production subsidy always produces a lower growth rate than the socially optimal growth rate.

It is also interesting to see how the variations in the parameters affect growth in Table 2. As one may expect, a higher rate of time preference \( \rho \) or a lower elasticity of intertemporal substitution \( 1/\theta \) leads to a lower growth rate, because individuals are

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameters</th>
<th>Social planner’s solution</th>
<th>Production subsidy ((s_f))</th>
<th>R&amp;D subsidy ((s_n))</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Growth rate (%)</td>
<td>Tax rate (%)</td>
<td>Subsidy rate (%)</td>
<td>Growth rate (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benchmark parameters: ( x = 0.3, \theta = 1.5, \varepsilon = 0.5, \eta = 2.02, \rho = 0.05, A = L = N_0 = 1 )</td>
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<td>0.00*</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<tr>
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<td>161.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \varepsilon = 0.7 )</td>
<td>6.59</td>
<td>0.00*</td>
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<td>( \varepsilon = 1.0 )</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
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<td>0.00*</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<td>161.89</td>
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<td>( L = 2.0 )</td>
<td>19.35</td>
<td>87.55</td>
<td>158.32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: (1) For all the parameterizations, the growth-maximizing mixes of subsidies are the same as using the R&D subsidy alone. (2) The numbers with * indicate that with these parameterizations, there do not exist production subsidy rates (and tax rates) that can induce R&D investment.
less willing to save. Higher productivity in final production $A$ or a larger labor force $L$ raises the rate of return on investment in R&D, resulting in a higher growth rate. Similarly, a lower cost of R&D $\eta$ raises investment in R&D, leading to a higher growth rate. A stronger taste for leisure $\varepsilon$ decelerates growth by increasing leisure (and thus reducing labor supply). Finally, a higher value of $a$, i.e., a more important role of intermediate goods relative to labor in final production, decelerates growth by lowering the demand for intermediate goods and hence the monopoly price of intermediate goods $1/a$.

### 4.2. Optimal production subsidies

Setting $s_n = 0$ in (29) leads to $\tau = s_f/[(1 - a)(1 + s_f)]$. Thus, the welfare function under the production subsidy is given by

$$U_0(s_f) = \frac{c_0(s_f)[l(s_f)]^{\theta}}{(1 - \theta)[\rho - (1 - \theta)\gamma(s_f)]] - \frac{1}{\rho(1 - \theta)},$$

(36)

where $(c_0(s_f), l(s_f), \gamma(s_f))$ can be found by substituting $s_n = 0$ and $\tau = s_f/[(1 - a)(1 + s_f)]$ into Eqs. (30)–(33) as follows. First, note that the government budget balance $\tau = s_f/[(1 - a)(1 + s_f)]$ in this case fully determines $\tau$ by the share parameter $a$ and the subsidy rate $s_f$. Substituting this budget balance and $s_n = 0$ into (30) for $\tau$ and $s_n$ allows us to obtain the reduced-form solution for leisure $l(s_f)$. Further, substituting $l(s_f), s_n = 0$ and $\tau = s_f/[(1 - a)(1 + s_f)]$ into (31), (32) and (33) leads to reduced-form solutions for $c_0(s_f), X(s_f)$ and $\gamma(s_f)$. We thus have:

**Proposition 4.** For a large enough $\theta$ (e.g. $\theta \geq 1$), the welfare level reaches its global maximum at a finite positive value of the production subsidy.
Proof. Differentiating (36) with respect to \( s_f \), we have

\[
U'_0(s_f) = \text{sign} U_0(s_f) \Rightarrow \text{sign} Y(s_f) = \text{sign} \left( \frac{\text{some expression}}{(1 + s_f)(1 + \varepsilon)} \right) + \eta s_f
\]

where

\[
Y(s_f) = C_1 + C_2 a \left( \frac{y}{C_0} \right) + \eta s_f (1 + s_f) \frac{U_1}{C_0} + \eta s_f (1 + s_f) \frac{U_2}{C_0}
\]

When \( s_f = t = 0 \), the expression in the first bracket on the right-hand side of (37) becomes proportional to \( Y \). Thus, by converting \( Y_1 \) and \( Y_2 \) back to \( l \) or \( 1 - l \), (37) becomes:

\[
\text{sign} Y_0 = \frac{\text{some expression}}{(1 + s_f)(1 + \varepsilon)} + \eta s_f (1 + s_f) \frac{U_1}{C_0} + \eta s_f (1 + s_f) \frac{U_2}{C_0}
\]

Note that \( Y_0 \) is positive under the transversality condition and because the rest is obviously positive. If \( s_f \) were too high, e.g., pushing \( t \) towards 1, the remaining resource for consumption would be too little. In this scenario, further rises in \( s_f \) would surely decrease welfare. Thus, the welfare level must reach its global maximum for some \( s_f \in (0, 1) \) under \( y \geq 1 \), given the underlying continuity of \( U_0(s_f) \).

Starting with too little R&D investment and too much leisure without any subsidy, an increase in the production subsidy encourages R&D investment and thus stimulates growth as mentioned earlier, moving in the direction toward their socially optimal levels. The accelerated growth thus enhances welfare over time. On the other hand, however, an accompanying increase in the labor income tax tends to raise leisure further above its socially optimal level, leading to a lower level of welfare. When the subsidy rate is low, the tax distortion is weak and the efficiency gain from faster growth dominates, leading to a net gain in welfare. Obviously, if the production subsidy is very high, the tax distortion becomes stronger and eventually dominates the positive welfare effect. In other words, there should be a positive rate of the subsidy at which welfare is maximized.

Although Proposition 4 gives the existence of the value of the production subsidy that maximizes welfare, it is difficult to show analytically whether welfare is globally concave with this subsidy for the welfare-maximizing subsidy to be unique. Numerically, Table 3 gives the simulation results for welfare using the same parameterizations as in Tables 1 and 2. There indeed exists a unique positive welfare-maximizing production subsidy for each of the parameterizations, as shown in Fig. 2(a).
4.3. Optimal R&D subsidies

The welfare function under the R&D subsidy is given by

\[ U_0(s_n) = \frac{(1 + z)(1 - s_n)[\theta \gamma(s_n) + \rho]}{\alpha} - \frac{1}{\rho(1 - \theta)}, \]  

(38)

where

\[ c_0(s_n) = \frac{\eta N_0}{L} \left\{ \frac{(1 + z)(1 - s_n)[\theta \gamma(s_n) + \rho]}{\alpha} - \gamma(s_n) \right\}, \]  

(39)

\[ l(s_n) = 1 - \frac{z \eta(1 - s_n)[\theta \gamma(s_n) + \rho]}{(1 - z)(\alpha^2 A)^{1/(1 - z)} L}. \]  

(40)

Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameters</th>
<th>Production subsidy (s_f)</th>
<th>R&amp;D subsidy (s_n)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tax rate (%)</td>
<td>Subsidy rate (%)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Benchmark parameterization</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>( x = 0.2 )</td>
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</tr>
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<td>( x = 0.4 )</td>
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<td>( \varepsilon = 0.7 )</td>
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<td>( \theta = 1.1 )</td>
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<td>( \theta = 3.0 )</td>
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<td>( \eta = 0.1 )</td>
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<td>( \theta = 0.1 )</td>
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<td>( L = 2.0 )</td>
<td>81.50</td>
<td>132.82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: (1) The numbers with * indicate that under these parameterizations, there do not exist subsidy rates (and tax rates) that can induce R&D investment. (2) The number with ** is the rounded-up growth rate of 0.0025%.

4.3. Optimal R&D subsidies

The welfare function under the R&D subsidy is given by

\[ U_0(s_n) = \frac{(1 + z)(1 - s_n)[\theta \gamma(s_n) + \rho]}{\alpha} - \frac{1}{\rho(1 - \theta)}, \]  

(38)

where

\[ c_0(s_n) = \frac{\eta N_0}{L} \left\{ \frac{(1 + z)(1 - s_n)[\theta \gamma(s_n) + \rho]}{\alpha} - \gamma(s_n) \right\}, \]  

(39)

\[ l(s_n) = 1 - \frac{z \eta(1 - s_n)[\theta \gamma(s_n) + \rho]}{(1 - z)(\alpha^2 A)^{1/(1 - z)} L}. \]  

(40)
Unlike the previous case with \( s_f > 0 \) and \( s_n = 0 \), the current case with \( s_n > 0 \) and \( s_f = 0 \) has no reduced-form solutions: the five variables \( c_0, \tau, I, X \) and \( \gamma \) are implicitly determined by five Eqs. (29)–(33). It is thus difficult to derive analytical results concerning the welfare effect of the R&D subsidy. For this reason, we again perform numerical simulations and report the results in Table 3. For each of the parameterizations, there is a unique optimal R&D subsidy rate. With the benchmark parameterization, the optimal R&D subsidy obtains a higher welfare level than does the production subsidy at a much lower tax rate. The welfare curve in Fig. 2(b) is smooth and single peaked, and the magnitude of the welfare gain can be substantial.

The results in Table 3 also help understand how and why the variations in the key parameters affect welfare, together with the aid of Eq. (26) that links welfare to leisure, initial consumption and the growth rate. For example, a rise in \( \theta \) indicates less willingness to save. As a result, it may raise leisure and initial consumption but may decelerate growth. (Of course, a higher \( \theta \) also changes welfare without going through any of the variables \( I, c_0 \) and \( \gamma \).) The negative growth effect turns out to dominate and results in a net decline in welfare. Also, a rise in the cost of R&D \( \eta \) has opposing effects on both leisure and initial consumption, but is surely harmful for growth, leading to a net decline in welfare. Further, a stronger taste for leisure \( \varepsilon \) raises welfare by increasing leisure and reduces welfare by decreasing initial consumption and the growth rate, resulting in a net decline in welfare.

Another interesting point is that a change in a particular parameter may change the relative effectiveness of the two subsidies in raising welfare, given the different characteristics of the two subsidies. Through reducing the R&D cost, the R&D subsidy is more effective in removing the *dynamic* efficiency loss of the R&D subsidy.

Fig. 2.
externality by raising the growth rate, but less effective in reducing the static efficiency loss of monopoly pricing. In contrast, through reducing the user cost of intermediate goods, the production subsidy is more effective in reducing the static efficiency loss of monopoly pricing but less effective in reducing the dynamic efficiency loss. Concerning tax distortions, the R&D subsidy requires a much lower labor income tax rate than the production subsidy to achieve any given growth target, since the subsidy base is much smaller in the former case (the R&D investment) than in the latter case (final output). A change in a particular parameter changes the magnitudes of these efficiency gains and losses.

For example, when the taste for leisure is weaker (e.g., $\varepsilon = 0.3$), the production subsidy generates a higher welfare level than does the R&D subsidy in Table 3, reversing the ranking with the benchmark parameterization. This is mainly because, when leisure is less important, the labor income tax distortion is weaker. When leisure becomes more important (e.g., $\varepsilon = 0.7$), the ranking goes back to that with the benchmark parameterization. When the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is higher (e.g., $\theta = 1.1$), the R&D subsidy remains better than the production subsidy, as the dynamic efficiency loss, which is better handled by the R&D subsidy, becomes even more important. When the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is lower (e.g., $\theta = 2$, or 3), the welfare ranking can be reversed. When the rate of time preference is raised to $\rho = 0.08$, the production subsidy cannot generate any positive growth and is thus ranked below the R&D subsidy. When the rate of time preference is much reduced to $\rho = 0.02$, the growth rates are rather high in both cases while the welfare ranking of the subsidies is reversed, indicating that the static efficiency loss is now the chief concern, which is better handled by the production subsidy. Further, when the cost of R&D investment $\eta$ is low (say $\eta = 1$), the ranking of the subsidies is reversed, because now the static efficiency loss becomes more important. When the cost of R&D investment is high (say $\eta = 3$), the ranking goes back to that with the benchmark parameterization. We thus conclude: in terms of improving welfare, the R&D subsidy can be more or less effective than the production subsidy depending on parameterizations.

These results are in sharp contrast with those in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995). In their model with lump-sum taxes and fixed labor supply, the production subsidy always dominates the R&D subsidy, because the former can completely recover both the static efficiency loss (low demand for intermediate goods) and the dynamic efficiency loss (the low growth rate) while the latter cannot. With the labor–leisure trade-off in our model, however, the production subsidy is not effective in bringing leisure down to its socially best level, even when the tax is lump sum, as mentioned earlier. When a labor income tax is used, the production subsidy entails more tax distortions than the R&D subsidy, pushing leisure further up from its socially optimal level. Thus, in our model the R&D subsidy can be more or less effective than the production subsidy depending on parameterizations.

4.4. Optimal combination of production and R&D subsidies

Now we want to see whether combining these two subsidies can do better than using one of them alone. To do so, we first rewrite the government budget
constraint (23) as
\[ \tau(1 - z)(1 + s_f) = \frac{s_n \varphi(1 + s_f)}{\theta} \left\{ \frac{1 - z}{1 - s_n} \right\} + s_f. \]  
(41)

Then, as shown in Appendix B, the utility-maximizing problem of the government by choice of \((\tau, s_f, s_n)\) subject to its constraint in (41) is equivalent to the following unconstrained problem that chooses \((s_f, s_n)\) to maximize:
\[
W = f^{(1+\epsilon)(1-\theta)} \left\{ 1 - \frac{s_n \varphi(1 - z)}{(1 - z) \theta (1 - s_n)} + \frac{s_n^2 \eta \varphi \rho}{(1 - z) \theta \Gamma L (1 - l)} - \frac{s_f}{(1 - z)(1 + s_f)} \right\}^{1-\theta}
\times (1 + s_f)^{(1-\theta)/(1-\varphi)} \left\{ \rho - \frac{(1 - \theta)(1 - z) \Gamma L (1 - l)}{\varphi \eta (1 - s_n)} \right\}^{-1}.
\]  
(42)

The first-order conditions for this maximization problem are
\[
W_{s_f} = \frac{\partial l}{\partial s_f} \left[ \frac{1 + \epsilon}{l} + \frac{s_n \eta \varphi^2 \rho}{(1 - \tau)(1 - z) \theta \Gamma L (1 - l)} \right] - \frac{\partial l}{\partial s_f} \left\{ \frac{\kappa \eta \varphi (1 - s_n) - (1 - \theta)(1 - z) \Gamma L (1 - l)}{(1 - z) \Gamma L (1 - l)} \right\} - \frac{1}{(1 - \tau)(1 - z)(1 + s_f) \theta \Gamma L (1 - l)} - \frac{1}{\Gamma L (1 - l)} = 0,
\]  
(43)

\[
W_{s_n} = \frac{\partial l}{\partial s_n} \left[ \frac{1 + \epsilon}{l} + \frac{s_n \eta \varphi^2 \rho}{(1 - \tau)(1 - z) \theta \Gamma L (1 - l)} \right] - \frac{\partial l}{\partial s_n} \left\{ \frac{\kappa \eta \varphi (1 - s_n) - (1 - \theta)(1 - z) \Gamma L (1 - l)}{(1 - z) \Gamma L (1 - l)} \right\} \frac{\varphi}{(1 - \tau) \theta (1 - s_n)^2} + \frac{\kappa \eta \varphi^2 \rho}{(1 - z) \theta \Gamma L (1 - l)} - \frac{(1 - \tau)(1 - z) \Gamma L (1 - l)}{(1 - \tau)(1 - z) \Gamma L (1 - l)(1 - s_n)(1 - s_n)} = 0,
\]  
(44)

where \(\partial l/\partial s_f\) and \(\partial l/\partial s_n\) are given in Appendix B. Thus, we have:

**Proposition 5.** The optimal mix of \((s_f, s_n)\) is implicitly determined by (41), (43), (44) and (53).

To reveal the quantitative implications of the optimal mix of subsidies, we use numerical simulations and report the results in Table 4 with the same parameterizations as in previous tables. For each parameterization, there is a unique welfare-maximizing combination of the two types of subsidies. For example, with the benchmark parameterization, the optimal mix of these subsidies is
The resulting welfare is $\frac{C}{0.5832}$, which is substantially higher than the welfare level without subsidies ($\frac{C}{0.7390}$). The relationship between the combination of these subsidies and the welfare level with the same benchmark parameterization is depicted in Figs. 3(a) and (b) for an easier view from different angles. According to the simulation results, combining the two types of subsidies gives a higher level of welfare than a single subsidy. For example, in Table 3 with the benchmark parameterization, the production subsidy obtains a maximum welfare level of $\frac{C}{0.6741}$ while the R&D subsidy obtains a maximum welfare level of $\frac{C}{0.6530}$, both of which are much lower than that ($\frac{C}{0.5832}$) achieved by their optimal mix in Table 4.

The key point of using both subsidies jointly is to take advantage of their relative strengths. While the production subsidy is more effective in removing the static distortion of the monopoly pricing by stimulating the demand for intermediate goods, the R&D subsidy tends to be more effective in removing the dynamic efficiency loss of the R&D externality by promoting growth. As a result, mixing both types of subsidies does better than using them in separation.

Table 4
Optimal combinations of subsidies vs. welfare

<p>| Benchmark parameters: $\alpha = 0.3$, $\theta = 1.5$, $\epsilon = 0.5$, $\eta = 2.02$, $\rho = 0.05$, $A = L = N_0 = 1$ |
|---|---|---|---|---|</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameters</th>
<th>Social planner’s solution</th>
<th>No subsidies ($s_f = s_n = 0$)</th>
<th>Combinations of subsidies ($s_f$, $s_n$)</th>
<th>Welfare</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benchmark parameterization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$-58.32$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternative parameterizations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$-58.90$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha = 0.2$</td>
<td>$-22.77$</td>
<td>$-58.68$</td>
<td>$77.70$</td>
<td>$(109.64, 60.33)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha = 0.4$</td>
<td>$-59.48$</td>
<td>$90.85$</td>
<td>$64.23$</td>
<td>$(51.83, 48.80)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\epsilon = 0.3$</td>
<td>$-27.03$</td>
<td>$-60.21$</td>
<td>$76.61$</td>
<td>$(86.11, 48.47)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\epsilon = 0.7$</td>
<td>$-51.92$</td>
<td>$-85.85$</td>
<td>$67.14$</td>
<td>$(67.84, 55.55)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\epsilon = 1.0$</td>
<td>$-68.76$</td>
<td>$101.71$</td>
<td>$62.72$</td>
<td>$(64.42, 57.60)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\eta = 1.1$</td>
<td>$-20.48$</td>
<td>$-46.56$</td>
<td>$74.28$</td>
<td>$(71.21, 53.76)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\eta = 2.0$</td>
<td>$-74.11$</td>
<td>$-142.16$</td>
<td>$69.34$</td>
<td>$(76.06, 52.36)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\eta = 3.0$</td>
<td>$-270.70$</td>
<td>$-647.38$</td>
<td>$67.75$</td>
<td>$(78.52, 51.64)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho = 0.02$</td>
<td>$-16.92$</td>
<td>$-175.12$</td>
<td>$77.00$</td>
<td>$(76.21, 49.39)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho = 0.08$</td>
<td>$-33.45$</td>
<td>$-46.19$</td>
<td>$67.04$</td>
<td>$(78.79, 53.92)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho = 0.10$</td>
<td>$-14.18$</td>
<td>$-73.90$</td>
<td>$75.95$</td>
<td>$(75.06, 50.24)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\eta = 1.0$</td>
<td>$-51.78$</td>
<td>$-73.90$</td>
<td>$67.71$</td>
<td>$(77.50, 53.88)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\eta = 3.0$</td>
<td>$-123.62$</td>
<td>$-146.87$</td>
<td>$0.00^*$</td>
<td>$(0.00, 0.00)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$A = 0.5$</td>
<td>$12.98$</td>
<td>$-25.48$</td>
<td>$77.32$</td>
<td>$(76.63, 49.11)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$A = 2.0$</td>
<td>$-57.54$</td>
<td>$-73.90$</td>
<td>$0.00^*$</td>
<td>$(0.00, 0.00)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$L = 2.0$</td>
<td>$-14.53$</td>
<td>$-73.90$</td>
<td>$75.90$</td>
<td>$(75.01, 50.28)$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The numbers with * indicate that for these parameterizations, there do not exist welfare-maximizing mixes of subsidies that can induce R&D investment.
We now consider whether there is any first-best combination of \( (s_n, s_f) \) financed by a labor income tax at rate \( \tau \) and a consumption tax at rate \( \tau_c \). The government budget constraint becomes
\[
\tau_c L_c + L w(1-l) \tau = s_n \eta \gamma^* N + s_f Y,
\]
and accordingly the household budget constraint is given by
\[
\dot{a} = a r + w(1-l)(1-\tau) - c(1+\tau_c).
\]
The equilibrium solution is given by
\[
l = \frac{\varepsilon \eta \rho (\alpha A)^{-\varepsilon/(1-\varepsilon)} + \varepsilon A L \theta (1-z) - (1-z)/(1-s_n)}{\varepsilon A L \theta (1-z) - (1-z)/(1-s_n) + A L \theta (1-z)(1-\tau)/[z(1+\tau_c)]},
\]
\[
X = \Gamma L(1-l),
\]
\[
\gamma = \frac{(1-z)X}{(1-s_n)\gamma^* \theta} - \frac{\rho}{\theta}.
\]
To achieve the first-best outcome in a decentralized equilibrium (i.e., \( l = l_{sp} \), \( X = X_{sp} \) and \( \gamma = \gamma_{sp} \)), we must satisfy the following three conditions:
(A) \( s_f = (1-z)/\alpha \);  
(B) \( s_n = 0 \);  
(C) \( 1-\tau = \alpha(1+\tau_c) \).

To be feasible, conditions (A)–(C) must also meet the government budget balance:
\[
(D) \quad \tau = \frac{l_{sp} - \varepsilon(1-l_{sp}) - \alpha l_{sp}}{l_{sp} - \varepsilon(1-l_{sp})} < 1.
\]
Note that, to be incentive compatible, the labor income tax rate should be less than 1, i.e., \( \tau < 1 \). Under these restrictions, the first best can never be achieved as shown below:

**Proposition 6.** No combination of \((s_f, s_h, \tau, \tau_c)\) can achieve the first-best outcome for \( \tau < 1 \).

**Proof.** By (D), whether there exists any labor income tax rate less than 1 such that conditions (A)–(D) hold depends on the sign of \( l_{sp} - \varepsilon(1 - l_{sp}) \). If \( l_{sp} - \varepsilon(1 - l_{sp}) < 0 \), then \( \tau > 1 \) under condition (D). Now, suppose \( l_{sp} - \varepsilon(1 - l_{sp}) > 0 \). Combining this with the solution for \( l_{sp} \), we have: \( \alpha(1 + \varepsilon)\eta \rho > (\alpha A)^{1/(1-\varepsilon)} L(1 - \alpha) \). Also, note that \( \gamma_{sp} \geq 0 \) has to hold in this model since the worse growth performance is not to innovate at all (zero growth). That is, we have \( (\alpha A)^{1/(1-\varepsilon)} L(1 - l_{sp})(1 - \alpha) \geq \rho \gamma \eta \).

Combining the above two conditions yields

\[
(1 + \varepsilon) \rho > \frac{(\alpha A)^{1/(1-\varepsilon)} L(1 - \alpha)}{\alpha \eta} \geq \frac{\rho}{1 - l_{sp}},
\]

which implies that \( l_{sp} - \varepsilon(1 - l_{sp}) < 0 \), reaching a contradiction. \( \Box \)

From this proposition, we can see that the optimal combination of subsidies in Proposition 5 is only the second best. This result is illustrated quantitatively by the simulation results in Tables 3 and 4 in which the numerical solutions for the social planner’s problem are also provided. The result here is in sharp contrast with that in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) in which using the production subsidy alone (or a subsidy to the purchase of intermediate goods) can induce the decentralized equilibrium to achieve the social optimum with a lump-sum tax. As they speculated, once the subsidy has to be financed by distortionary taxes, the social optimum may not be achievable.

5. Conclusion

We have examined the growth and welfare implications of various subsidies by extending a standard R&D growth model to incorporate elastic labor supply and distortionary taxes. The results differ substantially from those in the literature. With inelastic labor supply and lump-sum taxes in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), the social optimum can be attained by subsidizing either final output or the purchase of intermediate products. However, in our model none of the subsidies can achieve the social optimum, because in the presence of the R&D externality they cannot bring leisure down to its socially optimal level, although they all simulate R&D investment and growth. Also, in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), subsidizing either final output or the purchase of intermediate goods is definitely better than subsidizing R&D investment, as the former, not the latter, can achieve the social optimum. In our model, which type of the subsidies leads to a higher welfare level is unclear and depends on parameterizations; in particular, the R&D subsidy is more effective in promoting growth and may obtain higher welfare levels than the other forms of subsidies. The possibility that the R&D subsidy is better than the other subsidies is
largely due to the labor – leisure trade-off and their different requirements for tax revenue in our model. Moreover, in our approach mixing the two types of subsidies does better than using them in separation in maximizing welfare.

Also different from the literature are the policy implications of our results given the real-world tax system that consists of mainly income and consumption taxes. If growth is a chief concern as in many nations, subsidizing R&D is surely better than subsidizing either final output or the purchase of intermediate goods. Even if social welfare is the sole criterion, our results are not against the common practice of subsidizing R&D investment as observed in industrial nations, since the R&D subsidy can still improve on a decentralized equilibrium with or without other forms of subsidies.

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Appendix A

Proof of Proposition 2. To see the response of $\gamma(s_f)$ to a change in $s_f$, we differentiate (34) with respect to $s_f$. Then we have: $\text{sign } \gamma'(s_f) = \text{sign } \Phi(s_f)$, where

$$
\Phi(s_f) \equiv \frac{x\eta(\Gamma L[1 - x(1 + s_f)]/1 + s_f) - z[(1 - z)\Gamma L - x\eta\rho] + ex^2\eta\rho}{\eta[1 - x(1 + s_f)] + \epsilon x[1 - x^2(1 + s_f)] - ex(1 - x)(1 + s_f)} + \frac{\epsilon^2 \eta[(1 - x)\Gamma L - x\eta\rho][1 - z(1 + s_f)] - \epsilon x\eta(1 - x)^2(1 + s_f)]}{\eta + \epsilon x\theta + \epsilon(1 - z)}.
$$

When $s_f = 0$, we have: $\Phi(0) = x\eta\Gamma L(1 - x)^2[\epsilon(\theta - x)(1 - x) + \epsilon x(1 - x) + \theta(1 + \epsilon x)] - \epsilon x^2\epsilon^3 \rho(1 + \epsilon)(1 - x)$. For any meaningful solution, we must have $\gamma(s_f) \geq 0$ at $s_f = 0$, which can usually be guaranteed by a small enough $\rho$, implying $(1 - x)\Gamma L \geq x\eta\rho[1 + \epsilon(1 + x)]$ by (34). Substituting this into $\Phi(0)$ and noting that the coefficient on $\Gamma L$ is positive under $\theta \geq x$, we have $\Phi(0) \geq \rho x^2\eta^2(1 - x)\epsilon(1 - x) + 1 + 2\epsilon x + \epsilon^2 x^2 > 0$. We then show $\gamma'(s_f) < 0$ at a high level of $s_f$. Suppose $s_f = (1 - x)/(2 - x)$ such that $\tau = 1$. It is obvious by (22) that $\gamma(s_f)$ cannot be positive at such a level of $s_f$, starting with any $\gamma(s_f) > 0$ for $s_f = 0$. Thus, $\gamma'(s_f) < 0$ must occur before $s_f$ is raised to the level $(1 - x)/(2 - x)$. So $\gamma'(s_f) = 0$ must hold for some $s_f > 0$. Since

$$
\text{sign } \Phi'(s_f) = \text{sign } \frac{\Gamma L}{x\eta} \left\{ \frac{1 - z(1 + s_f) - (1 - x)[1 + z(1 + s_f)]}{\eta(1 - x)x^2(1 + s_f)^2} \right\}
$$

$$
= \text{sign } \{-z[zs_f + (1 - x)(1 + s_f)]<0,
$$
\( \Phi(s_f) \) is monotonically decreasing in \( s_f \) and thus the solution for \( \Phi(s_f) = 0 \) is unique.

Thus, for \( \theta \leq x \) and a small enough \( \rho \) (such that \( \gamma > 0 \), \( \gamma \) is globally concave with respect to \( s_f \) and reaches a maximum level at \( 0 < s_f < \infty \). □

**Proof of Proposition 3.** We set \( s_f = 0 \) and use (22) and (23) to rewrite the growth rate in terms of both the R&D subsidy \( s_n \) and the tax rate \( \tau \):

\[
\gamma(s_n) = \frac{[(1 - z)\Gamma L/(x\eta) - (1 - s_n)\rho](1 - \tau) - \varepsilon \rho(1 + z)(1 - s_n)}{\theta(1 - s_n)(1 - \tau) + \varepsilon \theta(1 + z)(1 - s_n) - \varepsilon z},
\]

(50)

where \( \tau \) satisfies

\[
\tau = \frac{y_g s_n}{(1 - s_n)(\theta \gamma + \rho)}.
\]

Substituting it into (50) for \( \tau \) and differentiating the resulting equation with respect to \( s_n \), we obtain \( \gamma'(s_n) = A_1 / A_2 \), where

\[
A_1 \equiv x\eta \theta[\theta \gamma + x \gamma + \rho](1 - s_n) + x\eta \gamma \theta[(1 - s_n)(\theta \gamma + \rho) - x \gamma s_n] \\
+ \gamma x\eta \varepsilon \theta(1 + z)(1 - s_n)(\theta \gamma + \rho) + \gamma x\eta [\varepsilon \theta(1 + z)(1 - s_n) - \varepsilon z](\theta \gamma + \rho) \\
- (1 - x)\Gamma L(\theta \gamma + x \gamma + \rho) + x\eta \rho[(1 - s_n)(\theta \gamma + \rho) - x \gamma s_n] \\
+ x\eta \rho(1 - s_n)(\theta \gamma + x \gamma + \rho) + 2x\eta \rho(1 + z)(1 - s_n)(\theta \gamma + \rho),
\]

\[
A_2 \equiv x\eta \theta(1 - s_n)[(1 - s_n)(\theta \gamma + \rho) - x \gamma s_n] + x\eta \gamma \theta(1 - s_n)[(1 - s_n)\theta - x s_n] \\
+ x\eta(1 - s_n)[\varepsilon \theta(1 + z)(1 - s_n) - \varepsilon z](\theta \gamma + \rho) + x\eta \gamma \theta(1 - s_n) \\
x[\varepsilon \theta(1 + z)(1 - s_n) - \varepsilon z] - (1 - x)\Gamma L[\theta(1 - s_n) - x s_n] \\
+ x\eta \rho(1 - s_n)[\theta(1 - s_n) - x s_n] + x\eta \rho \theta(1 + z)(1 - s_n)^2.
\]

By \( 1 - \tau = [(1 - s_n)(\theta \gamma + \rho) - x \gamma s_n] / [(1 - s_n)(\theta \gamma + \rho)] \), it is clear that \( 1 - \tau = 1 \) if \( s_n = 0 \) and that if \( s_n = 1 \) then \( 1 - \tau \leq 0 \) for any non-negative \( \gamma \). Using (50) to express \( (1 - z)\Gamma L = x\eta \gamma \theta(1 - s_n)(1 - \tau) + \varepsilon \theta(1 + z)(1 - s_n) - \varepsilon z) / (1 - \tau) + \varepsilon x\eta \rho(1 + z)(1 - s_n) / (1 - \tau) + x\eta \rho(1 - s_n) \). Substituting \( (1 - z)\Gamma L \) in \( A_1 \) and \( A_2 \), we have: if \( s_n = 0 \) and if \( \theta \geq x \), then \( A_1, A_2 > 0 \), leading to \( \gamma'(s_n) > 0 \). If \( s_n = 1 \), then \( \gamma \) cannot be positive by (50) and by the expression of \( (1 - \tau) \). Thus, starting with \( s_n = 0 \) and any positive \( \gamma \), \( \gamma'(s_n) < 0 \) must occur before \( s_n \) rises to 1. Thus, \( \gamma'(s_n) = 0 \) for some \( s_n > 0 \).

The rest of the proof is to show that \( \Phi'(s_n) < 0 \), paralleling the proof of Proposition 2.

From (35), we have: \( \text{sign } \gamma'(s_n) = \text{sign } \Phi(s_n) \), where

\[
\Phi(s_n) \equiv \Psi_1(s_n)[\Psi_2(s_n)^2 - 4\Psi_1(s_n)\Psi_3(s_n)]^{-1/2} \\
\times [\Psi_2(s_n)^4 - 2\Psi_3(s_n)\Psi_1(s_n)\Psi'_3(s_n) - 2\Psi_1(s_n)\Psi'_3(s_n)] - \Psi_1(s_n)\Psi'_2(s_n) \\
- ([\Psi_2(s_n)^2 - 4\Psi_1(s_n)\Psi_3(s_n)]^{1/2} - \Psi_2(s_n))\Psi'_1(s_n).
\]

(51)
From (51), we have

\[ \text{sign } \Phi'(s_n) = \text{sign}[\Psi_2(s_n)^2 - 4\Psi_1(s_n)\Psi_3(s_n)]^{-1/2}[\Psi_2'(s_n)^2 + \Psi_2(s_n)\Psi_2''(s_n) - 4\Psi_1'(s_n)\Psi_3'(s_n)] \]

\[ - \Psi_3''(s_n) - [\Psi_2'(s_n)^2 - 4\Psi_1'(s_n)\Psi_3'(s_n)]^{-3/2} \times [\Psi_2'(s_n)\Psi_2''(s_n) - 2\Psi_3'(s_n)\Psi_1'(s_n) - 2\Psi_1'(s_n)\Psi_3''(s_n)], \]

(52)

where

\[ \Psi_1'(s_n) = -\theta[\theta[1 + \varepsilon(1 + \alpha)] + \alpha] < 0, \]

\[ \Psi_2'(s_n) = \frac{(1 - \alpha)L(x^2_A)^{1/(1-\alpha)}}{L(1 - s_n)^2} - \frac{\alpha\rho s_n}{1 - s_n} - 2\theta[1 + \varepsilon(1 + \alpha)], \]

\[ \Psi_2''(s_n) = \frac{2(1 - \alpha)L(x^2_A)^{1/(1-\alpha)}}{L(1 - s_n)^3} - \frac{\alpha\rho}{(1 - s_n)^2} + \frac{\alpha\rho}{(1 - s_n)^2}, \]

\[ \Psi_3'(s_n) = -\rho^2[1 + \varepsilon(1 + \alpha)] < 0. \]

Substituting \( \Psi_k(s_n), k = 1, 2, 3, \) and their derivatives into (52), we have: if \( \rho \) is sufficiently small, then \( \Phi'(s_n) < 0 \), i.e., \( \Phi(s_n) \) is monotonically decreasing in \( s_n \). \( \square \)

**Appendix B. Derivation of Eq. (42)**

We use (41) to write an implicit solution for leisure in (25) as a function of \( (s_f, s_n) \), i.e., \( l(s_f, s_n) \):

\[ lAL[\varepsilon\theta(1 - s_n)[1 - x^2(1 + s_f)]/x - \varepsilon(1 - \alpha)(1 + s_f) + \theta(1 - s_n)[1 - x(1 + s_f)]/x \]

\[ - s_n(1 + s_f)(1 - \alpha) + \frac{L\varepsilon s_n\alpha\rho(1 + s_f)(1 - s_n)}{(1 - l)^2} \]

\[ = \eta\varepsilon(1 - s_n)\theta(1 - s_n)[1 - x^2(1 + s_f)]/x - \varepsilon\eta\alpha\varepsilon AL[\theta(1 - s_n)[1 - x^2(1 + s_f)]/x - (1 - \alpha)(1 + s_f)]. \]

(53)

From (53), we derive \( \partial l/\partial s_f = \Omega_1^{SF}/\Omega_2^{SF} \) and \( \partial l/\partial s_n = \Omega_1^{SN}/\Omega_2^{SN} \), where

\[ \Omega_1^{SF} \equiv \varepsilon AL[\varepsilon\theta(1 - s_n)[1 - x^2(1 + s_f)]/x + \theta(1 - s_n)[1 - x(1 + s_f)]/x \]

\[ + \frac{L\varepsilon s_n\alpha\rho(1 + s_f)(1 - s_n)}{(1 - l)^2} - \varepsilon\eta\alpha\varepsilon AL[\theta(1 - s_n)[1 - x^2(1 + s_f)]/x - (1 - \alpha)(1 + s_f)]. \]

\[ \Omega_2^{SF} \equiv AL[\varepsilon\theta(1 - s_n)[1 - x]/x + \theta(1 - s_n)[1 - x(1 + s_f)]/x \]

\[ - (\varepsilon + s_n)(1 - \alpha)(1 + s_f) + \frac{A\rho\varepsilon s_n(1 - s_n)\varepsilon(1 + s_f)}{(1 - l)^2}, \]
Based on the solution for $U_0$ in (26) and the expression for $\tau$ in (41), the utility-maximizing problem of the government by choice of $(\tau, s_f, s_n)$ subject to its constraint in (41) is equivalent to choosing $(s_f, s_n)$ to maximize (42).

References